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ABSTRACT
This thesis investigated the role of the amygdala in social cognition by examining 
variability in social-perceptual abilities within the normal population and via experiments 
with individuals who have Asperger’s syndrome (AS).
I found that a significant proportion of men from the general population had a fear 
recognition deficit akin to that seen in patients with bilateral amygdala lesion and that 
poor fear recognition was associated with poor theory of mind ability and with reduced 
activation of the amygdala and associated areas of the ‘social brain’. Further experiments 
suggested a mechanism for these impairments - reduced fixation of the eye region of the 
face -  similar to that exhibited by patient SM, who has suffered bilateral amygdala 
damage.
Overall, I found that AS subjects also had a fear recognition deficit when compared with 
matched controls. However, there was great variability in responses, with scores ranging 
from normal to severely impaired. Again, an eyetracking experiment showed that low 
fear recognition was related to a reduced amount of time spent fixating the eyes. 
Informed by recent neurodevelopmental models of amygdala involvement in autistic- 
spectrum disorders, I conducted psychological, neurophysiological and neuroanatomical 
experiments in order to examine the cause of this failure to attend to the eyes in some AS 
subjects. As a whole, the findings support a ‘hyper-active amygdala model’, in which 
social stimuli induce an aversive level of arousal and so are avoided. I suggest that 
inattention to social stimuli, which could have a number of possible aetiologies, might be 
at the heart of a general route to social cognitive impairment, which could be shared by 
several distinct populations.
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Chapter 1 - Introduction
The architecture of the mind and brain -  modules
The idea that the mind is organised into modules, splitting cognitive processes into 
smaller, somewhat independent and specialised sub-processes, has been central to 
cognitive science almost since the inception of the discipline. Marr considered it to be so 
important that he was moved to “elevate it to a principle, the principle of modular design” 
(Marr, 1982, pg. 102). There is considerable evidence that a modular design of the mind 
is to some degree reflected in the neural architecture of the brain. For example, focal 
brain damage can result in impairments within specific perceptual categories or subtypes 
of cognitive process. Damage to the amygdala, for instance, prevents fear conditioning 
despite the fact that subjects retain declarative knowledge of the conditioned- 
unconditioned stimulus contingencies, whereas hippocampal lesion produces the opposite 
effect (Bechara et al., 1995). Such ‘double dissociations’ bolster the claim that different 
neural systems support different computational sub-specialisations.
There is currently much debate over the nature of modularity, a full treatment of which is 
beyond the scope of this thesis. What, for example, are the necessary criteria for an area 
of cognition to be considered a module (Coltheart, 1999)? Even more hotly debated are 
the processes by which modularity comes about: to what extent are modules in the adult 
mind or brain genetically determined and to what extent do they emerge through patterns 
of developmental experience (Geary and Huffman, 2002)? Whatever the outcome of 
these arguments, it seems clear that cognition is often split into sub-processes, 
implemented by neural systems evolved to be somewhat specialised in their particular 
brand of information processing.
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Evolution, social cognition and the concept of a 
social cognitive ‘module’
From an evolutionary perspective, living in groups is adaptive in that it can provide better 
security from predators, better mate choice and more access to food. On the other hand, it 
gives rise to the possibility of within-group competition for resources. One solution to 
these opposing evolutionary pressures can be seen in the rigid, eusocial behaviour 
demonstrated by insects, such as ants or bees. Another solution is exemplified by 
primates, and especially humans, who are imbued with the mental capacity to engage in 
cooperation and altruism as well as coercion, manipulation and deception. Social 
cognition refers to the mental processes that make such complex and flexible interactions 
possible. These include, for example, the ability to recognise a conspecific and their place 
in one’s social network, as well as more complex matters, such as reasoning about the 
content of other’s thoughts, feelings and desires (see Adolphs, 1999a; Adolphs, 2001; 
Cacioppo et al., 2002 for further discussion).
Given the strong evolutionary pressure, several theorists have suggested that humans 
have evolved a special purpose cognitive system (i.e. a module) to subserve social 
behaviour (e.g. Brothers, 1990; Karmiloff-Smith et al., 1995). Following Gardner (1983), 
behavioural evidence for the existence of a social cognitive module usually takes the 
form of demonstrating:
a) an evolutionary history to social cognitive abilities, usually via behavioural work 
with primates
b) the existence of persons with a selective absence of social cognitive ability or, 
conversely, with spared social cognition in the presence of impairments in other 
cognitive areas
22
I will briefly review evidence relating to these factors below.
Social cognition in prim ates
There is a large literature demonstrating sophisticated cognitive processing of social 
signals by non-human primates (for reviews, see Byrne and Whiten, 1988;Call, 
2001;Whiten and Byrne, 1997). For example, there is much evidence that monkeys and 
apes are able to use information about the direction of a conspecific’s gaze (Emery, 2000). 
Importantly, studies have shown that gaze following can not simply be explained by low- 
level mechanisms, such as ‘turn in the direction others are oriented and search until you 
find something interesting’, as some have suggested (Povinelli and Eddy, 1996). For 
example, chimpanzees who saw a human experimenter looking above and behind them 
ignored a distractor object presented to them when they turned around (Tomasello et al.,
1999). Furthermore, the same chimpanzees follow gaze around barriers by moving to 
new locations where their view is unhindered. It seems, therefore, that chimpanzees 
understand that their informants are looking at something specific in a particular location.
Call and colleagues have published a series of studies where a subordinate and a 
dominate individual compete over two pieces of food placed in a cage, which nicely 
demonstrate the sophistication of primate social cognition (Hare et al., 2001;Menzel, 
1973;Menzel, 1974). Subordinates preferentially approached food that was hidden from 
the dominates gaze (behind an opaque barrier) but this preference disappeared when the 
barrier was made transparent -  seemingly because they recognised that the transparent 
barrier was not serving to block the dominant’s visual access to the food. Other 
experiments showed that subordinates preferentially approached food that dominates had
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not seen been hidden, or which had been moved when the dominates were not watching. 
Finally, when a dominant who had seen the food been hidden was switched for a new 
dominant who had not, subordinates retrieved more food than they did when the 
dominant was not switched. Together, these experiments demonstrate that chimpanzees 
can extract knowledge from their experiences and use it to solve social problems.
However, the precise nature of this knowledge is still uncertain. For example, it may be 
that non-human primates are able to have insight into the subjective experience of their 
social partners, that is they may have a theory of mind similar to that of humans (Whiten,
2000). On the other hand, while non-human primates might attribute seeing, wanting and 
expecting to conspecifics, they may not be able to understand that the belief others hold 
about things can be different from their own and from reality (Call, 2001). Teasing apart 
these possibilities will be a difficult task but can potentially provide a fascinating insight 
into the evolution of our own social-cognitive abilities.
Selective ab sen ce  of social cognitive ability -  autistic-spectrum  
disorders
Autistic-spectrum disorders (ASDs) are pervasive developmental disorders characterised 
by deficits in communication, the presence of stereotypic or repetitive behaviours and 
impairments in social interaction (DSM-IV, American Psychiatry Association, 1994). 
There are three major sub-types: autism, Asperger’s Syndrome (AS) and Pervasive 
Developmental Disorder Not Otherwise Specified (PD-NOS). AS and autism are 
differentiated by the lack of a language delay in the former, whereas PD-NOS is reserved 
for when autistic symptoms are apparent but do not meet the full criteria for the other 
categories. The shared phenotype of the sub-types of ASDs suggests common
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neurobiological and genetic mechanisms (Schultz et al., 2000b;Volkmar et al., 2004) and 
it is common for them to be considered as one.
Of the three areas of difficulty apparent in ASD, deficits in social cognition are generally 
considered to be the most definitive and compelling (Grelotti et al., 2002). Individuals 
with an ASD have significant difficulty with social interactions; they can be somewhat 
unaware of social norms and have difficulties establishing social relationships with others 
(Volkmar et al., 1994). Crucially for the argument of a social cognitive ‘module’, these 
impairments can be demonstrated in the absence of a general cognitive deficit.
One prominent psychological account of ASD is that those with the condition lack a 
‘theory of mind”, that is, the capacity for conceiving of other people’s and one’s own 
mind (Baron-Cohen et al., 1985). Individuals with an ASD have difficulty in making 
attributions of mental states to others and to themselves, thought to result in an inability 
to construct a social world that is guided by intentions, desires and beliefs (for review, see 
Baron-Cohen et al., 2000b).
Affected individuals show deficits on a myriad of tasks which tap into social-perceptual 
and social-cognitive abilities (Cohen and Volkmar, 1997). Of these, problems with face 
processing are particularly pervasive (Grelotti et al., 2002). Failure to make eye contact 
and inattention to faces were noted in Kanner’s (1943) original description of the disorder. 
Modem eye-tracking equipment has confirmed that adults with an ASD fixate the face, 
and particularly the eye region, less than do normal controls (Dalton et al., 2005;Klin et 
al., 2002;Pelphrey et al., 2002). These abnormalities are present from an early age: in a 
retrospective study of the first birthday parties of 11 children with autism and 11 typically 
developing controls, the children with autism showed significantly less interest in the
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faces of other people, as well as being less likely to show objects to other people or to 
orient to someone calling their name (Osterling and Dawson, 1994). Individuals with an 
ASD appear to perceive faces in a feature-based rather than a configural manner, shown 
for example by their failure to demonstrate an ‘inversion effect’ (Hobson et al., 
1988b;Langdell, 1978). As configural processing of a stimulus is associated with 
experience and expertise, autistics are sometimes considered to be face ‘in-experts’ 
(Grelotti et al., 2002). There are reports that those with an ASD are poor at recognising 
emotion from faces (Hobson et al., 1988a;Hobson et al., 1989) and that this might be 
specific to negative emotions such as fear (Howard et al., 2000;Pelphrey et al., 2002). 
However, this remains a controversial issue with a number of negative findings (Castelli, 
2005;0zonoff et al., 1990). The emotion recognition deficits seen in ASD and their 
implication for neurocognitive models of social cognition are explored in more depth in a 
later section.
Selective sparing of social cognitive ability -  Williams syndrom e
Williams syndrome is caused by a deletion of a set of genes on chromosome 7 and results 
in an unusual facial morphology, heart abnormalities and an intriguing cognitive profile 
(see Bellugi and St George, 2000, for review). Although the subjects have generally low 
IQ and are severely impaired in visuospatial processing, they appear remarkably able 
socially (Karmiloff-Smith et al., 1995). They are able to perform many social tasks, 
including linguistic ones, normally and in fact often appear hypersocial in terms of their 
interaction with adults. Many suggest the disease provides something close to the 
converse of ASD (Bellugi and St George, 2000) and is therefore considered to be an 
example of selective sparing of social cognitive ability in the presence of deficits in other 
areas of cognition.
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Summary
The evidence discussed in this section demonstrates an evolutionary history to human 
social cognitive ability and provides examples of persons with both a selective absence of 
social cognitive ability and spared ability in the presence of other cognitive impairments. 
There is therefore converging support for the notion of a social cognitive module of the 
mind. The next section explores how this module may be implemented within the neural 
architecture of the brain.
The neurobiology of social cognition
It has long been supposed that the social cognitive module is embodied in a network of 
brain regions, specialised for processing social information. In her seminal review, 
Brothers (1990) draws mainly upon work on single cell recordings in non-human 
primates to outline such a network, consisting of the amygdala, temporal cortex and 
anterior cingulate cortex. To this she later adds the orbitofrontal cortex (Brothers, 1997). 
In the years since, this model has been built upon and refined (for reviews, see Adolphs, 
1999a; Adolphs, 2001). In most constructs the model consists of areas thought to identify 
(perceive) socially relevant stimuli, such as faces or emotional expressions (e.g. the 
fusiform gyrus and the superior temporal gyrus), areas to attach emotional, social or 
motivational significance to such stimuli (e.g. the amygdala) and areas believed to engage 
in social reasoning (e.g. the prefrontal cortex). Recent work has added the concept of a 
specific “theory of mind” network, specialised for understanding the mental states of 
others (Gallagher and Frith, 2003), as well as the idea of a mirror neuron system, aiding 
the understanding of other’s behaviour through simulation (Blakemore and Frith, 2005). 
Below, I will briefly review the evidence linking each area of this network to social 
cognition.
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Fusiform cortex
Numerous neuroimaging studies have found that an area of the fusiform cortex responds 
to faces more than to visual stimuli of other categories (e.g. Kanwisher et al., 
1997;McCarthy et al., 1997). Although there is a debate regarding the degree to which 
this area of cortex is specifically specialised for face perception (Kanwisher, 2000;Tarr 
and Gauthier, 2000), the robustness of the effect is such that the area has become known 
as the ‘fusiform face area’ (FFA). Experiments that vary which properties of the face are 
attended to (Hoffman and Haxby, 2000), or examine which neural areas show adaptation 
when a stimulus property is repeated (Gauthier et al., 2000;Winston et al., 2004), suggest 
that the FFA analyses the identity of the person to which the face belongs.
Superior tem poral su lcus and surrounding cortex
The area comprising of the superior temporal sulcus (STS) and surrounding gyri was first 
thought to have a role in social cognition following electrophysiological recordings in 
non-human primates, which found single neurons responsive, in a relatively selective 
manner, to faces (e.g. Perrett et al., 1982). Further work found cells in monkey STS 
responsive to head or gaze direction (Perrett et al., 1985b) and to body (Perrett et al., 
1985a), and even specific hand, movements (Perrett et al., 1986).
In humans, neuroimaging studies have found analogous regions to be involved in 
processing gaze direction (Calder et al., 2002; Hoffman and Haxby, 2000) as well as 
biological motion: including body movements (Bonda et al., 1996;Grossman and Blake, 
2001;Senior et al., 2000), hand movements (Grezes et al., 1999;Grezes and Costes, 1998) 
and mouth movements (Calvert et al., 1997;Puce et al., 1998). This is true even when the 
movement is relatively abstract, as in the case of point light displays (Bonda et al.,
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1996;Vaina et al., 2001), of enactment by geometrical shapes imitating purposeful 
movement (Schultz et al., 2003) and when movement is merely implied, as in a static 
image of a moving person (Kourtzi and Kanwisher, 2000). In addition, the STS has often 
been shown to be responsive to the emotional expression of faces (e.g. Narumoto et al., 
2001;Winston et al., 2003a;Winston et al., 2004).
Together, these findings suggest the STS has a primary role in the initial perception and 
analysis of visual social cues. However, recent work has shown an even broader role for 
the human STS -  namely in the process of ‘mentalizing’ whereby one infers the beliefs, 
feelings or intentions of others. For example, Gallagher et al. (2000) found STS activity 
to be associated with understanding the meaning of stories or cartoons. Other 
neuroimaging experiments using theory of mind tasks have found STS activity when 
people attribute intentions to the movements of geometric shapes (Castelli et al., 2000) or 
when taking the self-perspective (Vogeley et al., 2001). Incorporating the latter findings, 
Frith and Frith (1999) suggest that the STS is involved in the detection of the behaviour 
of agents and the analysis of the goals and outcomes of this behaviour.
Anterior superior tem poral su lcus and gyrus
In general, the neuroimaging studies described above report activation confined to the 
posterior two-thirds of the STS and surrounding gyri (see Gallagher and Frith, 2003; and 
Puce and Perrett, 2003, figure 3). However, the role of the anterior third of this area (or, 
at least, of the superior temporal gyrus, roughly BA 22) has been implicated in social 
cognition by two recent neuroimaging studies. Both Calder et al. (2002) and Wicker et al. 
(2003) found activation in the anterior superior temporal gyrus (STGa) when they 
compared direct to averted gaze. Furthermore, the data reported by Wicker et al. (2002)
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suggests that the STGa may be selectively involved in the reading of emotion from the 
eyes when focussed directly on the viewer.
Amygdala
The amygdala has long been associated with social and emotional processing (Adolphs, 
1999b). Recent theories stress its role as a ‘salience detector’: monitoring sensory input 
for stimuli of high emotional or social relevance (e.g. Sander et al., 2003). Thus, in terms 
of the social brain network, the amygdala is thought to apply emotional significance to 
social stimuli perceived by, for example, the FFA and STS (e.g. Adolphs, 2001). The 
amygdala is then thought to be able to modulate attention, memory and reasoning, thus 
influencing current and future behaviour in light of the salient stimulus (Dolan, 2002).
The role of the amygdala in social cognition is central to this thesis and will be 
considered in depth in subsequent sections.
Temporal poles
In primates, the temporal poles are generally associated with object and face recognition 
(Nakamura and Kubota, 1996). However, in humans, neuroimaging experiments have 
activated these regions during tasks requiring retrieval of episodic memories. For 
example, the temporal poles are active during the recollection of familiar faces and 
scenes (Nakamura et al., 2000), the recognition of familiar voices (Nakamura et al., 2001), 
autobiographical memory retrieval (Fink et al., 1996) and emotional memory retrieval 
(Dolan et al., 2000). Furthermore, the temporal poles are one of a number of regions 
consistently activated in theory of mind reasoning (Gallagher and Frith, 2003). On the
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basis of these data, Gallagher and Frith (2003) suggest that the temporal poles are a store 
for semantic and episodic memories and are engaged in this regard during mentalizing 
(where, for example, memory of past interactions could aid in an analysis of someone’s 
current intentions). Interestingly, in an fMRI study by Kampe et al. (2003) subjects 
activated the temporal poles both when someone looked directly at them and when their 
name was called, suggesting this region is also involved in processing signals of 
communicative intent.
Prefrontal cortices
The famous case of Phineas Gage first highlighted the role of the prefrontal cortex in 
social cognition (Damasio et al., 1994). Previously a polite, socially adept person, Gage 
changed dramatically following damage to his frontal lobe, becoming uncaring, profane 
and socially inappropriate. Studies by Damasio and colleagues (Damasio, 1994;Eslinger 
and Damasio, 1985) have confirmed this finding and pinpointed the orbitofrontal cortex 
as being crucial to adaptive social functioning. Patients with damage to this region 
demonstrate a diminished capacity to respond to punishment, stereotyped and 
occasionally inappropriate social manners and a lack of concern for others. Early 
orbitofrontal damage can impair social and moral reasoning later in life (Anderson et al., 
1999), which is consistent with neuroimaging findings that show this area to be active 
when subjects make moral judgments (Moll et al., 2002a;Moll et al., 2002b).
An area of medial prefrontal cortex (more accurately, the anterior paracingulate cortex), 
roughly corresponding to Brodmann area 9 or 32, is considered play a major part in the so 
called ‘theory of mind network (see below). Not only is it consistently active in 
neuroimaging studies using theory of mind tasks but it appears to be the only part of this
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network that is activated specifically to mentalising (Gallagher and Frith, 2003). 
Furthermore, two well-controlled experiments, in which the only difference between the 
mentalising and control conditions was the subject’s belief about whether they were 
playing a human or computer, found activation only in the anterior paracingulate cortex 
(Gallagher et al., 2002;McCabe et al., 2001).
The theory of mind network
As alluded to above, three regions have consistently been associated with theory of mind 
processing during neuroimaging studies, namely: the anterior paracingulate gyrus, the 
superior temporal sulcus and the temporal poles. In a series of reviews, Frith and 
colleagues (Frith and Frith, 1999;Frith, 2001;Gallagher and Frith, 2003) have suggested 
specific roles for each of these areas within a dedicated theory of mind network. The 
anterior paracingulate gyrus is seen as the key region for mentalising; it is the centre of 
the reasoning needed to determine an agent’s mental state. The other two regions of the 
network are thought to aid in this process by providing information relevant to the 
reasoning -  the STS analyses cues from an agent’s body movements or changing facial 
features, while the temporal poles provide relevant memories of past social encounters.
It should be noted that, as yet, the evidence for this network as a ‘mentalising system’ is 
based almost entirely on neuroimaging findings. Lesion and other studies are sparse. In 
fact, a lesion study has shown that extensive damage to the anterior paracingulate gyrus 
does not necessarily result in impairments on theory of mind tasks (Bird et al., 2004).
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The mirror neuron system
The pre-motor areas of non-human primates have been shown to have so called ‘mirror 
neurons’, cells which respond both when a monkey performs an action and when that 
monkey observes the same action by another (Gallese et al., 1996;Rizzolatti et al., 1996). 
Neuroimaging studies have provided evidence of analogous activity in human premotor 
regions and it has been suggested that such activity could represent an attempt to 
understand and predict another’s actions through simulation of the neural processing that 
would be required to perform those actions (Blakemore and Frith, 2005). This notion of 
understanding through simulation has been extended to the social and emotional domains, 
where it is linked with the somatosensory regions (Adolphs, 1999a;Adolphs, 2001). For 
example, damage within the right somatosensory cortices impairs the judgment of other 
people’s emotional states from their faces (Adolphs et al., 2000a). In particular, lesion 
and neuroimaging studies converge to implicate the insula in both the experience and 
recognition of disgust (e.g. Calder et al., 2000; Wright et al., 2004).
Social cognitive stimuli
The key sensory channels used by most mammals for social communication are olfaction 
and touch: rat mothers, for example, recognise their pups by smell (Hauser and Konishi, 
1996). In most primates, however, it is the visual system that is most commonly involved 
in the perception of social stimuli. Some authors even suggest that the increased reliance 
on visual signals in primates has been driven by increases in the sophistication of social 
interactions. When it comes to complex interactions involving, for example, deception or 
cooperation, it is proposed that visual signals offer evolutionary advantages over the other 
modalities in that they can be directed to specific individuals and suffer less from 
ambiguity (see Emery, 2000, for further discussion).
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For primates (especially humans), few visual signals carry a greater abundance of social 
information than the face (Adolphs, 2001). From an individual’s face it is possible to 
ascertain their identity, age, gender, emotional state and the direction of their attention. 
Such information is critical to inferring another’s mental state or intentions (Baron-Cohen, 
1995). Therefore, it is no surprise that laboratory investigations into human (and primate) 
social cognition have largely focussed on aspects of face perception, including memory 
for faces (Broks et al., 1998), analysis of eye gaze direction (Elgar et al., 2002;Leekam et 
al., 1997), assessment of sexual attractiveness (Perrett et al., 1994;Perrett et al., 1998), 
assessment of trustworthiness from the face (Adolphs, 2002;Winston et al., 2002) and the 
perception of emotional expressions (Blair, 2003;Russell et al., 2003). Of the facial 
features, the eyes have received much attention (Emery, 2000). Direct gaze is an 
extremely potent social stimulus, potentially signalling threat, sexual desire or simply the 
desire to communicate (Kampe et al., 2003). Averted gaze can signal the focus of an 
individual’s attention and as such can be an important cue to understanding his intentions 
(Bruinsma et al., 2004;Phillips et al., 2002). Both the perception of emotional expressions 
and the importance of eyes as a transmitter of social information are fundamental to this 
thesis and are considered in greater depth in the following two sections.
Facial expressions of emotion
The facial musculature is far more developed in primate compared to non-primate 
animals (Andrew, 1963), allowing primates, especially humans, to produce a wide-range 
of facial expressions of emotion. Six of these (happiness, sadness, fear, surprise, anger 
and disgust) have been shown to be consistently produced and recognised across cultures, 
even amongst isolated peoples, such as the Dani of West New Guinea (Ekman and 
Friesen, 1971;Izard, 1971). Evidence of this kind has led some to suggest that these six
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‘basic’ emotions might be universal and innate (Ekman, 1994;Izard, 1994), However, this 
belief is still contested (Russell, 1994). Whatever the outcome of this debate, it seems 
certain that in all cultures facial expressions are key providers of the signals necessary for 
social interaction.
The analysis of facial expressions by muscle contractions began with the 
electrophysiological work of Duchenne (1862/1990). This was later expanded on by 
Darwin (1872/1998) and formalised by Ekman and Friesen (1978) in their Facial Action 
Coding System (FACS). FACS identifies the presence of specific actions of facial 
muscles (action units) in emotional expressions and is therefore able to characterise each 
emotion by the muscle contractions that are typically involved.1
However, not all features of an emotional expression are used equally when a person 
attempts to infer what another is feeling. In an elegant study, Smith et al. (2005) 
characterise the information underlying the recognition of the six basic emotional 
expressions using the ‘Bubbles' procedure (Gosselin and Schyns, 2001). In this task, 
subjects view sparse images of faces, in which only a random sub-set of features are 
revealed in any one stimulus presentation, and attempt to categorise the underlying 
emotional expression. From the results it is possible to define the information that is most 
often used to classify each expression -  see figure 1. Interestingly, where there is
An important idea, first touched on by Duchenne (1862/1990) and Darwin (1872/1998) but later expanded on by Ekman and 
colleagues (Ekman et al., 1990;Frank et al., 1993), concerns the fact that some muscle contractions involved in a fecial expression are 
voluntary while some are not. This has implications for deception and communication in that there exist subtle but consistent 
differences between faked and real expressions of emotion. To take a famous example -  a heart-felt smile involves contraction of the 
orbicularis oculi muscles, which are not under voluntary control, producing characteristic wrinkles around the eyes - the so-called 
Duchenne smile. The social, or fake, smile on the other hand, lacks the orbicularis oculi contraction and the corresponding eye- 
wrinkling. From an evolutionary perspective, it would make sense for us to have become highly tuned to those aspects of a facial 
expression that are involuntary, enabling us to spot with ease when an expression is real and when it is fake. However, evidence that 
we do indeed possess this skill is thin on the ground, limited at present to a modest ability to recognise ‘Duchenne’ compared to faked 
smiles (Frank et al., 1993).
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ambiguity between the information transmitted from a face stimulus, the human 
‘information seeking strategy’, serves to minimise this ambiguity. This is relevant for 
differentiating between surprised and fearful expressions, the typical features of which 
overlap to a high degree: information from the mouth and from the eyes characterise both 
emotions. To solve this ambiguity, human observers appear to rely on information from 
the eyes for fearful faces and from the mouth for surprised faces (see figure 1). Smith et 
al. (2005) see this as an example of the brain’s decoding structures seeking to 
orthogonalize dissimilar inputs. A failure of this optimal information seeking strategy 
may be relevant to the emotion recognition deficits seen in some psychiatric populations, 
who often mis-label “fearful” expressions as “surprised”. This issue will be discussed in 
more detail in subsequent sections.
Happy Surprised Fearful Angry Disgusted Sad Neutral
Figure 1. Results o f Smith et al.'s (2005) Bubbles task. The images represent the information used by 
subjects to classify each emotion. Adapted from Smith et al. (2005).
Disorders affecting social cognition often produce deficits in labelling the six basic 
emotional expressions. Schizophrenics, for example, reliably show such deficits, although 
the precise manifestation of the impairment is inconsistent (for review see, Edwards et al.,
2002). Specific deficits in fear recognition have been reported in autism (Howard et al., 
2000;Pelphrey et al., 2002), Turner Syndrome (Lawrence et al., 2003) and psychopathy 
(Blair et al., 2004;Dadds et al., in press). These findings have been received with a great
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deal of interest, largely because fear recognition has been strongly linked to amygdala 
function both in lesion (Adolphs et al., 1999;Calder et al., 1996) and neuroimaging 
studies (Breiter et al., 1996;Morris et al., 1996). The link between the amygdala and 
processing of fearful faces is given more detailed consideration in a later section.
The importance of eyes for social cognition
Many vertebrate species have evolved a system for detecting eyes, which seems to serve 
the function of a rapid, predator detector (Emery, 2000). For example, lesser mouse 
lemurs engage in greater gaze aversion when shown two schematic eyes presented 
horizontally compared to the same stimuli presented vertically (Coss, 1978). Similar 
results have been found for certain species of birds (Jones, 1980;Scaife, 1976), house 
mice (Topal and Csanyi, 1994) and jewelfish (Coss, 1979). A number of species are also 
able to ascertain whether a pair of eyes are fixed upon them or away from them, which 
has obvious evolutionary value in terms of avoiding predators (see Emery, 2000, for 
further examples).
However primates, especially humans, utilise the eyes to a far greater degree, using them 
for complex communicative functions. For example, by analysing the direction p(f a 
conspecific’s gaze it is possible to infer what they are attending to and why i\ has 
significance. Such ‘allocentric’ gaze monitoring is thus critical for the development of 
joint attention, an ability thought to be a pre-cursor to theory of mind and known to be 
impaired in children with autism (Charman, 2003;Leekam et al., 2000).
In addition, direct eye-contact is highly relevant for human social communication 
(Kleinke, 1986) and can indicate signals as diverse as threat and sexual attraction. The
37
ability to distinguish direct from averted gaze is present in the newborn (Batki et al., 
2000;Farroni et al., 2002) and by later life has become highly sensitive (Senju et al., 
2003;vonGrunau and Anston, 1995). Consistent with this, direct gaze activates the 
amygdala (Kawashima et al., 1999) and enhances FFA activity, an effect which can be 
attributed to amygdala-fusiform modulation (George et al., 2001). Furthermore, the fact 
that direct gaze activates the theory of mind network (Calder et al., 2002;Kampe et al., 
2003), demonstrates that eye contact is a socially significant stimulus, initiating 
immediate analysis of the intentions of the onlooker.
Consistent with the importance of the eyes as conveyors of social signals, when scanning 
faces humans reliably spend most time fixating on the eye-region (Adolphs et al., 
2005;Horley et al., 2004;Mertens et al., 1993;Pelphrey et al., 2002;Walkersmith et al., 
1977). This pattern has been demonstrated in children as young as five weeks old (Haith, 
1977) as well as non-human primates (Keating and Keating, 1982;Nahm et al., 1997).
The eyes are especially important for recognising fearful expressions
Traditionally, the eyes have been thought of as key communicators of emotion -  in 
literature, eyes are referred to as the “windows of the soul” (Du Bartas) , that “are often 
voice and words in a silent look” (Ovid)2. Baron-Cohen (1997b) has argued for a 
“language of the eyes” and has shown that, at least for complex, subtle feelings such as 
guilt or admiration, the eyes are critical for accurate emotion recognition. For the basic 
emotions however, the eyes appear to be less crucial (Baron-Cohen et al., 1997b) -  
except, that is, for fearful expressions. The study by Smith et al. (2005), described above,
2 Taken from (Stevenson, 1967).
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clearly shows the heavy reliance that humans place on information from the eyes in order 
to recognise fearful faces (see figure 1). This finding is confirmed by Kohler et al. (2004) 
who, using the FACS system, analysed which action units of emotional expressions are 
most associated with correct recognition of the given emotion. For fearful faces, it was 
nostril dilation (which occurred infrequently) and widened eyes.
Neuroimaging studies confirm the importance of the eyes for fearful expressions. Using 
chimerical stimuli (fearful eyes with a neutral mouth compared to neutral eyes with a 
fearful mouth), Morris et al. (2002) showed that the eyes are critical for producing the 
well documented amygdala response to fearful faces (Breiter et al., 1996;Morris et al., 
1996;Winston et al., 2003a). Whalen et al. (2004) show that even isolated fearful 
eyes, removed from the context of the face, produce amygdala activation in comparison 
to neutral eyes. Furthermore, it appears to be the presence of a large white area (the sclera) 
surrounding a black circle (the pupil), rather than the shape of the fearful eyes, which 
drives the amygdala response: eye images with the colours in versed produced no 
amygdala activation.
Recent work with the amygdala-lesioned patient, SM, further supports the importance of 
the eyes for recognising fear (Adolphs et al., 2005). SM has a well circumscribed, 
bilateral lesion of the amygdala, which is thought to have resulted in a severe and 
selective impairment in the recognition of fear from facial expressions (Adolphs et al., 
1994;Adolphs and Tranel, 2000). Importantly, this is in the absence of any impairment in 
perception, memory, language and reasoning - in so far as these do not involve the 
processing of emotional stimuli (Adolphs and Tranel, 2000). Using the Bubbles task, 
Adolphs et al. (2005) show that, unlike normal controls, SM fails to make use of visual 
information from the eyes in faces (see figure 2a). Furthermore, when scanning complete
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face stimuli, SM fails to explore the face normally and, in particular, spends significantly 
less time fixating the eyes compared to normal controls (see figure 2b). These 
abnormalities are present for all face stimuli -  not just for fearful expressions. However, 
Adolph’s et al (2005) propose that they manifest as a specific fear recognition impairment 
because it is only for this basic emotion that information from the eyes forms a vital 
component. Such an explanation fits well with reports of SM’s other impairments, 
notably a failure to read complex ‘social’ emotions (Adolphs et al., 2002), a skill which 
Baron-Cohen et al. (1997b) has shown relies critically on reading information from the 
eyes.
A number of other populations show similar abnormalities to SM. Psychopathic
Controls SM Controls SM
Figure 2. SM fails to make sure of information from the eyes in faces (taken from 
Adolphs et al., 2005). a) In the Bubbles task, controls make use of the eyes and mouth in 
fearful (top) and happy (bottom) faces but SM only uses the mouth, b) When viewing 
whole faces, controls fixate on the eyes, SM does not.
individuals, for example, have a specific fear recognition deficit (Blair et al., 2004;Dadds 
et al., in press), which is shown to be temporarily corrected by asking them to focus on
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the eye region of faces (Dadds et al., in press). With increasing age, otherwise healthy 
adults show a progressive reduction in the ability to recognise fear and, to a lesser extent, 
anger and sadness (Calder et al., 2003;Malatesta et al., 1987;Wong et al., 2005). This has 
been associated with an increasingly abnormal scan pattern with progressing age: older 
adults spend less time fixating on the upper half of the face, focussing more on the lower 
half (Wong et al., 2005).
With one exception (van der Geest et al., 2002), people with an autistic-spectrum disorder 
have consistently been shown to spend less time fixating the eyes in pictures of faces 
(Dalton et al., 2005;Klin et al., 2002;Klin et al., 2003;Nacewicz et al., 2006;Pelphrey et 
al., 2002). In addition, there is some evidence that those with an ASD may have a fear 
recognition deficit (Howard et al., 2000;Pelphrey et al., 2002), but this remains 
controversial and there are a number of negative findings (Adolphs et al., 2001;Castelli, 
2005). This research is reviewed in more detail in a subsequent section.
In ASD, the studies examining abnormal scanpath and impaired emotion recognition 
have remained essentially separate lines of inquiry: as yet, no one has formally 
investigated the links between the two. Given the strong connection between eye fixation 
and fear recognition (discussed above) and given the consistent evidence of poor fixation 
of the eye region in ASD, one would predict that a fear recognition deficit in ASD would 
be easy to demonstrate. Why this is not the case and, furthermore, the reasons why people 
with ASD should fixate less on the eyes than normal controls have not been empirically 
explored. Experiments attempting to shed light on these issues are presented in chapters 4 
and 5.
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Theory of mind tasks
The original test of the ability to attribute thoughts and feeling to others is the ‘false 
belief task’ in which a subject must keep track of a character’s mistaken mental state in 
order to predict how the character will behave based on that belief (in contrast to the 
subject’s own belief or reality). False belief tasks can be first order (‘she thinks X’) , such 
as the Sally-Anne test (Baron-Cohen et al., 1985), or the more difficult second order (‘she 
thinks that he thinks X’), such as the Ice-Cream story (Pemer and Wimmer, 1985). Such 
tasks have been a useful starting point for tracking the theory of mind deficits in children 
with an ASD. However, they have a number of limitations. Firstly, they call upon mental 
faculties other than ToM, such as executive function, with which children with autism 
have been shown to be impaired (Russell, 1998). Secondly, higher-functioning children 
and adults with ASD, particularly those with AS, are able to pass false belief tasks despite 
a continuing, real-world failure to understand what other’s think and feel (Frith et al., 
1994).
To combat these restrictions, researchers have attempted to develop tasks which assess 
ToM reasoning in relative isolation and/or highlight the difficulties faced by higher- 
functioning ASD individuals. One of the latter ‘advanced’ ToM tasks is based on Baron- 
Cohen’s (1997b) work into the ‘language of the eyes’: subjects have to recognise 
complex social emotions using the eyes alone (Baron-Cohen et al., 1997a). This, however, 
confounds social-perceptual ability with ToM reasoning. Another approach asks subjects 
to infer character’s thoughts and feelings from a verbal story (Happe, 1994). However, 
Abell et al. (2000), have created a ToM task (known as the Happe-Frith triangles task), 
which is divorced from the human context. This is based on the observations of Heider 
and Simmel (1944) that, when shown silent animations of a triangle and a circle moving
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within a rectangle, adults were inclined to describe the events in terms of intentional 
action. Abell et al. (2000) created animations in which geometrical shapes engaged in 
goal-directed sequences (e.g. chasing) or in ToM related sequences (e.g. tricking). Both 
children (Abell et al., 2000) and adults (Castelli et al., 2002) with high-functioning autism 
or AS made fewer and less appropriate mental state attributions to the ToM sequences. 
Furthermore, in fMRI normal adults activate areas of the ToM network (namely the 
posterior STS, medial prefrontal cortex and temporal poles) when viewing the ToM 
cartoons, while those with an ASD do not (Castelli et al., 2000;Castelli et al., 2002). I use 
the Happe-Frith triangles task in chapter 3 to assess the ToM abilities of healthy adults 
with a fear recognition deficit.
The amygdala and emotion
There is a vast literature linking the amygdala to the processing of emotional stimuli (for 
review see, Dolan, 2002;Phelps, 2006;Phelps and Le Doux, 2005). A very brief overview 
of this large topic will be given here, including some ideas regarding the amygdala’s 
function in moment-to-moment behaviour. 1 will then move on to the more germane topic 
of the amygdala’s role in social cognition.
Implicit emotional memory -  fear conditioning
Much research, mostly conducted in rodents but confirmed to some extent in humans, has 
identified the amygdala as the central structure in the acquisition and expression of fear 
conditioned memories (for review see, LeDoux, 1996;Ledoux, 2000;Maren, 2001). Based 
on work with rats, the lateral nucleus (LA) is typically viewed as the sensory interface of 
the amygdala and as the key site of plasticity, while the central nucleus (CE) is viewed as
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the output region. LA receives inputs from sensory thalamus as well as from cortical 
sensory areas. The thalamic input is seen as a quick, but crude, route to the amygdala, 
whereas the cortical input provides a slower but more fine-grained representation 
(LeDoux, 1996;LeDoux, 2003). The functional significance of these two pathways is 
considered later. CE controls the expression of fear responses via projections to various 
subcortical nuclei, such as the hypothalamus (blood pressure changes, stress hormone 
release) and central grey (freezing behaviour), (LeDoux, 1996;Ledoux, 2000;Maren, 
2001)
Brain imaging studies with humans are consistent with this animal model. In fMRI, the 
amygdala is activated during fear conditioning (Buchel et al., 1998;Labar et al., 1998) 
and the magnitude of this activity is correlated with the strength of the conditioned 
response (Labar et al., 1998). Furthermore, a CS presented subliminally leads to co­
activation between the amygdala and both the superior colliculus and pulvinar (Morris et 
al., 1998b). These structures are thought to be components of a subcortical route to the 
amygdala, consistent with the data showing both a cortical and a subcortical pathway to 
the amygdala in the rat.
Finally, data from patients with brain damage are also consistent with the animal model. 
Damage restricted to the amygdala prevents the acquisition and/or physiological 
expression of conditioned fear, despite having no effect on the explicit memory of the 
conditioning procedure. Patients with hippocampal damage, on the other hand, 
demonstrate the physiological expression of conditioned fear but have no conscious 
recollection of being conditioned (Bechara et al., 1995).
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Emotional modulation of memory
The amygdala appears able to modulate memory consolidation in other brain regions, 
notably the hippocampus, thereby enhancing memory for emotionally arousing events 
(McGaugh, 2000). This is indicated by studies in rats where post-training, neurochemical 
knockout of the amygdala prevents normal enhancement of memory for a fear-arousing 
event (LeDoux, 2003). In humans, damage to the amygdala impairs memory for 
emotional stimuli (Adolphs et al., 2000b;Cahill et al., 1995) and, in fMRI, activation of 
the amygdala during encoding is predictive of later memory retention for emotional 
stimuli (Cahill et al., 1996;Canli et al., 2000;Dolcos et al., 2004;Hamann et al., 1999).
Emotional modulation of attention and perception
It is of obvious evolutionary value for an unattended, but emotionally important, stimulus 
to gain rapid access to awareness. An influential idea is that this is achieved by amygdala 
modulation of other brain areas (Armony and LeDoux, 1999;Dolan, 2002): the amygdala 
detects the salient stimulus (rapidly, possibly via the subcortical route) and facilitates 
attention and perception towards that stimulus via feedback projections to sensory cortex 
(Amaral et al., 2003b;Freese and Amaral, 2005).
In support of this, patients with amygdala damage do not show the normal facilitation of 
attention for emotional stimuli, as demonstrated in an attentional blink paradigm 
(Anderson and Phelps, 2002). Neuroimaging experiments have shown enhanced 
activation of fusiform cortex to emotionally arousing (i.e. fearful) rather than to neutral 
faces and this is correlated with amygdala activation (Morris et al., 1998a;Morris et al., 
1998b). This facilitation of cortical sensory processing is absent if the amygdala is 
damaged (Vuilleumier et al., 2004).
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These lesions and neuroimaging studies provide strong support for the idea that the 
amygdala modulates attention and perception via feedback to sensory cortex. In order for 
this modulation to be effective, the amygdala must receive and process information about 
the relevant stimulus before it has been processed in the region to be modulated. 
Achieving this early amygdala input is thought to be the function of the ‘quick and 
coarse’ subcortical route to the amygdala -  possibly via the superior colliculus and 
pulvinar (Morris et al., 1999). In support of this, the amygdala can differentiate between 
fearful and neutral faces even when these are presented unconsciously (Morris et al., 
1999;Pasley et al., 2004;Whalen et al., 1998;Williams et al., 2004). In addition, 
Vuilleumier et al. (2003) took advantage of the fact that a subcortical visual pathway 
would be more sensitive to low-frequency spatial information, whereas a cortical route 
would be tuned to high-spatial frequencies. They found that the superior colliculus, 
pulvinar and amygdala responded preferentially to low-spatial frequency fear versus 
neutral faces. Furthermore, by using hybrid high- and low-spatial frequency faces, 
Winston et al. (2003b) showed that enhancement of fusiform activity to fearful faces is 
driven by low-spatial frequency information (to which the fusiform is not preferentially 
tuned). Finally, subjects with damaged visual cortices (so called ‘blindsight’ patients) can 
show differential amygdala activity to fearful and neutral faces, despite being unable to 
consciously perceive the stimuli (Morris et al., 2001;Pegna et al., 2005).
The amygdala as a ‘salience detector’ -  modulating current and 
future behaviour
The majority of research on the amygdala has focussed on its reactivity to negatively 
valenced (often fear related) stimuli, resulting in it being viewed as part of a fear- or 
danger-specialised cognitive module (Ohman and Mineka, 2001;Paradiso et al., 1999).
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However, this has been challenged by findings that the amygdala is activated by positive 
events, such as happy faces (Canli et al., 2002;Winston et al., 2003a;Yang et al., 2002), 
positive words (Hamann and Mao, 2002), pleasant tastes (O’Doherty et al., 2001) or 
erotic film excerpts (Karama et al., 2002;Redoute et al., 2000). Two theoretically 
important studies, using olfactory (Anderson et al., 2003) and gustatory (Small et al.,
2003) stimuli, demonstrate that amygdala activity co-varies with the perceived arousal of 
events, not with the valence. Therefore, more recent theories present the amygdala as a 
‘salience’ or ‘relevance’ detector (e.g. Dolan, 2002;Sander et al., 2003).3 The slight bias 
of the amygdala response towards negatively valenced stimuli is likely to be an example 
of a system-wide ‘negative bias’, thought to reflect the fact that potentially dangerous 
events have become particularly relevant to us through our evolutionary history (Ito et al., 
1998)
Once a salient event has been detected, we have seen that the amygdala can associate it 
with other stimuli that might better predict it (fear conditioning), modulate sensory cortex 
to enhance its current processing and influence hippocampal activity to facilitate its entry 
into long term memory. In light of a relevant event, the amygdala is thereby able to 
influence current and future behaviour, facilitating an adaptive response and assisting in 
the success of the organism. For social animals, each encounter with a conspecific is 
replete with potentially relevant stimuli. It is perhaps therefore not surprising that there 
has been much interest in the amygdala’s role in social cognition, which will be discussed 
in the next section.
According to Sander et al. (2003, pg. 311), an event is relevant to an organism if it, “can significantly influence (positively or 
negatively) the attainment of his or her goals [or] the satisfaction of his or her needs”.
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The amygdala and social cognition
Amygdala lesion alters social behaviour in non-human primates and 
rats
The seminal work of Kluver and Bucy (1937; 1939) first suggested that the amygdala 
might be involved in social behaviour. This work showed that ablation of the temporal 
lobes in macaque monkeys caused profound changes in behaviour, including: loss of fear, 
changes in food preferences, hypersexuality and reduced social interaction. Further work 
revealed that most of these behavioural changes can be produced following more 
selective ablations, restricted largely to the amygdala (Aggleton and Passingham, 
1981;Weiskrantz, 1956). Later, Bachevalier and colleagues (1994;2001) found that 
lesions to the amygdala and surrounding structures in infant monkeys reduces dyadic 
social interaction later in life, leading to the suggestion that such early lesions might 
provide an animal model of autism (Bachevalier, 1994). A number of naturalistic 
observational studies of monkey behaviour following amygdalectomy are consistent with 
these data (e.g. Dicks et al., 1969;Kling et al., 1970;Kling, 1972). For example, Dicks et 
al. (1969) retrieved rhesus monkeys from their natural habitat, subjected them to bilateral 
amygdala ablation and then returned them to their social groups. The lesioned animals 
failed to integrate socially and often died without support from their troop.
However, Amaral and colleagues have pointed out a number of methodological problems 
with these studies (Amaral, 2003;Amaral et al., 2003c) and new experiments designed to 
control for these deficiencies do not fully support the data described above (Bauman et al., 
2004a;Bauman et al., 2004b;Emery et al., 2001;Prather et al., 2001). A major 
shortcoming of the earlier amygdalectomy work was the use of suction or radio frequency
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ablation to produce the lesion. Such methods destroy not only the cell bodies in the 
lesioned area but also damage axons travelling through the targeted brain region. As a 
result, it is impossible to determine whether the behavioural changes produced following 
the older lesion methods were due to elimination of the targeted region or to the 
inadvertent interference with connections between two or more untargeted areas. Another 
major concern, at least in studies where lesions are produced neonatally, is how the 
animals are reared. In earlier studies, infant monkeys were reared away from their 
mothers; however recent evidence suggests that this in itself can produce abnormalities in 
later social interaction, (Sackett et al., 2002), confounding any lesion effects.
In their recent program of research (Bauman et al., 2004a;Bauman et al., 2004b;Emery et 
al., 2001;Prather et al., 2001), Amaral and colleagues avoided the confounds of earlier 
studies by using ibotenic acid to produce neurotoxic lesions, which destroyed only the 
cell bodies and not the fibres of passage in the region. They also mother-reared subjects 
and provided daily access to large social groups, thus simulating a natural environment.
In the first of these investigations, Emery et al. (2001) produced bilateral amygdala 
lesions in adult male rhesus monkeys and observed their behaviour in dyadic social 
interactions with age, sex and dominance matched control animals. Rather than showing 
reduced social interaction, the amygdala lesioned animals generated significantly greater 
amounts of affiliative social behaviour (groom, present sex etc) towards other monkeys 
than did controls and appeared to be socially uninhibited. The authors conclude that an 
intact amygdala in not essential for carrying out social behaviour in adult monkeys. 
Instead, they suggest that the amygdala normally serves to monitor the environment for 
potential threats. By removing it, the “break” is lifted -  the lesioned animals fail to 
perceive the potential danger of the interaction and so do not apply the species-typical 
caution usually provoked by such encounters. This conclusion is bolstered by
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observations of the lesioned monkeys’ responsiveness to novel, non-social, objects. 
Monkeys typically exercise caution when faced with such stimuli, yet the lesioned 
monkeys did not, approaching and tactually exploring the objects. This was true even of 
normally fear-eliciting stimuli, such as a rubber snake, which a non-lesioned monkey 
would normally never explore tactually.
While the above data argues against the idea that the amygdala is essential for the 
production of social behaviour in an adult monkey, it is still possible that the amygdala 
might be critical for the development of appropriate social interaction. This idea carries 
weight, as a recent theory of the amygdala’s role in autism stresses a neurodevelopmental 
perspective (Grelotti et al., 2002;Schultz, 2005) and, in humans, early amygdala lesion 
causes significantly greater deficits in ToM tasks than do later lesions (Shaw et al., 2004). 
To investigate this possibility, Amaral and colleagues carried out a series of studies in 
which the amygdala was lesioned bilaterally in rhesus monkeys at 2 weeks of age and 
social interactions were assessed at 6, 9 and 12 months of age (Bauman et al., 
2004a;Bauman et al., 2004b;Prather et al., 2001). The results show a host of complex and 
subtle behavioural changes, which will be summarised below.
In response to novel, non-social objects, the effect of amygdala lesion in infant monkeys 
mimicked that found in adult animals: namely, a failure to apply species-typical caution 
to the situation. However, during social encounters the findings were strikingly different. 
Neonatally lesioned monkeys produced more fear behaviours (fear grimaces, screams etc) 
is a social situation compared to both hippocampus and sham lesioned controls (Bauman 
et al., 2004b;Prather et al., 2001). This is in contrast to monkeys lesioned in adulthood, 
who become socially unfearful (Emery et al., 2001). Despite this, infant-lesioned 
monkeys do engage in affiliative social behaviour, even to a significantly greater degree
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than control animals in the case of certain behaviours, such as following, cooing and 
grunting (Bauman et al., 2004b). However, the amygdala-lesioned subjects did engage in 
less physical contact than controls (Bauman et al., 2004b). Interestingly, the control 
lesioned animals spent more time in proximity to other controls, whereas the amygdala- 
lesioned subjects spent more time with other lesioned animals (Bauman et al., 2004b). 
This raises the possibility that the amygdala lesioned animals were unable to integrate 
fully with the control animals, perhaps due to a failure to perceive or comprehend subtle 
social cues. After each social interaction, trained observers, blind to lesion status, rated 
each monkey on a macaque ‘personality’ scale (Capitanio, 1999). Amygdala-lesioned 
animals were judged to be more nervous, more fearful, less confident and less active than 
controls (Bauman et al., 2004b).
In experiments designed to test the development of mother-infant interactions in the 
amygdala-lesioned monkeys, Bauman et al. (2004a) found essentially normal interactions, 
with the exception of increased physical contact time between infant and mother. In a 
‘mother preference’ test that allowed the infants to choose between their mother and 
another familiar female, the amygdala-lesioned subjects did not preferentially seek 
proximity to their mother, unlike controls. However, they also produced fewer fear 
related behaviours during the task, leading the authors to conclude that, rather than 
lacking attachment to their mothers, the amygdala-lesioned subjects failed to perceive the 
potential danger of the separation and so did not attempt to seek solace in their mothers 
company.
Taking these findings as a whole, Amaral (Amaral et al., 2003a;Amaral, 2003;Amaral et 
al., 2003c) has argued forcibly that amygdala-lesioned monkeys are capable of 
fundamental social behaviour and, therefore, that the amygdala is not an essential
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component of the social-cognitive network. Instead, he suggests that the amygdala 
normally serves to detect potential threat in the environment and to mediate a 
behaviourally appropriate response. Amygdala lesion in adulthood removes this danger- 
detector, resulting in inhibition where cautious exploration would be the appropriate 
response. Neonatal lesions, however, produce increased fear responses in situations that 
would not normally elicit such a reaction. The reason for this divergence between the 
infant and adult lesioned animals is unclear, but Amaral and colleagues (Amaral, 
2003;Amaral et al., 2003c;Bauman et al., 2004b) argue that, since the lesioned infants are 
able to engage in affiliative social behaviours, the developmental effect of the lesion is to 
disrupt fear-processing rather than to fundamentally impair social cognitive ability. 
However, as Baumann et al. (2004b) concede, they were not able to directly evaluate how 
the amygdala-lesioned subjects interpreted or responded to specific social cues. Given the 
unusual findings of inappropriate fear responses combined with increases in certain 
affiliative behaviours, along with the fact that amygdala-lesioned animals may not have 
become fully integrated with controls, it is possible that the neonatal amygdala lesions led 
to subtle impairments in the ability to perceive and interpret social signals. More work is 
needed to examine this possibility before any firm conclusions can be made regarding the 
precise role of the amygdala in the development of primate social cognition. For example, 
we know that when viewing a face, monkeys normally fixate the eye region more than 
the other facial features (Keating and Keating, 1982;Nahm et al., 1997). Given the 
eyetracking results with SM, it would be interesting to compare the visual fixation 
patterns of rhesus monkeys to faces before and after neurotoxic lesion of the amygdala. 
Following ibotenic acid amygdala lesions in rats, Van Ree and colleagues report similar 
changes to social behaviour as those observed in primates, demonstrating the 
evolutionary history of the amygdala’s role (Daenen et al., 2002;Diergaarde et al., 
2004;Diergaarde et al., 2005;Wolterink et al., 2001). Furthermore, as with rhesus
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monkeys, results differ depending on whether the lesion was produced neonatally or 
when the animal is mature. The full spectrum of results is complex but the basic finding 
is that amygdala lesion reduces social behaviour and that this reduction is greater in 
animals lesioned on day 7 of life than those lesioned on day 21 of life. The authors have 
not tested the responsiveness of the rats to novel, non-social objects but other work 
suggests that lesions of the lateral/basolateral nuclei of the rat amygdala disrupts normal 
fear responses to novel stimuli (Vazdaijanova et al., 2001). Therefore, the extent to which 
the social deficits following lesion are secondary to a more general disruption of threat 
processing remains unresolved. Another caveat of this work is that the rats were reared in 
isolation, possibly confounding any lesion effects. Despite these shortcomings, the work 
of Van Ree and colleagues is a useful cross-species replication of the general findings in 
primates.
The amygdala and fear recognition in hum ans
Several case reports have linked bilateral amygdala damage with an impaired ability to 
recognise facial expressions of emotions, especially in the case of fearful faces (Adolphs 
et al., 1994;Broks et al., 1998;Calder et al., 1996;Young et al., 1995;Young et al., 1996). 
Unilateral amygdala damage, however, does not appear to be sufficient to cause these 
deficits (Adolphs et al., 1995). Only one of the bilaterally lesioned patients, SM, has 
damage restricted to the amygdala (resulting from Urbach-Wiethe disease, Adolphs et al., 
1994). The others suffered lesions following either encephalitis or surgery and, 
consequently, have sustained damage beyond the amygdala, in some cases substantially 
so. Despite this, basic visual perception appears normal in all of the reported cases, as 
tested by performance IQ or the Benton face matching test (Broks et al., 1998;Young et 
al., 1995). The idea that it is damage specifically to the amygdala, rather than to other
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parts of the temporal lobe, that is the root cause of the emotion-recognition deficit is 
supported, on the one hand, by the existence of SM and on the other by the absence of a 
deficit in individuals with temporal lobe damage sparing the amygdala (e.g. Broks et al.,
1998). In the most definitive study of this type, Adolphs et al. (1999) pooled data from 
several research groups to compare nine individuals with bilateral amygdala damage with 
both brain damaged and normal controls. This allowed sufficient power for group-wise 
statistical analysis and confirmed the major findings of the case reports: the amygdala 
damaged group were impaired at recognising all negative facial expressions but most 
severely for fear. It should be noted however, that individual performances in fear 
recognition ranged from extremely impaired to essentially normal, consistent with a case- 
report by Hamann et al. (1996), which found no fear recognition deficit in a patient with 
bilateral amygdala damage. Adolphs et al. (1999) suggest that such variability in 
impairment can be put down to the possibility of using compensatory cognitive strategies 
when attempting to recognise the emotional faces, but this has not yet been tested 
empirically.
Regarding the mechanism by which amygdala damage might lead to emotion recognition 
impairments, earlier reports suggest that, without a functioning amygdala, subjects have 
difficulty triggering a retrieval of knowledge concerning the emotion when presented 
with certain facial expressions (Adolphs et al., 1999). However, the work using the 
Bubbles task and eyetracking technology with SM (Adolphs et al., 2005, discussed above) 
points to a subtly different interpretation. SM’s poor fear recognition is apparently due to 
a failure of her amygdala to direct her visual system to fixate, pay attention to and make 
use of information from the eye region of faces. The fact that her fear recognition 
improves when she is directed to the eye region shows that she is, in fact, able to trigger 
the required emotional knowledge when she receives the necessary perceptual input. Her
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problem lies in an inability to search automatically for this input, i.e. environmental clues 
of social or emotional relevance. This account may explain SM’s impairments on other 
social tasks, such as judging trustworthiness of faces (Adolphs et al., 1998, see below). 
However, before any firm conclusions can be made, it would be useful to see SM’s 
results replicated with other amygdala-damaged patients and, as discussed in the previous 
section, with non-human primates who have undergone amygdala lesion.
Neuroimaging studies with normal subjects have complemented the neuropsychological 
data. The amygdala is consistently activated when participants view fearful, compared to 
other (e.g. neutral or happy), faces (Morris et al., 1996;Morris et al., 1998a;Morris et al., 
1999;Phillips et al., 1998;Thomas et al., 2001;Whalen et al., 1998;Winston et al., 2003a). 
The evidence regarding the other emotions is less clear, although both sad (Blair et al.,
1999) and angry (Adams et al., 2003) faces have been shown to activate the amygdala 
under certain circumstances. Winston et al. (2003a) report compelling data, showing that 
the amygdala responds to high versus low intensities of all emotional expressions, 
including happy faces. They conclude that, rather than being fear or even negative- 
emotion specific, the amygdala responds to any stimulus of high emotional significance. 
This accords with recent data using olfactory (Anderson et al., 2003) or gustatory (Small 
et al., 2003) stimuli, showing amygdala activation varies with stimulus arousal, but not 
valence. That activation is more consistent to negative compared to positive expressions 
may reflect the fact that, in primate evolution, negatively-valenced stimuli have become 
more arousing than positive ones (Anderson et al., 2003;Ito et al., 1998). That activation 
to fearful faces is especially reliable may be because these are inherently the most 
arousing images and/or because, presented as they almost invariably are with forward 
looking gaze, the fearful faces are ambiguous -  a feature which is capable in itself of 
causing amygdala activation (Adams et al., 2003;Whalen, 1999).
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The amygdala and other areas of human social cognition
Given the evidence from primates and rats that the amygdala is important for social 
behaviour, a number of researchers have attempted to extend the link between the 
amygdala and emotion recognition in humans to wider areas of human social cognition, 
such as the ability to ‘mentalise’. An early example is the finding that patients with 
bilateral amygdala damage judge faces to be more approachable and trustworthy than do 
controls (Adolphs et al., 1998). Evidence corroborating this finding comes from a fMRI 
study with healthy individuals: the amygdala is automatically engaged when viewing 
faces rated by the observer as untrustworthy, even if the subject is occupied in an 
incidental task, such as assessment of age (Winston et al., 2002).
However, interesting though this finding is, it could easily be explained by the theory of 
the amygdala as an automatic and presumably often unconscious ‘danger-detector’4 - it 
does not necessarily follow that the amygdala is required for a higher-order 
understanding of the thoughts and feelings of others, as some have suggested it is (e.g. 
Baron-Cohen et al., 2000a). Attempts to implicate the amygdala in such ‘on-line’ 
mentalising have met with limited success. The one neuropsychological paper to find a 
positive result is that of Stone et al. (2003), who report that two patients with bilateral 
amygdala damage have difficulties with two theory of mind tasks: one testing the ability 
to recognise faux pas in verbal stories and the other testing the ability to recognise mental 
states from the eye region of faces. The amygdala lesioned subjects show clear 
impairments on both tasks; however there are a number of caveats to bear in mind with
4
As Amaral (2003) points out, the behaviour of the amygdala-damaged subjects described by Adolphs et al. (1998) is highly 
reminiscent of the social uninhibition seens in adult monkeys following amygdala lesion (Emery et al., 2001).
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these data. Firstly, damage is extended beyond the amygdala in both cases, including 
extensive damage to the right temporal lobe in one subject and areas of the basal ganglia 
and external capsule in the other. Secondly, the controls were not matched with the 
lesioned subjects in terms of IQ5. Given the verbal nature of both tasks and the fact that 
the verbal IQs of the amygdala lesioned patients in Stone et al.’s (1999) paper are 
relatively low (82 and 99) it would have been pertinent to have at least measured the IQ 
of the control subjects. Finally, given the fact that amygdala damage may impair the 
ability to make adequate use of information from the eyes (as seen with SM), the 
“reading the mind in the eyes” task is an inappropriate test o f ‘pure’ mentalising ability in 
this subject group.
Evidence of an ‘on-line’ role of the amygdala in mentalising tasks is equally limited in 
the neuroimaging literature. As Gallagher and Frith (2003) point out in their review, 
among all the neuroimaging studies of theory of mind only Baron-Cohen et al. (1999b) 
have found amygdala activation. In this study, participants viewed pictures of eyes 
depicting an emotional expression: amygdala activation was present when subjects 
judged the emotion, but not the gender, of the stimuli. Given the well established role of 
the amygdala in emotion processing, it is feasible that this activation reflects the 
emotional content of the pictures rather than the process of mentalising per se.
As we have seen, the evidence of a role for the amygdala in ‘on-line’ mentalising is far 
from conclusive. However, given its well established function as a detector of socially 
salient stimuli (Sander et al., 2003), it has been suggested that the amygdala might be
5 The authors claim that earlier work shows that the faux pas test does not correlate with IQ (Baron-Cohen et al., 1999a). However, 
examination of this data shows that, although not significant, there is a trend towards a positive correlation between performance on 
the task and verbal IQ (r=0.3, p=0.1).
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important for the development of ToM abilities (Gallagher and Frith, 2003;Grelotti et al., 
2002, see subsequent section for an exposition of this argument). Neuropsychological 
evidence for this is more promising. For example, Fine et al. (2001) report a patient with 
early left amygdala damage and a diagnosis of AS and schizophrenia who was impaired 
on second-order false belief tasks, comprehension of mental state cartoons and advanced 
ToM stories requiring participants to understand non-literal utterances such as white lies 
or sarcasm. Of course, such results would be expected from someone with a diagnosis of 
AS and so these data should be interpreted with caution: it is impossible to say whether 
the early amygdala lesion had a causal role in the incidence of AS or whether the 
occurrence of both in the same person is coincidental. More promising data comes 
Heberlein et al. (2004) who studied a patient whose amygdala lesion is thought to have 
occurred in childhood or adolescence. The patient was asked to describe what was 
happening in the Heider and Simmel (1944) cartoons of geometric shapes. Whereas 
normal subjects interpreted the shapes as being social agents pursuing goals and having 
feelings, the patient failed to do so, describing the movements in purely mechanistic 
terms. In this regard, the amygdala damaged patient was similar to patients with an 
autistic-spectrum disorder (Abell et al., 2000). However, the best evidence that early 
amygdala damage can impair later ToM performance comes from Shaw et al. (2004). 
These authors compared ToM performance between a group of subjects who suffered 
congenital or childhood amygdala lesion with a group whose lesions arose in adulthood. 
The early damage group were impaired on the more advanced ToM tasks, such as 
detecting tactless comments or interpreting non-literal utterances, compared to both the 
healthy control group and the late amygdala damage group. Furthermore, these results 
held even after controlling for measures of executive function, memory and general 
intellectual ability.
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Theories of the neurodevelopmental role of the amygdala in social 
cognition
Considering the evidence above as a whole, including both the human and animal 
research, there is not strong evidence that the amygdala is essential for ‘on-line’ social 
interaction. Instead, the role of the amygdala seems largely restricted to detecting and 
then enhancing the perception for, and memory of, socially and emotionally salient 
events (Dolan, 2002). In adults, impairment of this neuromodulatory system appears to 
result in two main social problems: firstly, a failure to approach a social situation with the 
appropriate caution, resulting in an over-trusting and socially uninhibited manner, and, 
secondly, failing to be drawn to the most emotionally meaningful aspects of the 
environment (such as eyes), resulting, for example, in occasional errors in reading 
someone’s emotional state. ‘Fundamental’ social interaction is generally unaffected. As 
Amaral (2003) suggests, this is perhaps because individuals (be they humans or primates) 
have had a life time to acquire and store social knowledge before their amygdala was 
damaged. They can therefore call upon past experience to understand social situations 
and to react appropriately -  mediated perhaps by undamaged areas of the social brain, 
such as the preffontal cortex.
However, as discussed in the previous section, it has been suggested that damage to the 
amygdala early in development could impair the ability to accrue social knowledge, 
thereby resulting in more profound social-cognitive deficits later in life. Several theorists 
have argued that social-cognitive abilities, such as theory of mind, build upon basic 
social-perceptual knowledge and have implicated the amygdala in this (Baron-Cohen, 
1994;Hobson, 1993;Tager-Flusberg and Sullivan, 2000) but Schultz and colleagues 
(Grelotti et al., 2002;Schultz et al., 2000b;Schultz, 2005) have provided the most
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complete theory of how this might occur. According to this model, the amygdala flags 
social stimuli, such as faces and eyes, as salient and then, via feedback connections, 
influences the cortical sites where the actual computations of these stimuli are performed 
(e.g. the STS and FFA) to process the stimuli more deeply and for longer. Over time, this 
facilitates social-perceptual learning. In the next stage of the model, skill in perceiving 
social stimuli to obtain information such as person identity or emotional state is 
hypothesised to be of critical importance for the development of social skills. Social- 
perception ability provides the ‘scaffolding’ necessary during social interactions to 
understand the barrage of non-verbal communications that occur in rapid succession.
To date, evidence for the model is restricted to what we know about the amygdala’s role 
in healthy adults and to the work showing that amygdala lesions acquired early in life can 
have more profound effects on later social-cognitive function than lesions acquired in 
adulthood. More direct, neurodevelopmental, evidence is certainly required. However, 
the model does have some plausibility and it can be brought to bear to help explain the 
possible role of the amygdala in autistic spectrum disorders, which is the topic of the next 
section.
Evidence implicating the amygdala in autistic- 
spectrum disorders
Cellular pathology of the amygdala in ASDs
Bauman and Kemper (1985) examined the microscopic organisation of six post-mortem 
autistic brains. Nissl stained sections of brain tissue from autistic cases were compared to
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age-matched controls in which corresponding areas were compared under the microscope. 
They report that neurons in the amygdala of the autistic subjects were unusually small 
and more densely packed than those of controls. In a later review, Kemper and Baumann 
(1993) suggest that this pathology is indicative of a curtailed neuronal maturation. The 
only other study to examine the cellular pathology of the amygdala in autism also 
examined six post-mortem autistic brains (Bailey et al., 1998). However, in this case the 
authors were unable to find any significant differences compared to control brains.
Both of these studies suffer from two major drawbacks. Firstly, they are both complicated 
by including a number of cases who, as well as having autism, suffered from epileptic 
seizures. Epilepsy itself is associated with cell loss in the amygdala (Pitkanen et al., 1998) 
and may be a confounding factor in the autism studies. Secondly, both studies did not 
conduct quantitative analysis. Therefore, although suggestive and theoretically interesting, 
the results of Bauman and Kemper (1985) require urgent replication.
Structural MRI studies
There have been at least 15 MRI studies investigating the structure of the amygdala in 
autistic-spectrum disorders; these are summarised in table 1. Findings have been 
remarkably inconsistent, with results showing increases (Abell et al., 1999;Howard et al., 
2000;Schumann et al., 2004;Sparks et al., 2002), decreases (Aylward et al., 1999;Herbert 
et al., 2003;Nacewicz et al., 2006;Pierce et al., 2001;Rojas et al., 2004;Yamasue et al., 
2005) and no differences (Bigler et al., 2003;Dziobek et al., 2006;Haznedar et al., 
2000;Palmen et al., 2006) in amygdala volume between autistic groups and controls. 
There is substantial variation amongst these studies in terms of the method of volumetry 
employed, the types of potentially confounding factors controlled for and, not least, in
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terms of the characteristics of the subject groups (see table 1). Of the latter, the age of the 
participants has proven to be a crucial factor and when this is taken into account, a 
comprehensible pattern begins to emerge from the data. For example, Schumman et al.
(2004) show that, in normally developing children, there is a steep linear increase in 
amygdala volume from infancy to late adolescence. In autistic children, however, this 
trend is not apparent; instead the amygdala is already of a large size in infancy but 
seemingly remains this size throughout development. The result is that autistic children 
will tend to have bigger amygdala than controls if tested in early childhood but show no 
differences in adolescence. This broad pattern (the absence of normal amygdala growth 
through development) has been replicated by Nacewicz et al., {in press). However, they 
show that in adolescence and progressing into adulthood, the amygdala of autistic 
individuals may be reduced in volume compared to controls. Overall, this pattern of an 
increased amygdala volume in early childhood, no difference in adolescence and a 
decreased volume in adulthood is largely supported by the literature. For example, Sparks 
et al. (2002) found greater amygdala volumes in a group of 2-5 year olds with autism. 
Bigler et al. (2003) and Palmen et al. (2006) find no differences between groups with a 
mean age in the middle of adolescence (14 and 15 years respectively). Finally, with 
adults samples (mean age > 20 years), Aylward et al. (1999), Pierce et al. (2001) and 
Rojas et al. (2004) all found smaller amygdala volumes relative to controls.
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Table 1. Summary of structural MRI studies o f the amygdala in AS
C*u>
Name & 
Year
Technique Number of Subjects and 
Diagnosis
Age
Mean(SD)
Range
Controlled
for?
Amygdala volume findings Other findings Control 
for brain 
volume?
Aylward
etal.
1999
Manual tracing 14 HFA (IQ>80)
Clinical diagnosis, confirmed 
with ADI-R and ADOS
20.5 yrs 
(1.8)
11 -  37 yrs
Age, sex, IQ, 
family socio­
economic 
status
|  AMY I hippocampus Yes.
Abell et 
al. 1999
VBM 15 HFA
Clinical diagnosis, 
confirmed with an unspecified 
checklist. The rater does not 
appear to have been blind to 
subject group.
28.8 yrs 
(6.6)
Age, sex, 
handedness,
IQ
t  AMY |  right paracingulate 
i  left inferior frontal gyrus 
I left occipito-temporal junction 
t  anterior lobe of cerebellar hemisphere 
f pyramid of cerebellar vermis 
t  left middle temporal gyrus 
t  right inferior temporal gyrus
No
Pierce et 
al. 2001
Manual tracing 7 Autism
Clinical diagnosis, confirmed 
with ADI-R, ADOS and 
Childhood autism rating scale
29.5 yrs 
(8.0)
21 -  41 yrs
Sex, age, 
handedness
i  AMY No
Haznedar 
et al. 
2000
Manual tracing 10 Autism 
7 AS
Clinical diagnosis, 
Confirmed by ADI-R in 13 
individuals
27.7 yrs 
(11.3)
Sex, age No differences between 
control group and either the 
autistic or the AS group
AS group AMY > Autistic 
group
Yes
Howard
etal.
2000
Manual -  point 
counting
10 mixed autism and AS 
(numbers not specified)
Clinical diagnosis,
NOT confirmed
15.8-40
yrs
Sex, age, 
verbal IQ
t AMY Trend towards |  hippocampus No
Sparks et
al. 2002
Manual tracing 29 Autism 
16 PD-NOS
Clinical diagnosis, confirmed 
with ADI-R and ADOS
4.0 yrs
(0.4)
2.2-4.7 
yrs
Age, sex Autism: f AMY
PD-NOS: No difference 
after controlling for total 
brain volume
None after correcting for total brain volume Yes.
Salmond 
et al. 
2003
‘Individual’ VBM 
Comparing 
individual autistic 
brains to all 
controls
3 HFA 
11 AS
Clinical diagnosis, NOT 
confirmed
12.9yrs 
8 -  18 yrs
Age only. 
NOTE: Sex 
ratios poorly 
matched
7/14 show abnormal grey 
matter density in the 
amygdala
7/14 show hippocampal abnormalities.
13/14 show OFC abnormalities
10/14 show STG abnormalities
11/14 show cerebellum abnormalities
0/14 show visual cortex abnormalities (control)
No
Herbert
etal.
(2003)
Semi-automated 
segmentation into 
principal grey 
matter structures
17 HFS (IQ>80)
Wing Autistic Disorder Interview 
Checklist, confirmed by blind 
clinical diagnosis
7 -  11 yrs Sex, age I Amygdala-hippocampal 
complex
Yes
Bigler et Manual tracing 26 normocephalic autism NC: Age, sex No differences Yes,
0 \
•£»>
aJ. 2003
12 macrocephalic autism 
ADI-R and ADOS
14.2yrs 
(6.1) 
8 -31  yrs
MC:
12.8yrs
(4.43)
7-19yrs
Schuman 
net al. 
2004
Manual tracing 19LFA (IQ<70)
27 HFA (IQ>70)
25 AS (IQ>70 plus no language 
delay)
Clinical diagnosis, confirmed 
with ADI-R and ADOS
7.5-18.5
yrs
Age and sex 7,5-12.5 vr olds;
LFA j AMY 
HFA t  AMY 
AS t  AMY (n.s. trend)
12.75-18.5 vr olds 
No difference
Hippocampus enlarged at all ages (significant for 
LFA and HFA, only a trend for AS)
Yes.
Rojas et 
al. 2004
Manual tracing 15 Autism
Clinical diagnosis, confirmed 
with ADI-R and ADOS
30.3 yrs 
(9.1)
19-47 yrs
Sex |  AMY I Hippocampus Yes.
Cerebral
volume
Dziobek
etal.
2006
Manual tracing 17 AS
Clinical diagnosis, confirmed 
with ADI-R
41,4yrs 
(9.9)
Age, sex, 
education, IQ
No diff before or after 
controlling for brain 
volume.
BUT, controls show +ve 
correlation between 
amygdala and brain 
volume, which is not 
present with AS group.
Controls: AMY +ve correlation with recoanition 
of Ekman faces (.6) (combined emotions) and 
novel ToM task (.45)
AS: Slight +.ve n.s. (.25 and . 17)
BUT -ve correlation between Amyg vol and 
ASD1 (-.55). Mostly driven by ‘narrow interest 
patterns’ but most subscales in -ve direction
Yes.
Palmen
etal.
2006
Manual tracing 21 HFA 
21 AS
Clinical diagnosis, confirmed 
with ADI-R
15.6 yrs 
(5.25)
7 -2 5  yrs
Age, sex, IQ,
parental
education,
handedness,
height,
weight
No differences No correlation between social scale of ADI-R and 
amygdala or hippocampal volume
No differences between HFA and AS
Yes,
Nacewic 
zetal. 
in press
Manual tracing 23 Autism 
5 AS
Clinical diagnosis, 
confirmed with ADI-R
15.4 yrs 
(4.6)
8 -  25 yrs
Age, sex, IQ 8 -  12.5 vr olds 
No difference 
12.5-25 vr olds 
i  AMY
+ve correlation between AMY volume and 
number of fixations on the eye region of faces
-ve correlation between AMY volume and 
reaction time on emotional faces task
-ve correlation between AMY volume and 
impairments in nonverbal communication and 
social reciprocity (as measured by ADI-R)
no correlation between AMY and presence of 
repetitive behaviours (as measured by ADI-R)
Yes.
Of the studies that do not fit with this age-related pattern, both Abell et al. (1999) and 
Howard et al. (2000) found increases in amygdala volume in groups of adults with an 
ASD. However, neither of these studies controlled for differences in total brain volume - 
a major deficiency given that there is much evidence of general cerebral enlargement in 
ASD (e.g. Courchesne and Pierce, 2005a). Herbert et al. (2003) report reductions in the 
volume of the amygdala-hippocampal complex (reported as a single entity) in young 
children. However, this is difficult to interpret, as changes in the amygdala and the 
hippocampus do not always co-vary (e.g. Howard et al., 2000;Salmond et al., 
2003;Schumann et al., 2004). This leaves two studies (Haznedar et al. 2000; Dziobek et 
al., 2006), which do not fit into the pattern described above, both of which found no 
differences between adult samples of cases and controls (where a reduction in amygdala 
volume would have been expected). The subject groups of these latter studies contained 
only (Dziobek et al., 2006), or a substantial proportion of (Haznedar et al., 2000), high- 
functioning (AS) individuals, whereas earlier studies typically contained a number of 
more severely autistic subjects. Recent work appears to suggest that severity of autistic 
symptoms may interact with age to predict volume changes in the amygdala, as will be 
discussed below.
On the basis of their data, Nacewicz et al. (in press) suggest that both age and severity of 
autistic symptoms influence amygdala volume in ASD. As well as the age-related 
differences discussed above, the authors report that amygdala volume in ASD was 
negatively correlated with both the non-verbal communication and the social reciprocity 
scale of the ADI-R: that is, the autistic subjects with the smallest amygdala showed the 
most impairment. Interestingly, these findings are echoed in the results of an eye-tracking 
experiment of emotion recognition on the same individuals (Nacewicz et al., in press). 
Autistic subjects with the smallest amygdala showed the slowest judgement of emotional
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expressions and the least fixation on the eye regions of the faces. Therefore, smaller 
amygdala volume was associated with increased severity of social impairment, measured 
by both a standard diagnostic interview and by behavioural data of eye fixations.
In light of the above, the negative findings of Haznedar et al. (2000) and Dziobek et al. 
(2006) are perhaps not as inconsistent with the pattern emerging from the other structural 
MRI studies as would first appear. Although they find no significant differences with 
healthy controls, Haznedar et al. (2000) do find that the amygdala of their AS subjects is 
significantly larger than that of the autistic patients. Furthermore, across the combined 
Asperger and autism groups, left amygdala volume is negatively correlated with 
impairments in non-verbal communication as measured by the ADI-R. Dziobek et al. 
(2006) show a non-significant trend towards similar negative correlations between all 
sub-scales of the ADI-R and amygdala volume. Therefore, there is an emerging 
consensus of a link between measures of social impairment and structural pathology of 
the amygdala in ASD. Impairment appears to interact with age to predict amygdala 
volume: enlarged amygdala in childhood make way to either normal or abnormally small 
amygdala volumes in adulthood, depending on the severity of autistic symptomology.6
These data beg two related questions: firstly, what is causing the dynamic changes in 
amygdala volume over time in ASD and, secondly, what does it mean, on a cellular level, 
for an amygdala to be abnormally large or small? To answer this first question, Nacewicz 
et al. (in press) propose a model of hyper-activity induced enlargement followed by 
atrophy. Analogous to stress-induced dendritic cell arborisation observed in the amygdala
6 One very important caveat regarding this conclusion is that, so far, all the studies have been cross-sectional. Longitudinal studies are 
required to unequivocally demonstrate dynamic changes in amygdala volume through development.
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of rats, the supposedly hyperactive amygdala of an individual with ASD at first becomes 
enlarged before undergoing excitotoxic cell loss and consequent atrophy. This ‘hyper­
active’ amygdala model — linked to the idea that those with an ASD are hyper-aroused by 
social stimuli - is one of the two major theories currently being considered as an 
explanation of the amygdala’s involvement in ASD. It is discussed in more detail in a 
subsequent section. As for the second question of how volume changes relate to cellular 
pathology -  one can only speculate given the current knowledge and techniques. As 
discussed above, Nacewicz et al. (in press) turn to animal models of chronic stress for 
suggestions but it is clear that more work is required using post-mortem preparations of 
tissues from autistic brains.
fMRI studies
Perhaps surprisingly, given the structural findings, evidence for functional abnormalities 
of the amygdala in ASD is thin on the ground. What little evidence there is usually 
employs visual stimuli depicting emotional expressions. For example, Baron-Cohen et al. 
(1999b) have shown that the amygdala is activated when normal subjects judge what a 
person is thinking or feeling from looking at their eyes. Individuals with ASD, however, 
do not show this activation. Others have reported that amygdala activity in high- 
functioning individuals with autism is blunted compared with controls when implicitly 
processing emotional expressions (Critchley et al., 2000). Using a similar task, Welchew 
et al. (2005) show evidence of a functional connectivity between the amygdala and 
parahippocampal gyrus in controls but not in those with an ASD.
However, a major problem with these studies is that they did not measure the fixation 
patterns of subjects during the experimental tasks. There is substantial evidence
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(discussed in the next section) that individuals with an ASD do not explore faces 
normally -  in particular they spend less time fixating the eyes (e.g. Klin et al., 
2002;Pelphrey et al., 2002). Therefore, it is unclear whether the lack of amygdala 
activation in response to faces is a result of abnormal neural functioning or simply a 
failure to engage with the salient aspects of the stimuli. Recent evidence by Dalton et al.
(2005) suggests it might be the latter: in a concurrent eye-tracking and fMRI study where 
faces were presented, the autistic subjects spent less time fixating the eye region, as 
expected. However, amygdala activation correlated with the time spent fixating the eyes 
in the autistic group, which may indicate that the autistic amygdala can respond normally 
given the necessary visual input (however, as discussed later, this needs to be confirmed 
in studies where gaze fixation is manipulated within the same individual).
Inferences from neuropsychology
Some of the most provocative, albeit somewhat circumstantial, evidence for involvement 
of the amygdala in ASD comes from neuropsychology: autistic individuals show a 
variety of impairments that are reminiscent of patients with bilateral amygdala damage. 
For example, there have been reports that individuals with autism are impaired at 
recognising fear, and to a lesser extent sadness, anger and disgust, in facial expressions of 
emotion (Howard et al., 2000;Pelphrey et al., 2002). However, there have also been a 
number of negative findings (Adolphs et al., 2001;Castelli, 2005;Grossman et al., 2000). 
The latter two of these studies were conducted with children (mean chronological age 
11.8 and 12.3 respectively, verbal age 9.3 years for the second study) rather than adults, 
which may go some way to explaining the negative findings. For example, control 
children may not yet be developed enough to complete the task successfully, which
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would appear to be the case in the Grossman et al. (2000) study where control children 
only correctly identified 50% of the fearful faces (AS children identified 48% correctly).
The other negative finding, by Adolphs et al. (2001), warrants further consideration. In 
this study, facial emotion recognition performance is compared between a group of 7 
high-functioning autistic adults, 8 subjects with bilateral amygdala damage and 18 
normal controls. Despite not presenting statistics to specifically compare each group pair 
(presumably because of the small sample sizes), the authors claim that the ‘autistic 
subjects gave normal ratings to facial expressions [of the emotions]’ (Adolphs et al.; 2001, 
page 234). However, for fearful faces, 6 out of 7 autistic subjects gave responses below 
the mean for normal controls and this deficit was by at least 1 standard deviation in 4 of 
the 6 cases (Adolphs et al., 2001, figure 2). A similar, albeit less severe, pattern is seen 
for sad and disgusted expressions. It is true that, in general, the autistic performance was 
better than that of the amygdala damaged participants (although, again no statistical test 
of this is presented). However, as the authors point out, some individual autistic 
performances are as poor as the worst results of the amygdala damaged group, indicating 
the possibility that a subset of autistic individuals may be disproportionately impaired. 
Interestingly, both Howard et al. (2000) and Pelphrey et al. (2002) report much greater 
variance for autistic fear recognition responses than for control responses. This variability 
and the reasons for it deserve further investigation and form part of the rationale behind 
the experiments presented in chapters 4 and 5 of this thesis.
Although there is some debate about the existence of a ‘basic emotion’ recognition deficit 
in ASD, the finding that such individuals have problems inferring complex ‘social’ 
emotions from faces (and particularly the eye region) has not been contested (Baron- 
Cohen et al., 1997a;Baron-Cohen et al., 1997b;Baron-Cohen et al., 2001a). As discussed
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in an earlier section, patients with amygdala damage have been shown to be impaired at 
the same task used by Baron-Cohen and colleagues (Adolphs et al., 2002). In fact, like 
autistics, amygdala lesioned patients are typically worse at recognising the ‘social’ 
emotions than the ‘basic’ ones.
As well as the test of basic emotion recognition, Adolphs et al. (2001) compared high- 
functioning autistic adults to bilateral amygdala damaged subjects and healthy controls on 
a test of ‘social judgement from faces’: subjects had to judge the trustworthiness of a 
series of individuals from facial photographs. Like amygdala damaged patients, autistic 
individuals gave abnormally positive ratings to those faces which controls rate as the 
most negative.
Finally, there is consistent evidence that, like SM, autistic individuals scan faces 
abnormally, spending less time fixating on the eye region than normal controls (Dalton et 
al., 2005;Klin et al., 2002;Pelphrey et al., 2002;Nacewicz et al. in press). Interestingly, 
the one study to not produce this result was conducted with children (van der Geest et al., 
2002), which perhaps goes someway to explaining the failure to find a fear recognition 
deficit in younger individuals with ASD (Castelli, 2005). Given the evidence that 
structural amygdala volumes may develop from abnormally large in childhood to 
abnormally small in adulthood and the fact that smaller amygdala volume is associated 
with less eye fixation and poorer fear recognition, it is an intriguing possibility that the 
development of these three variables (amygdala volume, eye fixation and fear recognition) 
is linked. A longitudinal study could provide useful insight into this issue.
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The relevance of the non-human primate amygdala lesion data
As discussed in a previous section, Amaral has argued forcibly that the amygdala is not 
required for the expression of species-typical social behaviour in the adult or for its 
development in infants (Amaral, 2003;Amaral et al., 2003c). This is based largely on the 
fact that amygdala lesioned monkeys can and do engage in affiliative social behaviour, 
such as cooing, grunting and grooming (Bauman et al., 2004b;Emery et al., 2001;Prather 
et al., 2001). Based on these findings, Amaral and colleagues go on to argue that 
amygdala pathology must therefore not be involved in producing abnormal social 
behaviour in autism (Amaral et al., 2003a;Amaral and Corbett, 2002). Instead, if it is 
involved at all, it may be with producing the anxiety which is commonly experienced by 
autistic individuals (parallels are drawn here to the increased social fear exhibited by 
neonatally lesioned monkeys; Baumann et al., 2004b). However, these conclusions may 
be a little premature. It is true that the lesioned monkeys do not become socially 
withdrawn but it is not yet clear whether their perception and interpretation of social 
signals is entirely normal. Neonatal lesions produced a complex and subtle set of 
behavioural changes later in life (Baumann et al. 2004b). At 12 months old, the lesioned 
monkeys exhibited both inappropriate social fear and increased affiliative behaviour. 
Coupled with this, there is some evidence that the lesioned animals were not fully 
integrated into the non-lesioned group. It is therefore possible that the lesioned monkeys 
were impaired in their ability to perceive and accurately interpret social cues from 
conspecifics. More work with these monkeys, using specifically designed behavioural 
tasks, is required to provide a definitive answer to this issue.
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Overview
Overall, a link between the amygdala and ASD seems probable, but its nature remains 
uncertain. Taking subject age and the severity of autistic symptoms into account, the 
structural imaging data begins to provide a comprehensible picture and suggests 
hypotheses regarding dynamic abnormalities of amygdala structure, which can be tested 
with longitudinal studies. Of immediate concern, however, are the cellular correlates of 
these volumetric changes: existing post-mortem studies are flawed and require replication. 
The neuropsychological literature demonstrates some parallels between autistic 
individuals and patients with focal amygdala damage, consistent with the notion that 
amygdala dysfunction may contribute to autistic symptoms. However, identical 
symptoms can have diverse aetiologies and a causal role of the amygdala in the social- 
cognitive deficits of ASD is far from proven. Perhaps functional neuroimaging 
experiments can shed light on this matter, although, to date, studies have been flawed by 
confounding neural and behavioural abnormalities. What is needed is a theory (or 
theories) predicting a specific role for the amygdala, which can lead to clear, falsifiable 
hypotheses. Two candidate theories have come to the fore in recent years and will be 
discussed in the following section.
Neurodevelopmental theories of the amygdala’s role 
in autistic-spectrum disorders
The two theories are based on the idea that failure to orient towards the socially 
meaningful parts of the environment can cause deficits in social perception and, if it 
occurs early in life, may deleteriously affect the development of social knowledge and 
understanding (see earlier section and Schultz, 2005;Tager-Flusberg and Sullivan, 2000). 
Both theories suppose that this kind of social inattention is present in ASD and that the
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amygdala plays a part in this. However, they differ in what they believe are the root 
causes of the social inattention, as will be explained below.
Lack of 'social interest’ -  Amygdala hypo-activation
A number of groups have presented variations of this theory (e.g. Critchley et al., 2000; 
Baron-Cohen et al., 2000) but its most vocal supporters have been Schultz and colleagues 
(Grelotti et al., 2002;Schultz et al., 2000b;Schultz, 2005). The basic premise is that during 
development, either through impairment with associative learning or via a failure of brain 
inter-connectivity, the amygdala is unable to flag social stimuli as meaningful. 
Neurophysiologically this would present as an amygdala hypo-activation in response to 
social stimuli, manifesting behaviourally as a ‘lack of social interest’. The result is 
reduced processing in cortical areas where high-level computations of social stimuli 
usually take place -  e.g. the FG and STS. This reduced processing could occur both 
directly, through a lack of amygdala neuromodulation of the FG or STS via feedback 
connections, or more indirectly through reduced attention and orientation towards the 
stimuli. Either way, over time the net result is hypothesised to be a hindering of social- 
perceptual learning and consequent underdevelopment of social-perceptual skills. These 
abilities are thought to provide a building block for higher-order social-cognitive abilities, 
such as ToM, and to provide the ‘scaffolding’ necessary to understand the barrage of non­
verbal communications that occur during social interaction (Baron-Cohen, 1994;Hobson, 
1993;Schultz, 2005;Tager-Flusberg and Sullivan, 2000). Therefore, this sequence of 
events, beginning with a failure to orient towards socially meaningful stimuli early in life, 
could result in the development of profound social-cognitive impairment by adulthood.
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Aversion to social stimuli -  Amygdala hyper-activation
The hyper-active amygdala model suggests that affected individuals find social stimuli 
over-arousing and hence aversive. Therefore, such stimuli are actively avoided (rather 
than ignored, as proposed by the hypo-active amygdala model). Neurophysiologically, 
the model predicts heightened amygdala responsiveness to relevant stimuli (so long as 
attention is directed towards those stimuli), manifesting behaviourally as anxiety and 
autonomic arousal. Like the hypo-active model, the failure to orient towards socially 
meaningful parts of the environment causes problems with social-perception, which over 
time may develop into more profound social-cognitive difficulties. The hyper-active 
model has its roots in the work of Hutt and Ounsted (1969), who suggested that 
individuals with autism actively avoid eye-contact in order to reduce the over-arousal 
produced in them by these stimuli, but the major proponents of its modem incarnation are 
Richard Davidson, David Amaral and colleagues (Amaral and Corbett, 2002;Dalton et al., 
2005;Nacewicz et al., in press).
Evidence, predictions and other considerations
To date, much of the available evidence could apply equally well to either the hyper­
active or the hypo-active theory -  the finding that autistics spend less time fixating the 
eye region of faces for example. However, some preliminary evidence for the hyper- 
responsive model has come to light. I will review this and then suggest a number of 
testable predictions based on both of the theories. The section then ends by discussing the 
idea that both theories could apply, but to different sub-sets of individuals with ASD, and 
by considering the place of the amygdala theories of autism within the broader suite of 
neurocognitive models of the disorder.
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The finding that neonatal amygdala lesion in macaques affects social fear rather than 
‘fundamental social interaction’ (Bauman et al., 2004a;Bauman et al., 2004b;Prather et al., 
2001), has been cited in support of the hyper-activity model (for example, see Amaral 
and Corbett, 2002, pg. 17). However, how the removal of a structure relates specifically 
to hyper- rather than hypo-activity is unclear. Furthermore, as discussed earlier, it is still 
uncertain exactly how and if neonatal amygdala lesion affects subtle social cognitive 
processes. More research with neonatally lesioned monkeys is required but has the 
potential to shed much light on the role of the amygdala in autism.
In their concurrent fMRI and eyetracking study, Dalton et al. (2005) showed that eye 
fixation within autistic individuals (but not controls) was positively correlated with 
amygdala activation. This, the authors claim, suggests that autistics are hyper-aroused by 
looking at eyes and so avoid them. However, the data are also consistent with the hypo- 
functional model: perhaps the individuals looking at the eyes the least are doing so 
because their amygdala are under-active and so are not flagging the eyes as salient. The 
lack of a correlation amongst the controls could be due to a ceiling effect for eye-fixation 
-  all the controls spent a significant time fixating the eyes. What is needed is an 
experiment where eye fixation is manipulated while amygdala activity or associated 
responses (such as SCRs) are measured. The hyper-active model would predict that 
autistics would show a greater response than controls when asked to look at the eyes, 
whereas the hypo-responsive model would predict the opposite effect. Self-report 
measures of arousal would also be beneficial -  for example the hyper-activity model 
would predict that eye fixation amongst the autistics will be negatively correlated with 
measures of social anxiety, whereas the hypo-responsive model would suggest there 
would be no such correlation. Experiments testing some of these predictions are 
presented in chapter 5.
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Nacewicz et al. (in press) found that autistic impairment interacts with age to predict 
abnormally large amygdala volume in childhood, followed by abnormally small 
amygdala volumes by adulthood. Furthermore, subjects with the smallest amygdala 
fixated the eye regions of faces the least. This, the authors conclude, is consistent with, ‘a 
model of hyperactivity-induced changes’ (initial outgrowth followed by atrophy) caused 
by heightened ‘allostatic load’ (Nacewicz et al. in press, pg. 20). As the authors readily 
admit, longitudinal studies are needed to substantiate the dynamic nature of their claims. 
However, the model also makes predictions which could be tested via cross-sectional 
studies. For example, if allostatic load is responsible for the volumetric changes (and for 
the lack of eye fixation) then autistic adults with the greatest levels of social anxiety 
should have the smallest amygdala -  this prediction is tested in chapter 5.
As yet, no evidence specifically in support of the hypo-functional theory has been 
published. However, the model does proffer a number of testable predictions, some of 
which have already been discussed. Those not yet mentioned relate to the supposed 
failure of the amygdala in autism to flag a socially salient event and to modulate attention 
accordingly. This failure could occur in at least two ways: by an inability to form 
stimulus-salient associations or by a failure of amygdala-cortical modulation. The first of 
these could be examined in associative learning experiments, using, fear conditioning for 
example.7 One way the second could be investigated behaviourally is via experiments 
where attention is modulated by stimulus salience -  an example paradigm is the 
emotional modulation of the attentional blink (Anderson and Phelps, 2001). Work of this 
kind is presented in chapter 6.
7 I am aware of both positive (Goldsmith, personal communication) and negative (Schultz, personal communication) findings of a fear 
conditioning impairment in autism, but none of these studies have yet been subject to peer review.
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One intriguing possibility is that both models apply, but to different sub-sets of 
individuals with an ASD. For example, while Hirstein et al. (2001) found elevated 
electrodermal activity in the majority of children with autism (70%), they also described 
a small sub-set (11%) with near absent responses. While this study is flawed by not 
making an objective measure of the focus of the children’s attention (by using eye- 
tracking for example), it does raise the possibility that there exists both autonomically 
hyper- and hypo-responsive sets of individuals. Perhaps parallels can be drawn here to 
behavioural classifications of autistic sub-types, which describe both ‘socially aloof and 
‘active, but odd’ individuals (Wing and Gould, 1979). It will be theoretically important to 
verify the existence of the hyper- and hypo-responsive sub-types via studies involving 
large numbers of participants.
It is important to point out that the theories described above do not attempt to give an all- 
encompassing neurocognitive account of ASDs. Rather, they are theories of how the 
amygdala might be involved in the aetiology of some autistic symptoms. Many areas of 
the brain have been implicated in the pathophysiology of autism and evidence suggests 
that there might be diffuse abnormalities in brain development (for review see Brambilla 
et al., 2003), resulting in impaired inter-regional connectivity (Courchesne and Pierce, 
2005a;Courchesne and Pierce, 2005b). The value of the amygdala theories is that they 
have the potential to explain the sometimes inconsistent body of evidence implicating the 
amygdala in ASDs. At best, however, they are likely to represent one of a number of 
‘routes’ to social-cognitive impairment in this disorder.
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Chapter summary, introduction to the experiments 
and predictions
It has been argued that social cognition represents a unique domain or module within the 
architecture of the mind, embodied in a distributed network of brain regions each 
somewhat specialised for the task of processing social information. In support of this, the 
existence of special populations, such as ASD and Williams Syndrome, as well as 
patients with focal brain damage, has shown that social- and non-social cognitive ability 
can vary independently. To date though, no studies have examined individual differences 
in social cognitive ability amongst the normal population and linked these to underlying 
neural function. In chapter 3 I attempt a first effort at such an experiment by investigating 
the variability in emotion recognition ability in the normal population. Specifically, 
because of its association with the amygdala and with disorders of social cognition such 
as ASD, I examine the ability to recognise fear from facial expressions. I predicted that:
a) poor ability to recognise fearful expressions would extend to social cognitive 
problems not directly related to face processing -  namely, the Frith-Happe theory 
of mind task
b) in fMRI, poor ability to recognise fearful expressions would be associated with
i. reduced activation of the amygdala and associated regions of the ‘social 
brain’ in response to socially salient stimuli
ii. reduced functional integration between the amygdala and other areas of 
the ‘social brain’, such as the FG and STS
c) poor fear recognition ability would be associated with greater day to day 
difficulties with social interaction and communication
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ASDs are disorders primarily of social cognition and a number of researchers have 
suggested that dysfunction of the amygdala may have a role to play in the pathology of 
the condition, citing neuroanatomical, neurophysiological and neuropsychological data 
(Baron-Cohen et al., 2000a;Sweeten et al., 2002). Of the latter, one controversial 
assertion is that, like patients with amygdala damage, individuals with an ASD are poor 
at recognising fearful expressions. In chapter 4, I investigate this claim and attempt to 
link it to another neuropsychological phenomenon of ASD which is reminiscent of 
patients with amygdala damage: the reduced amount of time spent fixating the eyes. 
Specifically, I predict:
a) an overall fear recognition deficit in a group of adults with an ASD
b) an overall reduced amount of time spent fixating the eyes in the ASD group
c) a link between fear recognition and time spent fixating the eyes, such that 
those with the lowest fear score are the subjects who fixate the eyes the least
d) that lower eye fixation and poorer fear recognition in the ASD group are 
associated with a greater degree of day to day social impairment
The exact nature of the amygdala’s role within the social-cognitive network is a matter of 
considerable debate. With a few caveats, the weight of evidence suggests that the 
amygdala is not necessary for adequate social interaction in the adult. However, it may 
play a vital role in social-perceptual development, the disruption of which may lead to 
profound social-cognitive impairment later in life. This notion informs two recent 
theories of how the amygdala might be involved in ASD which differ in their proposed 
aetiology but converge in their later pathogenesis. In the hypo-functional model, the 
amygdala fails to flag social stimuli as significant, and so they are ignored. In the hyper- 
functional model, social stimuli cause amygdala-mediated over-arousal and so they are
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avoided. In either case, the net result is an under-development of social-perceptual, 
followed by social-cognitive, ability.
In chapters 5 and 6 I present psychological, psychophysiological and neuroanatomical 
experiments with two, interrelated, aims:
1) to test predictions of the hyper- and hypo-active amygdala models of ASD in 
order to gain greater insight into the amygdala’s role in ASD and social cognition 
in general
2) to explain the root causes of the reduced eye fixation and poor fear recognition in 
ASD, along the lines proposed by the two competing models
Specifically, I examine:
a) the relationship, in ASD, between social anxiety and the amount of time spent 
fixating the eyes. The hyper-active model predicts that there will be a negative 
correlation between these two variables.
b) the relationship between the size of the autonomic response when made to 
look at eyes and the amount of time spent fixating eyes during free-viewing. 
The hyper-active model would predict a negative correlation between these 
two variables; the hypo-active model would predict a positive correlation.
c) the relationship between the volume of grey matter in the amygdala and:
i. the amount of time spent fixating the eyes
ii. fear recognition ability
iii. autonomic response to eyes
iv. level of social anxiety.
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The hyper-active model would predict positive correlations between grey 
matter volume and (i) and (ii) above, but negative correlations with (iii) and 
(iv).
d) the ability of individuals with an ASD to show perceptual benefit for 
emotionally arousing stimuli, using an emotional modulation of the attentional 
blink paradigm. This ability has been shown to require a functioning 
amygdala and is thought to be a specific example of the amygdala’s role in 
enhancing cortical processing in response to a salient event (Anderson and 
Phelps, 2001). The hypo-active model hypothesises that this system is 
disrupted in ASD and would therefore predict less perceptual benefit for 
arousing events in cases versus controls.
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Chapter 2 -  Methodology
Experimental groups
Low and normal fear scoring males
In chapter 3 I present a series of experiments on males from the normal population who 
showed either low (poor) or high (normal) ability to recognise fear in facial expressions. 
These individuals were picked from a large sample of UCL students and staff who took 
part in an on-line version of the Ekman-Friesen test of facial affect (see below). Exact 
details of this recruitment procedure and of the group characteristics are given in chapter 
3.
AS group and their controls
In chapters 4 - 6 1  present a number of experiments conducted with adults with an ASD. 
As this group was intended to function as a model for understanding normal social 
cognition, I decided to study only high-functioning (IQ > 90) individuals with a diagnosis 
of AS, rather than people with autism, which is often associated with lower functioning. 
It was felt that this group represented a sample with a more ‘pure’ social cognitive deficit, 
unadulterated by global cognitive impairment.
Recruitment
Subjects with AS were recruited from a number of sources. Adverts were placed in the 
National Autistic Society newsletter, on the ASPEN message board (part of the National 
Autistic Society website), in the Autism London newsletter and on a website that
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provides information to university students with AS 
(http: 7\\vvvv.users.dircon.co.uk/-cns/). In addition, a list of social groups set up for 
individuals with AS was obtained from the National Autistic Society and each of these 
was contacted with a view to sending information sheets out to its members. This 
provided a particularly fruitful method of recruitment -  several volunteers were found, 
mainly from the Woking and Bristol social groups.
Controls were picked to be age, gender and (where possible) IQ matched with the AS 
group (see chapters 4, 5 and 6 for the exact group characteristics, which differed slightly 
between studies). Suitable volunteers were recruited either from databases of people who 
had taken part in earlier studies who had indicated that they would be willing to take part 
in more, from emails circulated around the Institute of Child Health (not including any 
departments working within the psychology or neuroscience fields) or from adverts on 
the gumtree website (wwvv.gumtree.com. a popular site for finding casual work in 
London).
Inclusion and exclusion critena
For ethical reasons, all subjects were at least 18 years of age. AS subjects were required 
to have a diagnosis from a UK psychiatrist or psychologist. Diagnosis was confirmed 
using the autism diagnostic observation schedule (Lord et al., 1989;Lord et al., 2000, 
ADOS, see below for details); to be included, an individual had to score above cut-off for 
at least autistic-spectrum disorder (the wider autism phenotype). A parental diagnostic 
interview, such as the ADI-R (Lord et al., 1994) or 3-DI (Skuse et al., 2004), was not 
used because, for many of our participants, a reliable parental informant was unavailable 
(mean age of subjects was ~35 years, range 1 8 - 6 2  years). In order to further quantify
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autistic symptomology in our sample, the autistic-spectrum quotient (AQ, Baron-Cohen 
et al., 2001b) was administered to the participants (see below for details). For both groups, 
individuals were excluded if they had a history of neurological or psychiatric disorder 
other than that under study. For AS subjects this was relaxed in relation to anxiety and 
depression, which were felt to be unavoidable comorbid conditions (Gillott et al., 
2001;Gillott and Standen, 2004;Stewart et al., 2006;Weisbrot et al., 2005).
ADOS
The ADOS is a semi-structured, standardised assessment of social interaction, 
communication and imaginative use of materials for individuals suspected of having an 
ASD (Lord et al., 2000). It consists of four 30-minute modules, each designed to be 
administered to different individuals according to their level of expressive language. In 
the case of the present thesis, this was always module 4, designed for adults or 
adolescents with fluent speech. This module consists of an interview section, during 
which both socioemotional questions and questions about daily living are asked. There 
are also a number of tasks, such as describing a picture, which tap into imaginative 
abilities.
The ADOS interviews were conducted and marked by a trained examiner, Rebecca 
Chilvers, to whom I am grateful. Interviews took place in a quiet room and were filmed 
for later off-line assessment. The ADOS algorithm for DSM-IV/ICD-10 diagnosis (Lord 
et al., 1999) was used to classify individuals as ‘autistic’, ‘autistic spectrum’ or ‘below 
cut-off. Individuals below cut-off were excluded from the study. Classification is made 
on the basis of exceeding thresholds on each of two domains: reciprocal social interaction
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and communication, and exceeding a threshold for a combined social-communication 
total.
Autistic-spectrum quotient
The autistic-spectrum quotient (AQ) is a brief, self-administered instrument for 
measuring the degree to which an adult with normal intelligence has the traits associated 
with the autistic spectrum (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001b). It comprises of 50 questions, 
made up of 10 questions assessing 5 different areas of autistic symptomology: social skill, 
attention switching, attention to detail, communication and imagination. Baron-Cohen et 
al. (2001b) report that a group of 58 adults with AS or high-functioning autism had a 
mean score of 35.8 (SD = 6.5), whereas a sample of 174 randomly selected controls had a 
mean score of 16.4 (SD = 6.3). In addition, 80% of the adults with AS or high- 
functioning autism scored > 32, compared to 2% of controls.
Neuropsychological tests
IQ m easures
As a measure of IQ, I used the Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence (WASI, 
Psychological Corporation, 1999). The WASI gives good concordance with the longer 
Weschler Adult Intelligence Scale (Psychological Corporation, 1997) from which it was 
developed, but is much quicker to administer, usually taking 30 minutes or less. The 
WASI consists of four subtests: Vocabulary, Block Design, Similarities and Matrix 
Reasoning. Results from the first and the third of these are combined to give a measure of
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‘Verbal IQ’, whereas the second and the fourth give a ‘Performance IQ’ measure. A 
combination of all four gives a ‘Full scale IQ’ score.
Developmental te s t of visual perception
Although the performance IQ subsets of the WASI are thought to measure aspects of 
visuo-spatial ability (Psychological Corporation, 1999), it was felt that a more direct test 
of visual-perceptual skills should be taken to rule out the possibility that poor fear 
recognition was related to deficits in this domain. To this end, in chapter 4 I administered 
the Developmental Test of Visual Perception (DTVP, Reynolds et al., 2002). This battery 
is thought to provide a purer test of visual perceptual skill than the performance IQ 
subtests of the WASI as it is as divorced as possible from reasoning ability (Reynolds et 
al., 2002).
Revised NEO Personality Inventory
In chapters 3 and 5 I am interested in characterising subjects’ personality. The instrument 
I have chosen for this is the Revised NEO Personality Inventory (NEO PI-R, Costa and 
McCrae, 1991). The NEO PI-R was developed to operationalise the classic five-factor 
model of personality, the structure of which has emerged from the last four decades of 
research (Digman, 1990). The five factors represent the most basic dimensions 
underlying the traits identified in both natural languages and psychological questionnaires. 
They are: ‘neuroticism’, ‘extraversion’, openness to experience’, ‘agreeableness’ and 
‘conscientiousness’. Each of the five factors is made up of six intercorrelated traits 
known as facets, which offer a more fine grained analysis of personality. For example, 
‘neuroticism’ comprises the following facets: ’anxiety’, ‘angry hostility’, ‘depression’,
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self-consciousness’, ‘impulsiveness’, and ‘vulnerability’. There are eight questions for 
each facet, making 48 for each factor and 240 in total. The instrument takes 
approximately 40 minutes to complete.
Anxiety m easures
As well as personality, in chapters 2 and 5 I measure the level of anxiety experienced by 
the participants. I am interested in both general anxiety and also in the specific case of 
anxiety in social situations. For the former I used the trait portion of the Spielberger 
State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (Spielberger, 1983) and, for the latter, the Social Phobia 
and Anxiety Inventory (Turner et al., 1999).
Trait portion of the State-Trait Anxiety inventory
Trait anxiety refers to relatively stable individual differences in anxiety-proneness, that is, 
to differences between people in their tendency to perceive stressful situations as 
dangerous or threatening and to respond to such situations with elevations in the intensity 
of their state anxiety (Spielberger, 1983). The trait portion of the state-trait anxiety 
inventory is a self-report questionnaire of twenty items. Scores are transformed into T- 
scores taking into account the age of the person being examined.
Social-Phobia and Anxiety Inventory
The Social Phobia and Anxiety Inventory (SPAI, Turner et al., 1999) is an empirically 
derived self-report inventory specifically developed for social phobia and anxiety. It 
assesses the somatic, cognitive and behavioural aspects of social anxiety across a wide
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range of social situations and settings. It contains 45 items arranged in a Likert scale 
format, allowing for an assessment of symptom severity.
Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale
Factors such as faking or response bias can diminish the validity of self-report 
questionnaires (Cronbach, 1990;Greenwald et al., 2002). In anxiety measures, a 
prominent form of response bias is social desirability, i.e. the tendency to portray oneself 
in a positive light, which can lead to a substantial underestimation of an individual’s true 
value on these dimensions (Egloff and Schmukle, 2003). To control for this, it is common 
practice in anxiety research to attempt to measure the propensity for social desirability 
and to use it as a covariate in statistical analyses where appropriate. To this end, wherever 
I take an anxiety measure I also administer the Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability 
Scale (SDS, Crowne and Marlowe, 1960). The SDS consists of 33 questions, drawn from 
a population of items defined by behaviours which are culturally sanctioned and 
approved but which are improbable of occurrence. Participants decide ‘true’ or ‘false’ 
depending on whether or not they believe themselves to engage in the behaviour. The 
resulting score is an index of the tendency to portray oneself in a good light.
Ekman-Friesen Test of Facial Affect Recognition
The photographs of emotional expressions used in this test were produced using the 
FACS system, discussed in chapter 1 (Ekman and Friesen, 1978). The pictures have been 
validated by numerous samples from a wide variety of cultural backgrounds, including 
groups of previously isolated peoples, such as the Dani of West New Guinea (Ekman and 
Friesen, 1971). Furthermore, as discussed in chapter 1, the photographs have been used in
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countless neuroimaging experiments and reliably activate brain areas known to be 
involved in social and emotional processing, such as the amygdala, MPfC and STG (e.g. 
Morris et al., 1996;Winston et al., 2003a;Winston et al., 2004). In addition, the test has 
been used with numerous samples of psychiatric and neurological patients, allowing 
direct comparison between my data and these populations.
The exact procedure and presentation of the test differed slightly between the 
experiments -  these details are given in the relevant results chapters. In each case, 
however, certain factors were constant. Subjects viewed 60 halftone photographs, 10 
exemplars of each of the 6 basic emotions (happiness, sadness, fear, surprise, anger and 
disgust). Subjects were shown the six emotion labels and were told to “pick the one that 
best fits what you think the person is feeling”. Before beginning the experiment, subjects 
completed 6 practice examples, one for each emotion. Feedback was not given on these 
items, the stimuli were not used in the subsequent test and responses to them were not 
analysed. The dependent variables were the number of correctly identified examples for 
each of the six emotions.
Frith-Happe theory of mind task
Background
This animated task was chosen as a measure of ToM ability. It has been clinically 
validated in studies of ASD children (Abell et al., 2000) and adults (Castelli et al., 2000; 
Castelli et al., 2002). In normal individuals, the task recruits the posterior STG, the TP 
and the MPfC — brain areas consistently activated during ToM reasoning (for review, see 
Gallagher and Frith, 2003). One advantage of the Frith-Happe task is that it is sensitive
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enough to measure deficits in high-functioning individuals, who would have no difficulty 
in passing traditional ToM tasks (Frith et al., 1994). Another advantage is that the stimuli 
are perceptually very simple and removed form the human context: it does not require the 
perception of social cues from the face for example. In this sense it is a somewhat ‘purer’ 
test of mentalising ability than other tasks designed for high-functioning individuals, such 
as the ‘reading the mind from the eyes’ task (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001a).
Procedure
Eight silent cartoons, each featuring a large red triangle and a smaller blue triangle, were 
shown on a computer screen. Each animation lasted between 34 and 45 seconds. There 
were two conditions, with four animations in each condition. In one type of animation, 
the actions of one character responded simply to those of the other. Animations of this 
type of action are intended to elicit goal directed action descriptions (e.g. following, 
fighting) and thus will be referred to as ‘Goal Directed’ (GD) animations. The ‘scripts’ of 
the GD cartoons involved the triangles chasing each other, following each other, fighting 
with each other and dancing with each other. The second type of cartoon, by contrast, 
showed one character reacting to the other character’s mental state. This type of action 
pattern is intended to elicit more mental-state (theory of mind) descriptions (e.g. mocking, 
coaxing) and will hereafter be referred to as ‘Theory of Mind’ (ToM) animations. The 
‘scripts’ to the ToM cartoons involved the triangles persuading, surprising, mocking and 
seducing each other (see Abell et al., 2000, for more details).
Participants were read the task instructions (Castelli et al., 2000; Castelli et al., 2002) 
asking them to describe what they thought the triangles were doing. The animations were 
shown in a random order. Participants’ spoken responses were recorded, transcribed and
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scored. Following Castelli et al. (2000, 2002), responses to each animation were scored 
on three dimensions: lntentionality (degree of intentional attribution, range 0-5, with 
absence of intentional language at one extreme and elaborate use at the other), 
Appropriateness (range 0-2), with incorrect at one extreme and highly appropriate at the 
other and Length of description (0-4, ranging from no response to four or more clauses). 
Responses were scored by two trained raters who were blind to NFS / LFS group 
membership. Where there was discrepancy between raters, the item was discussed and a 
compromise score was agreed upon.
Psychophysiological measurements
In chapters 3, 4 and 5, I use eyetracking technology to monitor subjects’ gaze fixation 
patterns. In chapter 4 and 5, I measure skin conductance responses as an index of 
autonomic arousal. These are described in detail below.
Eyetracking
Background
Detailed visual information can be obtained only through the fovea, therefore the eyes 
must move in order to provide information about any object or scene which is to be 
inspected in detail (Norton and Stark, 1971). Measuring eye gaze fixations (points in the 
visual field which are foveated for at least 100ms) has therefore been used extensively in 
psychology as an indicator of which parts of a visual stimulus a person is attending to (e.g. 
Adolphs et al., 2005;Keating and Keating, 1982;Norton and Stark, 1971;Walkersmith et 
al., 1977). I use this technique in chapters 3, 4 and 5 to measure the attention paid to the 
eye region of faces. Below, I describe the theory behind the technique, plus give details
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of the set-up and experimental procedure used to produce the results given in later 
chapters.
Theory of measurement
A beam of infra-red light illuminates the eye and its image is captured using a video 
camera. Two bright circular areas are apparent in the image -  one corresponds to the 
pupil and the other to the reflection of the illuminator from the front surface of the cornea 
(the corneal reflection or CR). Using the fact that these features are usually the brightest 
in the image, plus some prior information on their likely size, shape and smoothness, the 
system is able to identify the centre of both the pupil and CR. The distance and direction 
of the separation between the pupil and the CR varies with eye rotation (change in point 
of gaze) but does not vary significantly with eye translation (head movement with respect 
to the eye camera). A change in pupil-CR separation is therefore proportional to the 
change in point of gaze. By first using a calibration procedure, which measures pupil-CR 
separation at several known points on a screen, it is possible to calculate where on that 
screen the person is fixating with an error of less than one degree of visual angle.
Data acquisition
An ASL (Applied Science Laboratories) Model 504 remote infrared pupil-corneal 
reflection eye tracker (ASL 2001) was used to measure the participants’ line of gaze on 
the fixed image shown. The eye tracker was linked to a host computer (Dell Workstation 
Precision 650) which served as a digital data-recording device, and an auxiliary video 
display unit for observing the monitored eye. The stimulus scene was visible from the
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tester’s sitting position. Retinal and CR produced by the infrared reflection were sampled 
and transmitted to the host computer for recording at 120 Hz.
Experimental task and procedure
The assessment took part in a darkened and sound-proof room. Participants were seated 
in a comfortable chair in front of the computer monitor and were asked to place their chin 
on a padded chin rest. The chin rest was provided to minimise head movements, thus 
maximising the accuracy of the eye tracking, and to ensure a stable distance of 80 cm 
between the subject and the centre of the stimulus display screen. The task was divided 
into two phases, with a break in between the two during which the subject was allowed to 
move around. At the beginning of each phase, a brief calibration procedure took place, 
during which subjects were asked to look at nine points of known position on the screen. 
This allowed for individual differences in head and seating position.
The experiment was realised using Cogent 2000 (http://www.vislab.ucl.ac.uk/Cogent/), 
which is a MatLab toolbox, designed for creating psychological experiments. The stimuli 
used were 60 high-resolution monochrome digital photographs from Ekman and 
Friesen’s (1976) “pictures of facial affect”, consisting of 10 exemplars each of the 6 
‘basic’ emotions: happiness, sadness, fear, surprise, anger and disgust. These were the 
same pictures that were used in the on-line Ekman-Friesen test of facial affect recognition, 
described above. Each image was shown on a 43 cm computer monitor. In phase 1 of the 
experiment, participants were shown the images in a randomised order, with the 
constraint that no emotion was shown more than twice in a row. Images were presented 
for 2500 ms, preceded by a central fixation cross for 1500ms and followed by a blank 
grey screen for 500ms (total ISI = 2000ms). Participants were instructed to fixate the
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cross and then to look at the face, “however they wanted to”. In the second phase, the 
participants were again shown the 60 faces but this time the images were in the 
standardised order used in the Ekman-Friesen test of facial affect recognition. Again, 
each face was presented for 2500 ms, preceded by a central fixation cross for 1500ms and 
followed by a blank grey screen. This time, however, following the presentation of each 
face the participants were asked to decide which emotion had been expressed. The 
emotion labels appeared on the screen following each facial image and were numbered 1- 
6. Subjects responded via a key press and had an unlimited time to answer.
Data analysis
Any trials showing loss of tracking integrity and off screen gazes were excluded from 
subsequent data analysis. The regions of interest, the eye and mouth areas of the face, 
were predefined for each face. The number of fixations made in these regions and on the 
face as a whole during the 2500ms presentation was calculated. A fixation was defined as 
a set of consecutive gaze coordinates, confined within a diameter of 1 degree of visual 
angle for a duration of 100 milliseconds or more (Norton and Stark, 1971). The fixations 
for the eyes and mouth as a percentage of total fixations on the face for each presented 
stimulus were calculated. The average proportions of total fixations for the eye and 
mouth region were calculated for each emotion for each subject.
Autonomic responses -  electrodermal activity
Background
The use of electrodermal activity (EDA) as a psychophysiological measure dates back to 
1888 when Fere discovered momentary increases in skin conductance in response to a
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variety of stimuli. Today, these changes are known to reflect the engagement of the 
sympathetic branch of the autonomic nervous system (see below) and a distinction is 
made between tonic and phasic measurements. The tonic level of skin conductance is the 
absolute level of conductance at any given moment in the absence of a measurable phasic 
response, and it is referred to as the skin conductance level (SCL). Superimposed on the 
tonic level are phasic increases in conductance, known as skin conductance responses 
(SCRs).
SCRs are elicited by almost any novel, unexpected, potentially important, discrete 
stimulus in the environment (Siddle, 1991). Amplitude is the most commonly measured 
feature of an SCR, and this is known to be heightened by increases in stimulus 
significance and stimulus intensity (Dawson et al., 2000). As such, SCR amplitude 
provides a good indicator of the social or emotional impact that a stimulus has on a 
person.
I chose electrodermal activity as my measure of autonomic arousal largely because of its 
ease of measurement, quantification and analysis compared to the alternatives, such as 
heart-rate and pupilometry. In particular, I rejected pupilometry because of the difficulty 
in equalising the brightness of stimuli, necessary to avoid the confound of luminance- 
induced changes in pupil diameter. Heart-rate would have been a reasonable alternative. 
However, apart from being slightly more difficult to measure and analyse, Fowles (1988) 
has argued that heart-rate is influenced primarily by the engagement of a behavioural 
‘activation system’ that is involved in responding during appetitive reward seeking and 
during active avoidance. EDA, on the other hand, is viewed as an ‘anxiety system’, 
responding to such situations as punishment and passive avoidance. Given that I am
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mostly interested in the anxiety- rather than reward-like arousal properties of the various 
stimuli I present, electrodermal activity seemed the more appropriate measure.
I provide SCR data in chapter 5 to measure the arousal produced by viewing direct gaze 
and in chapter 6 to measure the arousal produced by emotional words. The precise details 
of experimental procedure differ in each instance and are given in the relevant chapters. 
Here I will report the experimental set-up and data analysis techniques common to both 
experiments, but first I will briefly review the physiological basis of EDA and SCRs.
Physiological basis
The palmar and plantar surfaces of the hands and feet have a high density of eccrine 
sweat glands, the functions of which appear to be both thermoregulatory and as an aid to 
grasping behaviour (Edelberg, 1972). Activation of these sweat glands provides a 
conductive path through the relatively resistant comeum of the epidermis. As more sweat 
is produced the resistance in the comeum is reduced, producing an observable change in 
electrodermal activity.
Eccrine sweat glands are innervated by sympathetic cholinergic fibres originating in the 
sympathetic chain (Dawson et al., 2000). Importantly, there is no parasympathetic control 
of EDA, meaning that changes in eccrine sweat gland activity can be regarding as a pure 
indicator of sympathetic activity. The validity of using EDA as an indirect measure of 
this has been proven experimentally: there is a high correlation between bursts of 
sympathetic nerve activity and SCRs (Wallin, 1981).
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Excitatory and inhibitory influences on the sympathetic nervous system are distributed in 
various parts of the brain, so the neural mechanisms and pathways involved in central 
control of EDA are numerous and complex (for review, see Boucsein, 1992). However, 
animal studies have implicated the amygdala in producing EDA associated with affective 
processing and numerous neuroimaging experiments show a correlation between 
amygdala activity and the amplitude of SCRs in response to emotional stimuli (Williams 
et al., 2005) confirming that SCRs are a viable measure of stimulus arousal.
Data acquisition and analysis
SCRs were collected via a pair of silver-silver chloride electrodes, approximately 0.8cm2 
in contact area and filled with 0.05 M sodium chloride gel, placed on the volar surfaces of 
the distal phalanges of digits II and III of the non-dominant hand after the skin was wiped 
with an alcohol swab. Data were recorded and analysed using a complete system 
provided by Psylab (www.psvlab.com). MatLab interfaced with the Psylab system via the 
parallel port, allowing synchronisation of SCR recording with the experimental paradigm. 
SCRs beginning 1 -  4 seconds after stimulus onset were detected automatically by Psylab 
software and their amplitude recorded for further off-line analysis (see chapters 4 and 6 
for further details).
Neurophysiological and neuroanatomical 
measurements - MRI
I use magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) of the brain in two experiments presented in this 
thesis. In chapter 3 ,1 use functional MRI (fMRI) to investigate brain activity in response 
to direct gaze, comparing responses in two groups of normal individuals: those who are
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good at recognising fear from facial expressions and those who are poor at this. In 
chapter 5, I use structural MRI to investigate brain morphology changes associated with 
AS.
A full treatment of MRI methodology would run to many hundreds of pages. Here, I will 
briefly describe the following points: the basic physics of the MRI signal, the physiology 
of the blood oxygenation level dependent (BOLD) response and the analysis of fMRI and 
structural MRI, including spatial pre-processing as well as statistical analysis.
Basic principles of MRI
The MRI signal8
The MRI signal is based on the magnetic properties of atoms which have an odd number 
of protons in their nucleus (e.g. *H, 13C). Such nuclei are said to have nuclear ‘spin’ and, 
when placed in a magnetic field, behave as magnetic dipoles that can assume two energy 
states: a high energy state (oriented against the magnetic field) or a low energy state 
(aligned with the magnetic field). Transition from the low to the high energy state is 
associated with the absorption of energy in the radioffequency (rf) range, whereas 
transition from high to low energy state results in the emission of rf energy. In MRI, a 
large homogenous magnetic field, produced by the imaging magnetic, causes the majority 
of spins to align with the magnetic field. Small magnetic field gradients, produced via an 
rf pulse, are then superimposed onto the homogenous field, tipping the spins against the 
main magnetic field so that they assume the high energy state. On removal of the small
g
This section is based largely on information from two textbooks - Functional MRI: an introduction to methods (Jezzard et al., 2001) 
and MRI: the basics (Hashemi and Bradley, 1997).
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field gradient, the spins relax back to the low energy state emitting rf energy as they do so 
-  this is the MRI signal.
Generating contrast in MRI
The majority of the MRI signal in vivo comes from the hydrogen atoms that make up 
water in tissue. Variations in the relative concentrations of water protons provide contrast 
between some structures, allowing clear discrimination between bone (little water, low 
MR signal) and brain (approximately 70% water, high signal), for example. Further 
contrast between different tissue types is possible because the time it takes for the nuclear 
spins of hydrogen atoms to relax differs depending on features of the local environment. 
This is governed by a ‘spin lattice’ relaxation process that has a rate constant 1/T1, where 
T1 is the so called ‘spin-lattice relaxation time’. T1 for hydrogen atoms in the body 
depends on the type of tissue containing the relevant water molecules. For example, the 
relaxation time of protons in cerebrospinal fluid, which is close to pure water, is much 
slower than that of protons in grey matter. By varying the repeat time between rf pulses, 
the contrast between tissue regions of long and short T1 can be altered dramatically.
In MRI, one is observing emissions from huge numbers of spins simultaneously. On a 
molecular level these nuclei are each experiencing continuous very small changes in 
magnetic field, allowing an exchange of energy between the nuclei which leads to a loss 
of coherence in the phases of their resonance emissions. This loss of coherence leads to 
an exponential loss of intensity for the summed resonance signal from all the nuclei 
together, described by the ‘spin-spin’ or T2 relaxation time. The T2 is an intrinsic 
property of nuclei in a particular chemical environment and therefore provides another
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source of contrast for distinguishing different tissue types. Grey matter, for example, has 
a longer T2 than white matter.
A third source of contrast arises when there are local magnetic field inhomogeneities that 
molecules can diffuse through. As molecules move into regions of different local fields, 
their resonance frequencies change slightly, lowering the coherence of the nuclear spins. 
This leads to a more rapid decay of the net signal, expressed by the T2* relaxation time.
Contrast differences arising from differences in relaxation times are realised by altering 
aspects of the rf pulse sequences with which the spins are excited. In this way it is 
possible to tune the scan to the aspects of the tissue that one wants to image.
fMRI
Physics and physiology
Haemodynamic changes and the blood oxygenation level dependent response
For a long time, it has been known that neural activity is associated with increases in 
local blood flow. For example, as far back as 1888 an Italian physician, Angelo Mosso, 
recorded the pulsations of the cortex in patients with skull defects, noting that the 
pulsations increased regionally with specific mental activities (Mosso, 1881). The 
purpose of this increase in blood flow is to deliver oxygen and glucose to the active 
region, necessary for the increased energy utilisation resulting from increased neural 
activity. However, despite over 100 years of research, the precise way that neural activity 
links to energy metabolism and how this causes increased blood flow remains unclear. It 
is hypothesised that increased energy utilisation occurs at the synapse (Duncan et al.,
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1987;Duncan and Stumpf, 1991), with metabolic changes in adjacent astrocytes during 
re-uptake of glutamate thought to play a prominent role (Magistretti and Pellerin, 1996) 
Astrocytes may respond to increased metabolism by dilating blood vessels, thereby 
increasing the flow and supply of oxyhaemoglobin (Magistretti and Pellerin, 1999).
In fMRI, neural activity is inferred by measuring the amount of oxy- relative to 
deoxyhaemoglobin in the blood. This is possible because deoxyhaemoglobin is 
paramagnetic, due to its central iron particle with four unpaired electrons (Pauling and 
Coryell, 1936). As a result, the magnetic susceptibility of blood depends upon the ratio of 
oxy- to deoxyhaemoglobin (this is the blood oxygen dependency that gives BOLD its 
name).
Protons in water molecules within the blood will experience local field inhomogeneities 
as a result of the levels of deoxyhaemoglobin. These inhomogeneities are detectable as a 
change in the T2* relaxation time: areas of low oxygenation (high deoxyhaemoglobin) 
have increased inhomogeneities, resulting in lower T2* and less MRI signal. Sensitivity 
of MRI to BOLD is maximised by using a sequence sensitive to these microscopic 
changes in T2*. The feasibility of BOLD fMRI was demonstrated first in animal models 
(Ogawa et al., 1990) and subsequently in humans (Frahm et al., 1992;Ogawa et al., 1992).
Analysis
The fMRI experiment reported in chapter 3 is analysed using SPM2 
(http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm/), a suite of functions designed for use within MatLab 
(Mathworks Inc, Nantick MA). Before statistical analysis, images are first realigned, 
normalised and then smoothed, as described below.
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Spatial Realignment
Head movements within the scanner can cause artefacts in the BOLD signal which have 
striking similarity to the BOLD signal produced by performance of a cognitive task 
(Hajnal et al., 1994). Spatial realignment controls for this artefact by estimating and 
correcting for the degree of head movement from scan to scan over an fMRI time series. 
In SPM2, each volume is compared to a reference volume (the first in experiments 
described in this thesis) and parameters estimated for six transformations (x, y and z 
translations and rotations in the three principal axes). The implementation involves 
iteratively comparing transformations to minimise the mean squared difference between 
the current image and the reference (Friston et al., 1995a).
Even after volumes are spatially realigned, subjects’ movements during data acquisition 
might have introduced artefactual variance into the time series. This is adjusted for 
mathematically, based on a moving average auto regression model of spin-excitation 
history effects.
Spatial normalisation
Spatial normalisation of fMRI time series renders the volumes into a common anatomical 
space. This allows statistical inference about a group of subjects, as well as comparison 
of results between different experiments. The anatomical space adopted in SPM is that of 
the template brain from the Montreal Neurological Institute, derived from 305 brains. It 
approximates the space described in Talairach and Toumoux’s (1988) atlas. The 
approach adopted in SPM (Friston et al., 1995a) consists of two components aimed at 
minimising the differences between the image to be normalised and an image in the 
anatomical space to be normalised to (the ‘template’ image). Firstly, parameters are
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estimated for 12 affine transformations -  3 translations (x, y and z), 3 rotations, 3 shears 
and 3 zooms. Secondly, parameters are estimated for a series of non-linear ‘warps’ or 
deformations. A Bayesian estimation framework, implemented iteratively, is used to 
optimise the normalisation procedure. In the study described in chapter 3, the template 
image used for normalisation was the EPI template provided with the SPM package.
Spatial smoothing
Following realignment and normalisation, images are smoothed with a Gaussian kernel. 
This is important for a number of reasons. Firstly, it increases the signal to noise ratio. 
Secondly, central limit theorem implies that the distribution of errors resulting from 
smoothed data will be more normal, helping to ensure the validity of parametric tests. 
Finally, smoothing the data reduces inter-subject anatomical and functional-anatomical 
differences that remain after normalisation.
Statistical analysis in SPM
SPM uses a mass univariate approach to analyse fMRI data. A model of hypothesised 
effects is built, based on the experimental design used. At each voxel of the brain, 
specific effects are examined by testing the fit of the model using a contrast pertaining to 
a possible effect (Friston et al., 1995b). Maps of t or F statistics are thus created 
(statistical parametric maps or SPMs) allowing a test of an experimental hypothesis 
against the null hypothesis of no effect. In SPM, parametric statistics are used to draw 
inference. This means that the statistics used have a known distribution and the 
probability of obtaining a particular statistical result is easily tested against this 
distribution.
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More specific details of how the data in chapter 3 were analysed are given in that 
chapter’s methods section.
Structural MRI
Different approaches -  pros and cons
There are two major approaches to investigating brain morphometry: (semi)-manual 
methods, which involve using anatomical landmarks to trace around and then measure the 
volume of brain structures in native space, and automated methods, which require images 
from multiple subjects to be registered together by some kind of normalisation procedure, 
therefore allowing automatic region-by-region analysis by a computer. Of the latter 
methods, the most commonly used is voxel based morphometry (VBM, described below), 
but a number of related methods also exist, including tensor-based morphometry and 
deformation based morphometry (Ashbumer and Friston, 2004).
There are numerous advantages and disadvantages to both manual and automated 
methods. The major advantage of manual techniques is that volumetric measurement is 
conducted on the native structural images, avoiding the problems of normalisation 
inherent in automated schemes. In addition, manual tracing leads to easily interpretable 
results -  data are volume measurements in clearly understandable units (e.g. cm3). 
However, it requires a specific region of interest to be defined a priori. As well as being a 
disadvantage in itself, this also means that, in practice, only clearly definable structures 
(e.g. the hippocampi or ventricles) can be investigated. Even for the structures just 
mentioned, identifying brain regions with consistency is no easy task and requires both 
considerable time and expertise. Different methods exist for identifying even well defined
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structures, leading to variability between different studies - see, for example, the 
comments by Dziobek et al. (2006) regarding the variability in amygdala volumes 
reported by different manual tracing studies. Finally, even when skilled raters use the 
same method to identify structures, residual variability remains.
By comparison, automated methods such as VBM are fast, simple to use and objective, 
thereby circumventing many of the disadvantages of manual tracing methods. In 
particular, they do not require a hypothesis and enable regional comparisons throughout 
the whole brain without restrictions to a few selected areas. Their principal drawbacks 
relate to the need to spatially pre-process the images, rather than working with the native 
scans. Images are first spatially normalised into the same stereotaxic space (by registering 
them with a template) before being segmented into different tissue classes (grey matter, 
white matter and cerebro-spinal fluid, or CSF). Algorithms of this kind will inherently 
introduce some noise and artefact into the data. A specific problem occurs when 
comparing the brains of a special population (with a particular disease for instance) with 
a normal control sample. The templates used for normalisation are typically derived from 
samples of normal individuals, meaning that normalisation could be biased towards 
controls. A way around this is to use a custom template, derived from the population 
under study. However, to be accurate such a template would need to be constructed from 
data from many subjects, which in many cases is impractical (see John Asbumer’s 
discussion of this issue at http://en.wikibooks.org/wiki/SPM-VBM).
The choice of method usually depends on the nature of the study and on the local 
availability of expertise. Where there is no a priori hypothesis leading to specific regions 
of interest or where the sample size is likely to be very large, automated techniques hold 
clear advantages. When the intention is to investigate certain, well defined brain
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structures, the advantages are less clear and researchers often choose manual tracing 
techniques to avoid the problems of spatial pre-processing. The study described in 
chapter 5 of this thesis makes clear hypotheses regarding amygdala volume. However, 
given the expertise available in my unit, it was felt that an automated method would give 
more robust results. Voxel-based morphometry was the obvious choice as it is the most 
tried and tested method and there exists considerable local expertise in this technique.
Voxel-based morphometry
VBM produces statistical parametric maps (SPMs) of volumetric differences. The 
technique typically involves the following steps (Ashbumer and Friston, 2004):
• Spatial normalisation of the images to the same stereotaxic space via registration of 
the image to the same template. The method used to do this is often the same as that 
described above for normalisation of fMRI images (but see below).
• Segmentation of the normalised images into different tissue classes. Classically, this 
began by registering the images to be segmented with a tissue probability map, 
derived from a large sample of brains. After registration, these maps represent the 
prior probability of different tissue classes being found at each location in an image. 
Bayes rule is then employed to combine these priors with tissue type probabilities 
derived from voxel intensities to provide the posterior probability. The most recent 
version of the SPM software (SPM5) has made improvements to the segmentation 
function, which are described below.
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Modulation of the images. Spatial normalisation results in the volumes of certain 
brain regions increasing whereas others decrease. This has implications for what 
VBM actually tests. The objective of VBM is to identify regional differences in the 
amount of a particular tissue (usually grey matter). To preserve the actual amounts of 
grey matter within each structure, a further processing step (known as modulation) is 
incorporated. This multiplies the partitioned images by the relative voxel volumes. 
Without this adjustment, VBM can be thought of as comparing the relative 
concentration of grey matter. With this adjustment, VBM compares the absolute 
amount of grey matter in different regions.
Smoothing of the images by convolving with an isotropic Gaussian kernel. This 
makes the subsequent voxel by voxel analysis comparable to a region of interest 
approach because each voxel in the smoothed images contains the average amount of 
grey matter from around the voxel (where the region around the voxel is defined by 
the form of the smoothing kernel). As with fMRI data, smoothing also has the effect 
of rendering the data more normally distributed, increasing the validity of using 
parametric statistical tests. The size of the smoothing kernel is usually chosen to be 
comparable to the size of the expected regional differences, thereby sensitising the 
analysis to differences at this spatial scale (by the matched filter theorem).
Data are now analysed via voxel-wise statistical tests, using the general linear model, 
as was described for fMRI data. The result is a SPM showing, for example, regional 
differences between two groups or regions where grey mater volume correlates with 
another measure (such as disease severity). As with fMRI data, where there is no a 
priori hypothesis, corrections for multiple dependent comparisons are made using 
Gaussian random field theory. Where there is a hypothesis there are two options,
either ‘small volume corrections’ are made, centering on the region of interest, or a 
stringent but uncorrected threshold (typically p  < .001) is used.
Recently, a form of VBM analysis known as ‘optimised’ VBM (Good et al., 2001) has 
become popular. This involves a tweak in the normalisation step where, rather than 
matching to a whole brain template, grey matter is matched to a grey matter specific 
template. This improved normalisation by reducing the confounding effects of non-brain 
(e.g. scalp) structural variability on the registration. However, with the advent of the new 
version of SPM (SPM5) ‘optimised’ VBM is no longer necessary because of 
improvements to the segmentation function, described below.
Unified segmentation in SPM5
The classical method of VBM segmentation was inherently circular, because the 
registration required an initial tissue classification, and the tissue classification requires 
an initial registration. In the latest version of SPM, this circularity has been resolved by 
combining both components into a single generative model. Estimating the model 
parameters (for a maximum a posteriori solution) involves alternating among 
classification, bias correction and registration steps. This approach, described in detail by 
Ashbumer and Friston (2005), provides better results than simple serial applications of 
each component and removes the need for an ‘optimised’ VBM strategy.
108
VBM in this thesis
In chapter 5 I report an experiment which used VBM to compare amygdala volumes 
between individuals with AS and matched controls as well as correlating amygdala 
volume in AS with various measures, such as eye fixation pattern and fear recognition 
score. I thereby test predictions of the hyper- and hypo-active amygdala models of ASD 
(see chapter 1). VBM analysis was conducted using SPM5 using the methods described 
above. Given the focus of the investigation on the amygdala, Type I error was controlled 
via small volume correction, using MNI-derived anatomical templates of the left and 
right amygdala to define the volume to be corrected by. The anatomical masks were 
created using WFU PickAtlas (http://www.fmri.wfubmc.edu/download.htm). Specific 
details of the statistical tests performed are given in the methods section of chapter 5.
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Chapter 3 -  Poor fear recognition in normal 
males
Part 1 - Fear recognition ability predicts social- 
cognitive and neural functioning in males
Introduction and summary
To date, few studies have examined individual differences in social cognitive ability and 
linked these to underlying neural function. As part of a lab-wide study into the genetics of 
social cognition, the emotional expression recognition abilities of 341 adult males9 were 
examined. The majority of subjects performed at or near ceiling (mode scores were 9 or 
10), but for the negative emotions (fear, sadness, disgust and anger) there was a 
considerable number who performed poorly (see figure 4 on page 111). This tail was 
most marked for fearful faces, where 8% of the sample showed fear recognition deficits 
akin to those reported in patients with amygdala damage.
A sample of 25 “low fear scoring” (LFS) and 25 “normal fear scoring” (NFS) males were 
brought into the lab for further testing. Despite an absence of psychological or 
neurological problems, on re-test LFS continued to show a significant fear recognition 
deficit. I hypothesised that low fear recognition ability would be related to reduced 
functional integrity of the amygdala and associated regions of the social brain (namely, 
the FG, STG, TP and MPfC). Thus, for ‘low fear scorers’ (LFS) compared to “normal 
fear scorers” (NFS), I predicted deficits on a test on ToM abilities (the Frith-Happe
9 An additional aim of the original project, unrelated to this thesis, was to investigate the possible influence of X-linked genes on 
emotion recognition ability. This is technically simpler with males (who only have one X chromosome) than females, therefore only 
males were invited to take part in the study.
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triangles task) -  a social-cognitive task known to involve these brain regions (Castelli et 
al., 2000;Schultz et al., 2003). As predicted, LFS made fewer and less appropriate mental 
state attributions to the cartoons than did NFS.
I also predicted that, compared to NFS, LFS would show reduced activation of the 
amygdala and associated brain regions when processing socially relevant stimuli. I tested 
this by comparing neural activation evoked by faces with high social significance (direct 
gaze) to that evoked by faces with lower social significance (averted gaze). My reasoning 
for manipulating social significance by altering eye gaze rather than by altering emotional 
expression was that, because the subject groups had been selected on the basis of 
differences in fear recognition abilities, any difference in response to another socially 
relevant dimension of the face would provide a more stringent test of my hypotheses. 
Also, as discussed in chapter 1, faces with direct gaze are known to engage diffuse areas 
of the social brain, including the ToM network. As predicted, LFS demonstrated 
significantly reduced activation in the amygdala, FG and anterior STG when viewing 
faces with direct versus averted gaze. In a functional connectivity analysis, NFS showed 
enhanced connectivity between the amygdala and anterior STG in the context of direct 
gaze; this enhanced coupling was absent in LFS10.
Some of the work presented in this chapter has recently been published in the Journal o f Cognitive Neuroscience (Corden et al., 
2006).
I l l
Methods
Population study
An email was circulated to each department of University College London, asking 
students and staff to participate in an on-line psychology experiment. A prize of £500 was 
offered as an incentive. In this on-line version of the Ekman-Friesen test of facial affect 
recognition (described in chapter 2), the six emotion labels were presented adjacent to 
each image and subjects indicated their responses via a mouse click. There was an 
unlimited time to answer.
Male subjects were classified according to their performance at recognising fearful 
expressions. Participants scoring 5/10 or less (8% of the sample) were labelled as LFS. 
This cut-off was chosen because it encompasses a range of scores usually reported for 
patients with amygdala damage on similar tests (Broks et al., 1998;Calder et al., 
1996;Young et al., 1996). The mean fear recognition score was 8.2/10; therefore 
individuals scoring greater than or equal to 8/10 were labelled as NFS. This dichotomous 
approach, using extremes of the population, was chosen in preference to a correlational 
approach in order to maximise the potential differences associated with variation in fear- 
recognition ability.
Neuropsychological examination
Twenty-five LFS volunteered to participate in further experiments and stratified 
randomisation was used to age-match 25 NFS volunteers (NFS, 30 ± 7.6 years; LFS, 31 +
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10.3 years, mean ± SD). None of the subjects had any history of psychological or 
neurological disorder, as measured by an in-house medical screening questionnaire.
The full scale IQ of each subject was estimated using the two-subset form of the 
Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence (WASI). In addition subjects repeated the 
Ekman-Friesen test of facial affect recognition and were examined on the Frith-Happe 
ToM task (see chapter 2). The Ekman-Friesen test was exactly the same as the on-line 
version, except participants completed it in the laboratory.
Group differences in behavioural scores were tested using t tests or Mann-Whitney tests, 
as appropriate. Threshold significance was set at p < .05, corrected for multiple 
comparisons via the Bonferroni-Holm step-down method (Hochberg and Tamhane, 1987).
Functional Imaging Experiment
Twelve LFS and twelve NFS volunteers were randomly selected from the right-handed 
members of the earlier groups and provided written informed consent to take part in the 
fMRI study.
Stimuli
Stimuli, shown in figure 3, were selected from those used in a previous study (George et 
al., 2001) and consisted of images of 12 people (6 men and 6 women) portraying a 
neutral expression. Each individual was photographed in full-face frontal view and also 
with the head rotated toward the right by 30° and for each of these head views, there were 
2 images, one with the subject looking straight at the camera and one with gaze averted at
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30°. Each face was centered in the image frame so that the edge of the nose between the 
two eyes - where faces are usually fixated at first glance (Yarbus, 1967) - always fell in 
the same location for frontal faces and for deviated faces. Four additional stimuli were 
then generated for each face, representing mirror-images of those already obtained. There 
were a total of 96 images (48 direct gaze and 48 averted gaze).
Direct Gaze Faces Averted Gaze Faces
Figure 3. Example stimuli used to compare neural activity induced by direct gaze compared to 
averted gaze. Identical sets of stimuli from 11 additional sitters were formed. Mirror images of  
each picture were created, producing double the number of stimuli.
Task
Subjects were required to make a gender judgment for each face via a button press. Each 
stimulus was presented for 700 msec with an inter-stimulus interval of 500 msec. A 
blocked presentation of stimuli was used. The eight subconditions of stimuli (i.e. the four 
main conditions further divided by mirror imaging of the stimuli) resulted in eight blocks 
of twelve stimuli. The blocks and stimuli within each block were presented in a different 
random order for each subject. Between each block, a blank screen was presented for 
5498 msec. Before each block, a fixation cross (placed in the area of the screen midway 
between where the eyes appear for the face stimuli) was shown for 1000 msec.
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fMRI data acquisition and pre-processing
A Siemens 1.5T Sonata system (Siemens, Erlangen, Germany) was used to acquire 
BOLD contrast-weighted echoplanar images (EPIs) for functional scans. Volumes, which 
consisted of 48 horizontal slices of 2mm thickness with a 1mm gap, were acquired 
continuously every 4.32s enabling whole brain coverage. In-plane resolution was 3 x 
3mm. Each subject’s head was mildly restrained within the headcoil to discourage 
movement. Response judgments were made during scanning with a buttonbox held in the 
right hand. The first six EPI volumes were discarded to allow for T1 equilibration effects. 
Functional datasets were then pre-processed using SPM2 (Wellcome Department of 
Imaging Neuroscience; http://\vvvvv.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm) on a Matlab platform 
(Mathworks Inc, Nantick MA) correcting for head movement by realignment and 
normalising the functional scans to an EPI template corresponding to the MNI reference 
brain in standard space. Normalised images were smoothed using an 8mm Gaussian 
kernel.
Statistical analysis
Data analyses were conducted using SPM2, applying a mass univariate general linear 
model (GLM and using a mixed effects two-level framework - see chapter 2). In 
individual subject analyses, each of the four main stimulus categories (averted 
gaze/deviated head, averted gaze/straight head, direct gaze/deviated head, direct 
gaze/straight head) were modeled separately by convolving a box-car function with a 
synthetic haemodynamic response function. A high-pass filter with a cut-off of 238 
seconds was applied to remove low-frequency noise.
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Subject-specific parameter estimates were calculated for each stimulus category at every 
voxel. Specific effects (e.g. direct gaze -  averted gaze) were tested by applying linear 
contrasts to the parameter estimates for each block. Contrast images from each subject 
were entered into second-level (random effects) analyses. In the a priori regions of 
interest (see introduction and summary), statistical threshold was set at p < .001, 
uncorrected for multiple comparisons.
Functional connectivity
To investigate functional connectivity between amygdala and other brain regions in the 
context of direct gaze we tested for “psychophysiological interactions”. These are 
condition-dependent (e.g. direct versus averted gaze) changes in the co-variation of 
response between a reference brain region and other brain regions (Friston et al., 1997). 
Separately for each subject, values of adjusted responses to direct gaze faces relative to 
averted gaze were extracted from the voxel in left amygdala maximally activated in the 
direct -  averted gaze contrast of the main analysis (maximal voxel: x-21, y-3, z-21). 
Using a specially developed routine in SPM2, the adjusted data were first deconvolved, 
and amygdala activity at the time of the direct gaze blocks extracted. The resulting 
condition-specific estimate of neuronal activity was then reconvolved with a synthetic 
haemodynamic response function. This procedure was repeated for the averted gaze 
blocks. The resulting regressors were entered as variables of interest into a separate 
analysis. Linear contrasts were applied to the parameter estimates for the regressors in 
order to identify regions where responses exhibited significant condition-dependent 
interactions with amygdala activity. This was done separately for each subject. The 
resulting contrast images were entered into a second-level (random effects) analysis in 
order to allow generalization to the population.
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Results
Behavioural findings 
Population study
There were 341 male respondents to the on-line Ekman-Friesen test. The mean age of the 
sample was 29.3 years, SD = 8.86 years.
Figure 4 displays the results Ekman-Friesen test. Most subjects performed near ceiling 
(median and mode scores were either 9 or 10 for all emotions except sadness, where both 
were 8). However, there were still a considerable number of people who performed 
poorly, especially for the negative emotions (fear, sadness, disgust and anger); this 
variability was most marked for fearful faces.
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Figure 4. Box plot displaying the results of the on-line Ekman-Friesen test of facial 
affect recognition. Boxes show the median (black line) and the inter-quartile range (IQR, 
edges of boxes). Whiskers are 1.5 * IQR. Circles represent mild outliers (between 1.5 and 
3 * IQR) and stars represent extreme outliers (> 3 * IQR).
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As explained earlier, for purposes of further study, the respondents were now labelled on 
the basis of their fear recognition score -  those scoring 5/10 (8% of the sample) were 
labelled as LFS, those scoring at least 8/10 (69% of the sample) were labelled as NFS 
(see figure 5a).
Of the 25 LFS and 25 NFS who took part in further experiments, reaction times for fear 
responses were very similar between groups -  LFS: (mean ± SD) 925 ± 332 msec; NFS: 
958 ± 384 msec; r(48) = -0.33, p  = .74 -  suggesting that differences in fear recognition 
were not due to a speed-accuracy trade-off. Milder impairments in the responses of LFS 
were apparent in the recognition of sad and angry facial expressions (see figure 5b).
Neuropsychological tests
The age-matched sub-samples of 25 LFS and 25 NFS were brought into the laboratory 
and re-tested on their ability to correctly identify emotional expressions, as well as 
undertaking a test of ‘mentalising’ ability. The IQs of the two groups did not differ 
significantly: mean ± SD, LFS 117 ± 10.2; NFS 121 ± 8.5; r(48) = -1.3,p  = .20.
Re-test of emotion recognition abilities
While both groups showed higher fear recognition scores on re-test, there remained a 
highly significant difference between LFS (mean ± SD) 6.9 ± 2.3 and NFS 9.7 ± 0.7, 
Mann-Whitney U= 66.5, p < .001. The milder differences in the ability to correctly label 
sad and angry expressions also remained, but on this occasion did not reach our corrected 
threshold for statistical significance -  sadness: LFS 7.6 ± 2.0, NFS 8.4 ± 1.2, U= 159,/? 
= .09; anger: LFS 8.2 ±2.2, NFS 9.0 ± 1.0, U= 170.5,/? = .15.
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Figure 5. Comparing LFS to NFS on the Ekman-Friesen test of facial affect.
A) Distribution of fear recognition scores amongst the 341 male respondents to the on-line Ekman-Friesen test (max score = 10). Those 
scoring less than or equal to 5 were labelled as ‘low-fear-scorers’ (LFS). Those scoring greater than or equal to 8 were labelled as 
‘normal-fear-scorers’ (NFS).
B) Mean number of correct responses for all six ‘basic’ emotions on the Ekman-Friesen test for the 25 LFS and 25 NFS who took part in 
further study. Scores are out of 10. Error bars indicate ±  1 standard deviation. As well as the difference in fear recognition, LFS were 
impaired, relative to NFS, at recognition of sad and angry expressions. Sadness: Mann-Whitney U  = 113.5, p < 0.05; anger: Mann- 
Whitney U= 84.5, p < 0.01, Bonferroni-Holme corrected.
Mentalising ability
Table 2 shows results for the ToM task. As predicted, LFS made fewer, and less 
appropriate, mental state attributions to the ToM animations than did NFS. These 
differences were significant at the 5% level, corrected for multiple comparisons (see table 
2). The two groups did not differ in their intentionality ratings of the GD animations. LFS 
showed a trend towards lower appropriateness scores for these animations but this did not 
reach significance. There were no differences between the two groups on the length of 
their descriptions.
Table 2. Scores on the Frith-Happe ToM task Mean scores (Standard Deviations)
Ratings Type (Range) and Group Animation Type
ToM GD
Intentionality (0-5)
LFS 3.7 (0.8)* 3.1 (0.6)
NFS 4.2 (0.5) 3.1 (0.5)
Appropriateness (0-3)
LFS 1.1 (0.5)* 1.4 (0.3)
NFS 1.4 (0.4) 1.6 (0.4)
Length (0-4)
LFS 3.7 (0.5) 3.5 (0.7)
NFS 3.8 (0.4) 3.5 (0.7)
ToM = theory of mind; GD = goal directed
* p < .05, comparing LFS to NFS, corrected for multiple comparisons
120
Neuroimaging findings
Task Performance
Mean accuracy across both groups was 96% on the gender discrimination task. There 
were no significant differences between the NFS and LFS subject groups (percent correct 
± S.D, NFS: 97 ± 2.5, LFS: 94 ± 4.5, z = -1.7, p = 0.1).
Direct gaze versus averted gaze
Across both subject groups direct, relative to averted, eye-gaze enhanced activity within 
bilateral amygdala, bilateral FFA and in regions surrounding the anterior STG - areas 
attributed to the ‘social brain’ (Brothers et al., 1990; see table 3).
I then tested the hypothesis that direct gaze would activate these regions more strongly in 
NFS compared to LFS. In the comparison of group by condition interaction, (NFS direct 
gaze -  NFS averted gaze) -  (LFS direct gaze -  LFS averted gaze), I observed greater 
activity in the left amygdala (.x -27, y  0, z  -18, z = 3.29), left lateral posterior fusiform 
gyrus (x -51, y  -60, z  -12, z = 3.13) and left anterior STG (x -57, y  3, z  -3, z = 3.82) in 
NFS compared to LFS (see figure 6). For each of these regions, there were equivalent 
activations in the right hemisphere, which showed a trend towards greater activation in 
NFS compared to LFS (right amygdala, x 30, y  -6, z -21, z = 2.40; right posterior FG, x 
45, y  -69, z  -9, z = 1.50; right anterior STG, x 60, y  6, z  -3, z = 1.71). Moreover, when a 
direct gaze - averted gaze contrast was performed separately in both groups, NFS 
activated left and right amygdala, left anterior STG, left lateral FG, right TP and right
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MPfC, whereas LFS showed no activation in voxels within these areas thresholded at p  
< .001, uncorrected (see table 3).
Table 3. Regions Activated in a Direct -  Averted Gaze Contrast.
Group Brain Region
MNI Coordinates 
x, y, z z-value
Combined Left amygdala -21,-3,-21 3.29
Right amygdala 21,-5 ,-15 3.24
Left lateral fusiform gyrus -54, -63, -12 3.14
Left lateral fusiform gyrus -48, -51,-18 3.04
Right fusiform gyrus 36, -57,-18 2.89*
Left anterior superior temporal gyrus -57, 3, -3 3.61
Left anterior middle temporal gyrus -60, 0,-18 3.37
NFS only Left amygdala -27, -3,-15 3.30
Right amygdala 21 ,-6 ,-12 3.68
Left lateral fusiform gyrus -51,-63,-12 3.60
Left anterior superior temporal gyrus -57, 6, -3 3.16
Left anterior middle temporal gyrus -48, 0,-18 3.27
Right temporal pole 39 ,21 ,-36 3.17
LFS only
Right medial preffontal cortex 
No significant voxels
9, 69, 12 3.04
FG = fusiform
cortex
gyrus; STG = superior temporal gyrus; TP = temporal pole; MPfC = medial preffontal
Activations are significant at/7 < .001 (uncorrected), except * p = .002 (uncorrected).
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Figure 6. Neuroimaging results for the interaction (NFS direct gaze -  NFS averted gaze) -  (LFS direct gaze -  LFS averted gaze).
Top: Regions where NFS show greater responses to direct versus averted gaze than LFS. Thresholded at p  < .003 for display (hence 
additional activation).
Bottom: Parameter estimates of the activity in the maxima, showing estimates of mean-corrected percent signal change (relative to overall 
mean activity at each voxel), averaged across repetitions and subjects, for the 2 groups (NFS and LFS) and 2 conditions (direct or averted 
gaze). Error bars indicate standard errors.
Functional connectivity
I next tested for group differences in the functional connectivity of amygdala responses as 
a function of the gaze direction of the perceived faces (see Methods). NFS, compared to 
LFS, showed greater functional coupling of the left amygdala with left anterior STG (x - 
54, y  -3, z 0, z = 3.56) and right TP (x 36, y  3, z -48, z = 3.01) when processing direct eye- 
gaze.
Part 1 Discussion
My findings indicate that a significant minority (8%) of the healthy male population 
(within a university environment) have a marked deficit in the recognition of emotional 
expressions, especially fear. These deficits are at a level akin to those reported in patients 
with acquired amygdala damage (Calder et al., 1996). An associated finding is that these 
impairments extend to encompass other social-cognitive skills. In addition, fear 
recognition deficits are associated with abnormalities in the brain’s response to socially 
relevant facial cues as well as in coupling between brain regions previously implicated in 
processing social information and the development of social skills.
In the Frith-Happe task, LFS attributed fewer and less appropriate mental states to the 
triangles in the ToM cartoons, but showed no deficits in the attribution of mental states to 
the GD cartoons. This pattern of scores is remarkably similar to that seen with high 
functioning autistic / AS subjects as reported by Castelli et al. (2002). Amygdala 
damaged patients also show deficits on various ToM tasks (Fine et al., 2001;Shaw et al., 
2004;Stone et al., 2003), including one requiring anthropomorphizing of abstract 
animations (Heberlein and Adolphs, 2004). Also, normal subjects show activation in
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amygdala, FG, TP and MPfC when attributing social meaning to such abstract animations 
(Martin and Weisberg, 2003;Schultz et al., 2003). Hence, I show that poor ability to 
recognise fear from facial expressions amongst members of the general population is 
predictive of a pattern of social-cognitive deficits consistent with impaired functioning 
within the so-called social brain (amygdala, FG, STG, TP and MPfC).
It should be noted however, that although I chose a categorical experimental design, 
comparing very low to normal fear scorers (see methods), these data should not 
necessarily be interpreted as implying the existence of a ‘special population’ of low-fear 
scorers. It may indeed prove to be the case that there are genetic and / or other biological 
variables which can predispose one to poor fear recognition and any associated social- 
cognitive deficits. However, fear recognition score appears to be a continuous variable 
(see figure 5a on page 113) and its variation may reflect normal individual differences 
with multiple and complex aetiologies.
In the neuroimaging experiment, subjects were not required to make explicit judgements 
about eye-gaze -  hence any processing of gaze direction was incidental. I replicated 
earlier findings suggesting an involvement of the amygdala in processing direct gaze 
(George et al., 2001 ;Kawashima et al., 1999;Wicker et al., 2003). Theories of amygdala 
function stress its role in rapid, and often automatic, detection of biologically 
(emotionally) significant events (Dolan, 2002). The amygdala acts both to heighten 
perception of a salient stimulus and enhance memory of its occurrence, thus effecting 
both immediate and future behaviour (for review, see Dolan, 2002). Amygdala activation 
to direct eye gaze may serve to increase attention towards the stimulus, thereby 
enhancing perception of the face and situation. LFS subjects failed to show amygdala 
activation to direct-gaze, perhaps suggesting they did not register eyes as being salient, an
125
impairment which may underlie their poor fear recognition ability. Furthermore, as 
discussed in chapter 1, failure to register socio-emotionally salient stimuli during 
development could lead to social-cognitive impairment later in life. It is intriguing to 
speculate that developmental deficits of this sort may have contributed to poor 
performance of LFS on the Frith-Happe ToM task.
Another area showing greater activation to social stimuli amongst the NFS was found on 
the left anterior superior temporal gyrus (see figure 3). A number of studies have 
implicated the STG in processing of seen gaze direction (e.g. Hoffman and Haxby, 
2000;Puce et al., 1998), however the locus of activity in these studies was far more 
posterior to the one reported here, in an area surrounding the temporo-parietal junction 
(TPJ). The discrepancy between these earlier studies and mine is likely to be due to the 
focus in the previous studies being on neural correlates of perception of averted gaze 
direction, rather than the contrast of direct -  averted gaze.
Areas corresponding to an anterior STG locus, similar to that activated in my study, were 
activated in a direct -  averted gaze contrast in the study by Calder et al. (2002), albeit in 
the right hemisphere. I found significant anterior STG activation to direct gaze only in the 
left hemisphere, although there was a trend towards significance in equivalent areas in the 
right hemisphere. Interestingly, Wicker et al. (2003) found bilateral activation of the 
anterior STG, in the same area as my locus, both when subjects had to judge emotion 
from eyes, keeping gaze constant, and in a direct -  averted gaze contrast. An interaction 
analysis showed that the anterior STG was selectively activated when subjects interpreted 
emotions that were personally directed.
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Wicker et al. (2003) hypothesise that the anterior STG may be a component of a neural 
system for processing ‘second-person’ intentional relations through eye-contact. Baron- 
Cohen (1994) has argued that such a system is a precursor to the ‘theory of mind module’. 
Evidence in favour of this perspective comes from several neuroimaging studies, which 
show that the anterior STG is one of a number of brain regions associated with the 
attribution of mental states (see Saxe et al., 2004, for review). Thus, the activation of 
anterior STG in NFS when someone looks directly at them may reflect engagement of 
‘mentalizing networks’, even though the explicit task did not require ToM reasoning. 
LFS, however, lack this activation, perhaps indicating that they do not automatically 
analyse the intentions of someone looking directly at them. This may help explain their 
relatively poor performance on both the fear recognition and the Frith-Happe ToM task in 
the current study.
In another study of eye gaze processing, Kampe et al. (2003) report activation in the 
MPfC and the TP in response to direct gaze faces. The authors suggest that activity in 
these regions, which are associated with theory of mind / mentalization processing (for 
review, see Gallagher and Frith, 2003), reflects the representation of communicative 
intent - a process which relies on mentalizing ability (Leslie and Happe, 1989). I 
observed activation of both these regions in NFS, but not LFS, in response to direct gaze. 
Moreover, as was seen with the anterior STG, the functional connectivity of the TP with 
the amygdala was strengthened during direct eye-gaze in NFS but not LFS. The lack of 
response in these regions demonstrated by the LFS group is consistent with a crucial 
contribution of MPfC and TP to rapid, automatic engagement of mentalizing.
My functional connectivity analysis suggests links, in NFS, between areas involved in 
decoding the intentions of the gazer (anterior STG and TP) with those that extract
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affective significance from a face (amygdala). Although the direction of the relationship 
can not be determined, this may be a specific example of the amygdala's 
neuromodulatory role in enhancing the processing of biologically / socially relevant 
stimuli in other brain regions (Dolan, 2002). That is to say, when an arousing stimulus 
(such as someone staring straight at you) signals the need to analyse the intent of a 
conspecific, the amygdala may promote recruitment of mentalizing regions. If this 
mechanism is impaired (especially if this happens early in development), deficits in social 
cognition may arise.
It has been argued that social cognition represents a distinct cognitive ‘domain’ or 
‘module’ (e.g. Brothers, 1990). One form of evidence for modularity is the existence of 
individuals with a selective deficit in the area of cognition under question, especially if 
this deficit can be associated with a reduction in functional capability in a given neural 
system (Gardner, 1983). In the domain of social cognition, individuals with autism have 
been cited as a population with a selective social-cognitive deficit (Brothers, 
1990;Karmiloff-Smith et al., 1995) and such individuals fail to activate areas of the 
‘social brain’ when processing socially relevant stimuli (for reviews, see Baron-Cohen et 
al., 2000a;Gallagher and Frith, 2003;Schultz, 2005). Patients with prosopagnosia or 
lesions to the orbitofrontal cortex provide examples of individuals with selective deficits 
in subsystems of the social-cognitive ‘module’ resulting from circumscribed brain 
damage (Brothers, 1990). In the present study I show that subjects from the normal 
population can demonstrate variability in their social cognitive abilities in the absence of 
a corresponding variability in global cognitive abilities (there were no differences in IQ 
between my two groups) and that these deficits are associated with reduced activity and 
functional connectivity within the ‘social brain’. As such, I provide evidence in support 
of a social cognitive module, subserving behaviour in response to conspecifics.
Caveats and further considerations
The data presented so far beg two important questions. Firstly, what effects, if any, do 
LFS’s social-cognitive deficits have on their day to day lives -  are they different from 
NFS in a more real-world way than captured so far? Secondly, it has recently been 
suggested that SM’s fear recognition deficit may be due to her failure to fixate on the eye 
region of faces (Adolphs et al., 2005) -  is the same true for LFS and, if so, what 
implication does this have for the conclusions of this study?
Regarding the first question, when I met the LFS subjects they did seem qualitatively 
different in terms of manner and character than the NFS subjects. Of course, I was not 
blind to subject group and my observations are likely to have been biased, but LFS did 
appear to be less likely to engage in spontaneous conversation and to be somewhat more 
socially withdrawn or anxious than NFS. I hypothesised that, while not being autistic, 
LFS subjects might show more autistic traits than NFS. To investigate this, the subjects 
were asked to fill in the autistic-spectrum quotient (AQ) questionnaire (Baron-Cohen et 
al., 2001b; see Methodology chapter). To test predictions about increased anxiety, 
particularly social anxiety, amongst the LFS, the trait portion of the Spielberger anxiety 
inventory (Spielberger, 1983) and the social phobia and anxiety inventory (SPAI; Turner 
et al., 1999) were administered. Finally, to assess general character, subjects were given 
the revised NEO personality inventory (NEO PI-R; Costa and McCrae, 1991). Results of 
these measures are given in part 2 of this chapter.
The question of eye-tracking is potentially very important. In the fMRI experiment, while 
I presented a fixation cross in the eye region of the stimuli before each block, I did not 
monitor subjects’ gaze fixation using eye tracking technology. LFS behavioural
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performance in the fMRI experiment was high (>94% correct responses) suggesting that 
their attention was directed towards the stimuli. However, I cannot rule out the possibility 
that LFS may not have been tracking the eye region of the stimuli as much as NFS, 
spending more time on other facial features such as the mouth. If this is the case, it may 
account for the low fear scores of the LFS group as well as their failure to activate the 
amygdala and other areas in response to direct gaze. This could have profound 
implications for any conclusions drawn about the aetiology of the social cognitive deficits 
seen in LFS. Therefore, I asked a group of LFS and NFS to participate in the eye-tracking 
experiment, outlined in chapter 2. Results are given in the next section.
Part 2 -  LFS are more anxious than NFS and spend 
less time fixating eyes
Personality and anxiety questionnaires
The AQ, NEO PI-R, trait anxiety and SPAI questionnaires were administered, following 
the protocol explained in chapter 2 (methods).
Group characteristics
All 50 subjects completed the AQ. The 
personality and anxiety questionnaires 
were completed at a later date and, 
unfortunately, only a sub-set of the 
original sample (15 LFS and 17 LFS)
Table 4. Characteristics o f the subjects who 
completed the NEO PI-R and anxiety measures.
Age (years) IQ
Average 
Fear Score
LFS Mean 35.5 115.7 5.9
N 15 15 15
SD 10.88 9.15 1.48
NFS Mean 33.1 119.9 9.2
N 17 17 17
SD 8.31 8.87 .60
Average fear score is the mean from the original online 
test and the in-laboratory re-test
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were available to take part; their characteristics are given in table 4. Average fear score 
remained significantly lower in this truncated sample — U < .001 >P< .001. Neither age -  
t{30) = J \ ,p  > .4 - nor IQ were significantly different - t(30) = -1.32,p  = .20.
Autistic-spectrum quotient (AQ)
AQ results are given in table 5. Although LFS reported experiencing a slightly greater
number of autistic-traits than NFS, this difference was not significant 7(48) = 0.97, p
= .34.
I compared the AQ scores of the LFS and NFS groups to the norm data published by
Baron-Cohen et al. (2001b). These 
authors report a mean AQ score of 17.8 
(SD = 6.8) for a random sample of 76 
males recruited by mail-out to addresses 
in East-Anglia (mean age 37, SD = 7.7) 
and 18.6 (SD = 6.6) for a sample of 454 
male university students (mean age 21 
years, SD = 2.9). NFS had a 
significantly lower score than the 
sample of male university students -  
t(477) = 2.33, p  < .05, Bonferroni-Holm 
corrected) but not the random sample of 
East Anglican males -  7(477) = 1.56, p  > .2, corrected) LFS were not significantly 
different from either group (both p  > .5, corrected).
Table 5. AQ total and sub-scales, split by group.
AQ scale Group Mean SD
AQ total LFS 17.1 6.60
NFS 15.4 5.79
Social LFS 2.5 1.86
NFS 1.8 1.86
Attention Switching LFS 4.4 2.25
NFS 3.9 1.91
Local Details LFS 5.1 2.57
NFS 5.2 2.14
Communication LFS 2.8 2.21
NFS 2.3 1.68
Imagination LFS 2.3 1.40
NFS 2.2 1.77
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For a sample of 58 individuals with AS or high-functioning autism, Baron-Cohen et al. 
(2001b) report a mean AQ score of 35.8 (SD = 6.5). Both LFS and NFS AQ scores were 
significantly lower than that of this ASD sample (LFS: f(81) = 11.8, NFS: r(81) = 13.3, p  
< .001, Bonferroni-Holm corrected).
NEO Personality Inventory (NEO PI-R)
Figure 7 presents the personality characteristics of the LFS and NFS groups, measured on 
Costa and McCrae’s (1991) ‘five factors’ of personality. These scores were entered into a 
MANOVA, with group (LFS or HFS) as a dependent variable. There was a significant 
effect of group -  Pillai’s trace = .521, F(5,24) = 5.2, p  = .002 -  indicating that LFS and 
NFS differed in terms of overall personality. ANOVAs were then carried out on each 
personality factor separately. The groups differed significantly in terms of neuroticism -  
F(l,28) = 6.3,p  = .018 -  and openness to experience -  F(l,28) = 16.1,/? < .001. There 
were no other significant effects (all p  > .12).
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Figure 7. Personality characteristics of LFS compared to NFS, measured on Costa and 
McCrae’s (1991) ‘five factors’ of personality. Factors are measured in T scores, where 45 -  
55 is the average range for the population.
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One sample t-tests were conducted for each group separately to compare their scores on 
the five personality factors to the average for the normal population, as reported by Costa 
and McCrae (1991). Only two results remained significant following correction for 
multiple comparisons: LFS were significantly more neurotic -  /(14) = -3.9, p  =  .02 
corrected - and NFS were significantly more open to experience -  r(16) = 7.4, p  < .01, 
corrected - than the general population.
The NEO PI-R breaks each personality factor down into six ‘facets’, or sub-scales, 
allowing a more fine-grained analysis o f  character. Figure 8 compares LFS and NFS on 
the sub-scales o f ‘neuroticism’ and ‘openness to experience’. Because o f  the high number
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of comparisons involved and the relatively small sample sizes, statistical analyses are not 
offered for these data.
Anxiety measures
Table 6 gives the results of the Spielberger trait anxiety questionnaire and the social 
phobia and anxiety inventory for LFS Table 6. Anxiety o f LFS compared to NFS.
and NFS subject groups. These data 
were entered into a MANOVA, with 
Marlowe-Crowne social desirability 
scale (see chapter 2) as a co-variate.
Trait Anxiety 
T scores
Social Phobia 
Scale
LFS Mean 60 73
SD 9.2 21.6
NFS Mean 52 58
SD 6.1 14.7
The two groups differed significantly Population norms: For trait anxiety, the average score for the
population is 50 (Spielberger, 1983). 
overall -  Pillai’s trace = 0.53, F{2>,26) For the SPAI, a group of 34 definitely non-socially anxious
university students scored 49 for the social phobia scale, whereas a 
— 9.8, p  < .001. TWO ANOVAs were group of 51 socially-phobic university students scored 99 (Turner et
al., 1999).
then conducted with each scale
separately (again with Marlowe-Crowne score as a co-variate). There was a significant 
effect of group (LFS/NFS) on both measures -  trait anxiety: F( 1,28) = 8.6, p  =.007; 
social phobia scale: F(l,28) = 5.4,/? = .03.
134
T 
sc
or
e
70
65
60
55
50
■LFS
-NFS
70
65
•- 55
50
-LFS
-LFS
Neurotic ism sub-scale Openness to experience subscale
F igu re  8. LFS and NFS com pared on the sub -scales of the  neuroticism and o p en n ess  to experience personality factors. 
R esults a re  given in T scores, w here 45 -  55 is the average  range.
Eye-tracking experiment
This experiment was conducted more than two years after the original LFS/NFS project 
began. Therefore, it was only
Table 7. Characteristics of the NFS/LFS subjects who 
possible for ten of the original took part in the eyetracking experiment.
sample to take part (4 LFS and 6 
NFS). To make a reasonable sample 
size, a number of female LFS and 
NFS, identified from the original on­
line data, were recruited. However, 
the quality of the eye-tracking
Age IQ Average Fear
LFS Mean 35.5 118.8 5.1
SD 15.52 8.80 1.43
NFS Mean 32.1 122.3 9.5
SD 12.14 9.53 .54
Average fear score is the mean from the original online test and the in­
laboratory re-test
recording was too poor to be used in several cases. The final sample consisted of 6 LFS 
(3 male) and 13 NFS (10 male). Group characteristics are given in table 7.
The gaze fixation data were entered into an ANOVA with group as a between-measures 
variable and phase and emotion as repeated-measures variables. The independent variable 
was the percentage of fixations made to the eyes. IQ was included as a co-variate. There 
was no significant effect of phase or significant interactions between phase and the other 
variables (all F < 1.8, all p  > .2); therefore, for display purposes, data from both phases 
are combined. Figure 9 displays the percentage of fixations made to the eyes, broken 
down by emotion and group. Even with the small sample size, the effects group, F(l,13) 
= 5.6, p  = .03, and emotion, F(5,65) = 2.6, p  = .03, were both significant. There were no 
significant interactions (all/?> .!).
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Figure 9. LFS subjects fixate on the eyes less than NFS subjects.
Error bars indicate ± 1 standard error.
Post-hoc comparisons were used to investigate the main effect o f  emotion. These 
revealed that subjects spent significantly less time fixating the eyes when view ing 
disgusted faces compared to all other emotions (all p  < .05, Bonferroni corrected). In 
addition, subjects spent significantly less tim e viewing angry compared to surprised faces 
(p  < .05, Bonferroni corrected). N o other pairwise comparisons w ere significant 
following correction for multiple comparisons.
W ithin the LFS and NFS groups, there were no significant correlations betw een the 
percentage o f  eye fixations made, the anxiety measures and fear recognition ability (all p  
> . 1).
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Table 8 gives the results of the relevant personality and anxiety measures for the new 
sample. The pattern of findings is very similar to the original sample; the exception being 
that neuroticism is this time slightly higher in the NFS group. However, probably due to 
the small sample size, none of these differences this time reach significance (all /?> .!).
Table 8. Personality and anxiety measures for the LFS and NFS samples who took part 
in the eye-tracking experiment.
Neuroticism
Openness to 
Experience
Trait anxiety 
T score
Social Phobia 
Scale
LFS Mean 56 61 62 80
SD 13.5 6.6 6.4 18.9
NFS Mean 58 63 56 69
SD 12.9 7.2 8.8 33.8
Part 2 Discussion
I found no evidence to support my prediction that LFS would experience more autistic 
traits than NFS. In addition, the mean number of autistic-traits reported by LFS is very 
similar to that of the norm data published by Baron-Cohen et al. (2001b). It is therefore 
very unlikely that poor fear recognition ability is associated with a greater incidence of 
ASD-like behaviour11.
On the other hand, there is some evidence that NFS demonstrate fewer autistic-traits than 
the average male -  their scores were significantly lower than the university student
A caveat is that this was a self-report measure and therefore LFS may be under-reporting their autistic-like symptoms (perhaps 
because of lack of insight). However, individuals with a diagnosed ASD do not seem to have this problem (they rate themselves highly 
on the AQ -  see Baron-Cohen et al, 2001). An objective measure of autistic symptoms might be beneficial, but it is difficult to think of 
one that would be sensitive enough to pick up the subtle differences that are likely to exist between LFS and NFS -  although the 
ADOS is a possibility.
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sample reported by Baron-Cohen et al. (2001b). However, when NFS were compared to 
the random sample of East-Anglican men the difference was not significant (although it 
was in the required direction). It is difficult to know which group is the best comparison 
for the NFS sample -  in age they more closely resemble the random sample, but in other 
characteristics they probably more closely match the university students (the NFS sample 
is made up mostly of undergraduate and post-graduate students and some faculty staff). 
Therefore, it is possible that better than average fear recognition is associated with better 
than average social functioning. Comparison of NFS with a well-matched group is clearly 
required to confirm or disconfirm this finding.
On the other measures of personality and anxiety, there were clear differences between 
the two groups. LFS rated themselves as being more neurotic than NFS. Examination of 
the neuroticism sub-scales suggests that this difference is driven largely by an increased 
tendency for LFS to feel anxious, depressed and self-conscious (on the NEO PI-R, self- 
consciousness is “akin to shyness and social anxiety”, see Costa and McCrae, 1991, pg. 
16). The other measures confirmed this finding -  LFS show greater general (trait) and 
social anxiety than NFS.12
Anxiety, particularly social anxiety, might be a product of poor social cognitive ability. 
For example if an individual has difficulty understanding social signals he might 
experience adverse peer interactions, which could lead to rejection and anxiety (Ginsburg
It is important to note that, while significantly more anxious than NFS, LFS should be thought of as being towards the top of the 
normal range rather than abnormally (clinically) anxious. For example, for trait anxiety the mean LFS score corresponds to the 82nd 
percentile on the published norm data; for neuroticism it is the 87* percentile (NFS scores corresponded to the 60* percentile on both 
measures, unfortunately detailed normed data is unavailable for the social phobia scale).
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et al., 1998). Alternatively, or in addition, anxiety may contribute to poor social cognitive 
ability. For example, if social stimuli cause over-arousal they might be actively avoided, 
with the result that subtle, but vital, social cues are missed. Over time, this could result in 
under-development of neural systems which normally subserve social behaviour. A 
similar idea is found in the hyper-active amygdala model of ASD (see chapter 1 and 
Dalton et al., 2005; Nacewicz et al., in press). Suggestions for experiments to investigate 
this possibility are given in the next section.
Inconsistent with my finding of a relationship between anxiety and poor fear recognition 
is the established literature associating high anxiety with hyper-vigilance of potentially 
threatening stimuli, of which fearful faces are considered to be one (for review see 
Dalgleish and Power, 1999). For example, anxious individuals have an attentional bias 
for fearful faces (Fox et al., 2005;Georgiou et al., 2005) and both high trait (general) 
anxiety (Surcinelli et al., 2006) and high social anxiety (Richards et al., 2002) 
individuals show an advantage for recognising fear in facial expressions. An explanation 
for this discrepancy might relate to the different strategies that people employ to cope 
with anxiety. While the majority of individuals appear to react to anxiety with hyper­
vigilance (Dalgleish and Power, 1999), there is evidence that others react with sensory 
defensiveness, avoiding any arousing stimuli (Pfeiffer et al., 2005). Again, more 
experiments will be required to investigate this further.
NFS rated themselves as more open to experience than LFS. This was not because LFS 
scored low on openness (they were in the normal range) but, rather, because NFS scored 
significantly above the normal range. Two recent, large scale studies are consistent with 
this finding, showing that openness to experience correlates with the ability to recognise 
emotions presented in multiple domains, including from facial expressions (Matsumoto et
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al., 2000;Terracciano et al., 2003). Open individuals tend to be intellectually curious, 
imaginative, and sensitive to aesthetics and inner feelings (Costa and McCrae, 1991). 
Thus, they are particularly attentive and receptive to their environment and the world 
around them, which may explain their heightened ability to read the emotions of others.
LFS spent less time fixating the eye regions of faces than controls, which, like SM, might 
contribute to their poor fear recognition ability. This finding may have profound 
implications for interpretation of the fMRI results presented in part 1 of this chapter. It is 
impossible to be certain about the fixation behaviour of our original sample -  only a few 
took part in the later eye-tracking study and no eye-tracking was performed during the 
neuroimaging experiment itself. Still it seems a distinct possibility that, during the fMRI 
experiment, LFS were fixating the eye region less than controls. If this is the case, then 
the reduced brain activity in LFS could simply reflect the fact that they were not engaging 
the most emotive parts of the stimuli (the eyes) as much as NFS. What this means in 
terms of understanding the social-cognitive deficit in LFS is discussed in the next section.
Summary, caveats and future directions
In part 1, I showed that poor fear recognition is associated with poor theory of mind 
ability and with reduced activation of diffuse areas of the social brain. In part 2, I found 
that poor fear recognition is also associated with increased levels of anxiety and with 
reduced time spent fixating the eyes in faces. The eyetracking results question the 
interpretation of the neuroimaging findings: were the brains of the LFS and NFS 
participants reacting differently to the same visual input or were the subjects behaving 
differently and therefore receiving different visual input? More experiments are required 
to answer this question and some suggestions are given below. Given the research
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showing the crucial role of the eyes in recognising fearful expressions (Adolphs et al., 
2005;Kohler et al., 2004;Smith et al., 2005), the eyetracking results presented here 
suggest that LFS are poor at recognising fearful faces because they spend less time 
fixating the eyes. The data collected so far are merely correlational; therefore it will 
require more work to positively prove this assertion -  again, some ideas for appropriate 
experiments are given below. The most important unsolved question is why LFS do not 
look at eyes as much as NFS and how this might relate to their higher levels of anxiety, 
their abnormal neural response to direct gaze and their impaired ToM abilities. At least 
four possibilities exist:
1) LFS do not register eyes as salient and so are not drawn towards them. Parallels 
may be drawn here to the hypo-active amygdala model of ASD (see chapter 1 and 
Schultz, 2005), where it is proposed that the amygdala fails to flag certain social 
stimuli, such as eyes, as important, with the result that attention is not directed 
towards them.
2) LFS find eyes aversive (over-arousing) and so actively avoid them. This echoes 
the hyper-active amygdala model of ASD (see chapter 1 and Dalton et al., 2005; 
Nacewicz et al., in press); which suggests that it is hyper-activity of the amygdala 
which leads to emotional stimuli being avoided. The fact that LFS are more 
anxious, including socially anxious, than NFS, could be considered to be 
consistent with this account.
3) A neurological reason not related to detecting emotional salience and/or the 
amygdala. For example, Wong et al. (2005) suggest that reduced fixation to the 
upper part of the face and declining ability to recognise fear and anger in old age 
might be related to front lobe atrophy affecting the integrity of the frontal eye 
fields. It may be beneficial to investigate the integrity of these circuits in LFS.
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4) A behavioural reason not related to emotional salience or anxiety. Aberrant visual 
scanning of faces by LFS may be due to an unusual cognitive strategy employed 
when attempting to gain information from faces. One could postulate a number of 
possible causes for this; untreated eyesight problems in childhood, for instance.
There are numerous experiments which could be conducted to take these findings 
forward. Probably the most crucial would involve measuring the neural responses of LFS 
and NFS to socially salient stimuli (e.g. faces with direct gaze) while manipulating where 
on the stimulus they are fixating (e.g. either the eyes or the mouth). Gaze fixation patterns 
should be carefully monitored using an eyetracker and autonomic responses, such as 
SCRs, should be recorded. Firstly, this experiment would show whether LFS brains do 
indeed react differently to the same visual input of a socially salient stimulus or whether 
the fMRI findings presented in part 1 of this chapter can be explained purely by 
differences in the way LFS viewed the faces. Secondly, it would test (1) and (2) above. If 
eyes are less salient to LFS, one would predict that LFS subjects would show reduced 
autonomic or amygdala activity to eyes (versus mouths) compared to NFS. On the other 
hand, if eyes are hyper-arousing to LFS, heightened responses would be expected. Finally, 
if no differences in autonomic and/or amygdala activity can be observed between LFS 
and NFS when they are made to look at the eyes, then this would count against both (1) 
and (2) and one could focus attention on alternative explanations for the failure to fixate 
eyes in LFS -  e.g. (3) and (4).
Testing if a failure to look at eyes actually causes poor fear recognition in LFS may be 
difficult, but one possibility is to borrow an experiment from Adolphs et al.’s (2005) 
study of SM. While SM does not spontaneously look at the eyes she is able to do so when 
instructed, with the result of a dramatic improvement in her fear recognition. When the
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task is repeated a few weeks later, however, both the failure to fixate the eyes and the 
poor fear score have returned. Together, these results suggest that poor eye fixation is the 
mechanism for poor fear recognition in SM. A similar experiment with LFS would 
provide useful data for interpreting the cause of their fear recognition deficit.
Finally, it would be useful to examine the cognitive strategies used by LFS when they 
attempt to classify fearful expressions. Probably the most precise way to do this would be 
to use the Bubbles task (Gosselin and Schyns, 2001). This would give exact details about 
the features of the face that are being used by LFS when they attempt to identify a given 
expression.
As stated earlier, part 2 of this chapter was completed towards the end of the time 
available for this PhD and considerably after part 1 was began. Unfortunately, therefore, 
there is neither the time nor the necessary numbers of LFS participants to conduct the 
experiments described above. Instead, the remaining chapters of this thesis focus on fear 
recognition and eyetracking in AS, with a view to testing predictions made by the hyper- 
and hypo-active amygdala models of ASD.
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Chapter 4 -  Fear recognition in Asperger’s 
syndrome
Introduction and Summary
In part 1 of this chapter I examine the controversial question of whether people with an 
ASD are impaired at recognising fear from facial expressions, as well as the other 
negative emotions, in line with an amygdala involvement in the condition. I show that a 
group of high-functioning Asperger’s syndrome (AS) subjects are indeed impaired at 
recognising fear and also sadness relative to age, IQ and gender matched controls. 
However, there is great variability in the AS group: their ability to recognise fear ranges 
from above average to severely impaired, which may help explain the equivocal findings 
in the literature regarding this issue. In part 2, I investigate the origin of the fear 
recognition deficit in AS and the reasons behind its variable manifestation. I show that 
poor fear recognition amongst AS subjects is associated with a failure to fixate the eye 
region of faces. This pattern is reminiscent of patient SM and is discussed in terms of 
current models of amygdala pathology in ASD (the hyper- and hypo- responsive models). 
In the next chapter I test predictions from these competing models, thereby investigating 
the underlying cause of the reduced eye fixation and poor fear recognition ability in some 
AS subjects.
Part 1 -  Recognition of facial affect in AS
Methods
Twenty-one individuals with a diagnosis of AS took part in this study (see chapter 2 for 
details of recruitment and diagnosis) along with twenty-one controls, matched as closely
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as possible for gender and age. Table 9 gives the age, gender, IQ and ADOS 
characteristics for these groups.
Table 9. Group characteristics for ‘recognition o f facial affect in AS’ study.
Age
(years)
Gender Verbal
IQ
Performance
IQ
Full IQ DTVP
Score
AQ ADOS
Category
AS 33.8 16 M 115.8 116.2 117.9 106.7 37.1 11 Autism
Mean (SD) (13.60) 5 F (9.68) (13.73) (11.67) (6.66) (6.21) 10 Autistic 
spectrum
Controls 32.1 16 M 115.1 115.5 117.2 106.3 14.9 NA
Mean (SD) (11.58) 5 F (8.19) (8.75) (8.00) (6.16) (8.58)
DTVP = Developmental Test of Visual Perception. ADOS = autism diagnostic observation schedule. AQ = Autistic-spectrum 
quotient
In (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001b), the mean AQ score for die AS sample was 35.8 (SD = 6.5); the mean score for a large sample of 
normal controls was 16.4 (SD = 6.3).
There were no significant differences between any of these variables (all p  > .72) apart from AQ (p < .001).
Subjects completed our computerised version of the Ekman-Friesen test of facial affect 
recognition (see chapter 2 for further details) in the laboratory. The six emotion labels 
were presented adjacent to each image and subjects indicated their responses via a mouse 
click. There was an unlimited time to answer.
Results
Figure 10 summarises the Ekman-Friesen test results as a box-plot. As in chapter 3, the 
data were not normally distributed and could not be normalised by transformation; 
therefore Mann-Whitney tests are used to compare group differences. AS subjects 
performed significantly worse than controls at recognising fearful (U = 124, p  < .05, 
Bonferroni-Holm corrected) and sad (U= 104.5, p  < .05, corrected) facial expressions.
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Figure 10. Results o f the Ekman-Friesen test of facial affect recognition for AS subjects and age and 
gender matched controls. Boxes show the median (black line) and the inter-quartile range (IQR, edges 
o f boxes). Whiskers are 1.5 * IQR. Circles represent mild outliers (between 1.5 and 3 * IQR) and stars 
represent extreme outliers (> 3 * IQR).
Of note is the generally higher degree of variability amongst the AS subjects (see figure 
10), which is particularly evident for fearful expressions: many individuals are 
performing normally (the mode fear recognition score is 10/10 for both groups) but a 
number are severely impaired. Conover’s squared ranks test13 (Conover, 1999) confirms 
that the variability in fear recognition scores is higher within the AS group (SD = 2.93 for 
AS, 1.34 for controls,/? = .01). There is also a significant difference in variance for angry 
expressions (SD = 2.10 for Asperger’s, 1.23 for controls, p  = .02) but not for any other 
emotion.
This is a non-parametric test for equality of variance between two sample populations. Levene’s test or the F  ratio test would be 
inappropriate in this case as both assume that the data come from a normally distributed population.
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Reaction times14 were slightly slower for the AS group, although this was not significant 
(mean ± SD, Asperger’s, 1061 ± 542 msec; controls, 909 ± 363 msec; t(40) = 1.05, p 
= .3), suggesting that the differences between the two groups were not due to a speed- 
accuracy trade-off. In addition, there were no significant correlations between fear or 
sadness recognition score and reaction time, age, verbal IQ, performance IQ or DTVP 
score for either group (all r < .28, all p  > .21), suggesting that differences in cognitive 
ability could not explain the variability in fear and sadness recognition ability.
In the AS group, neither fear or sadness recognition significantly correlated with the 
severity of autistic symptomology, measured either as part of the ADOS or self-reported 
by the AQ (table 10).
ADOS
Com
ADOS
RSI
ADOS
Total
AQ
Fear recognition score r .01 -.05 .-.01 .25
Sad recognition score r -.24 .03 -.07 .05
Table 10. Spearman’s correlations between fear and sadness recognition scores 
and measures of autistic impairment. All p > .31
ADOS = autism diagnostic observation schedule AQ = autistic-spectrum quotient
To further investigate the fear and sadness recognition deficits in the AS group, I 
characterised the errors that both groups made when misidentifying these emotions. For 
fearful faces, the groups made similar patterns of errors, usually misidentifying fearful 
faces as either surprised or disgusted (see table 11). Misidentifying fear as anger was the 
third most common error, seen more often in the AS group. However, Mann-Whitney
14 These are the mean reaction times, averaged over all emotions. Unfortunately, due to loss of the raw data it was not possible to 
present reaction times for the individual emotions. However, the Ekman-Friesen test is repeated in part 2 of this chapter, where on this 
occasion the reaction time data are given in full.
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tests for each emotion revealed no significant differences between the two groups’ error 
patterns, even before correction for multiple comparisons (all p > .36, uncorrected).
Surprised Angry Disgusted Sad Happy
AS Mean % of errors 56.5 16.1 26.7 .0 .6
SD 40.04 30.20 33.68 .00 30.20
Controls Mean % of errors 60.6 7.6 31.8 .0 .0
SD 49.03 17.26 41.13 .00 .00
Table 11. Pattern of errors made when misidentifying a fearful face, split by group. The percentage of times that 
each emotion was chosen in place of fear (the correct answer) was calculated separately for each subject and the 
mean of these data is shown above. Subjects who made no errors were not included in the analysis.
For the AS group alone, I then investigated whether the pattern of errors varied with fear 
recognition score by splitting the group into three sub-groups: those who scored < 5 for 
fear recognition, those who scored 6 or 7 and those who score 8 or 9 (see table 12). The 
data suggest that progressively more fearful faces are misidentified as angry as fear score 
drops. However, a Kruskal-Wallis test showed that this was not significant (%2 = 3.1, p  
= .24), perhaps largely because of the small sample size (see table 12).
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Mean fear score Surprised Angry Disgusted Sad Happy
<=5 Mean % of errors 45.8 26.7 25.6 .0 2.0
N 5 5 5 5 5
SD 36.26 30.28 31.37 .00 4.47
6 or 7 Mean % of errors 53.6 17.9 28.6 .0 .0
N 7 7 7 7 7
SD 39.34 37.40 30.37 .00 .00
8 or 9 Mean % of errors 75.0 .0 25.0 .0 .0
N 4 4 4 4 4
SD 50.00 .00 50.00 .00 .00
Table 12. Pattern of errors when AS subjects misidentify a fearful face, split by fear recognition 
score.
Table 13 shows the pattern of errors when subjects misidentified a sad face. Again, the 
pattern of errors was similar for each group, except that AS subjects sometimes identified 
a sad face as surprised or happy, which controls never did. However, there were no 
significant differences between the two groups after correction for multiple comparisons 
(all p  > .24) -  although for surprised the difference was significant before correction ip = 
.047). No clear patterns emerged when splitting the AS group by sadness score and, 
therefore, these data are not shown on this occasion.
Surprised Fearful Angry Disgusted Happy
AS Mean % of errors 10.5 58.5 10.5 18.1 2.5
SD 17.56 38.00 23.34 33.58 11.18
Controls Mean % of errors .0 72.2 4.4 23.3 .0
SD .00 38.66 11.73 35.52 .00
Table 13. Pattern of errors made when misidentifying a sad face, split by group. The percentage of times that 
each emotion was chosen in the place of sadness (the correct answer) was calculated separately for each 
subject; the mean of these data is shown above. Subjects who made no errors were not included in the 
analysis.
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Discussion
As predicted, individuals with AS were impaired at recognising fearful faces compared 
with age and gender matched controls. Like patients with amygdala damage, this 
extended to other negative emotions — there was a significant effect for sad faces and a 
trend towards an effect for angry faces. These data replicate studies by Howard et al. 
(2000) and Pelphrey et al. (2002), who both found a fear recognition impairment in adults 
with high functioning autism or AS, as well as trends toward an impairment for 
recognising sad and angry expressions. However, the present findings do not concur with 
studies by Adolphs et al. (2001), Grossman et al. (2000) or Castelli (2005), who all failed 
to find an impaired ability to recognise fear or any of the other ‘basic’ emotions in ASD. 
As discussed in chapter 1, the latter two of these studies were conducted with children 
(mean chronological age 11.8 and 12.3 respectively, verbal age 9.3 years for the second 
study) rather than adults, which may go some way to explaining the negative findings. 
For example, control children may not yet be developed enough to complete the task 
successfully, which would appear to be the case in the Grossman et al. (2000) study 
where control children only correctly identified 50% of the fearful faces (Asperger’s 
children identified 48% correctly). The other study which failed to find a fear recognition 
deficit in ASD was conducted with adults (Adolphs et al., 2001). However, as discussed 
in chapter 1, this was with a small sample size (7 ASD subjects) and examination of the 
data shows that all but one ASD subject scored below the control mean (see figure 2 of 
Adolphs et al., 2000), suggesting the possibility of a type II error.
A striking feature of the data reported here is the high degree of variability amongst the 
AS group, whose fear recognition scores showed over twice the standard deviation of the 
control sample. No previous studies have highlighted such a difference, although the data
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reported by Pelphrey et al. (2001) shows an effect of similar magnitude (2x that of 
controls). Howard et al. (2000) and Grossman et al. (2000) report milder differences in 
the same direction (SD of AS group 1.2x and 1.4x that of controls respectively), while 
Castelli et al. (2005) find the opposite effect, albeit using a different paradigm 
(Asperger’s 0.9x controls). Adolphs et al. (2001) do not provide the information, but they 
do note that two of their AS subjects performed noticeably worse than the rest of the 
group. There could be many reasons for this variability. Individuals with an ASD are a 
notoriously heterogeneous group and the manifestation of clinical symptoms can be quite 
variable (Wing and Gould, 1979). Whether this reflects significant differences in 
underlying pathophysiology or whether it is due to overlying, modulatory mechanisms is 
a pertinent question both to the study of the condition as a whole and to the current data. 
Variable fear recognition ability in ASD may indicate the existence of 
pathophysiologically distinct sub-groups or it may mean that some have developed 
compensatory cognitive strategies while some have not. This question will be returned to 
in later chapters. Whatever its cause, if there is greater variability in fear recognition 
amongst those with an ASD, it may go a long way to explaining the inconsistency in 
research findings, especially given the typical sample sizes of -20 subjects.
When they misidentified a fearful face, the AS group made similar errors to the control 
subjects, usually mistaking it for a surprised face. The similarity between the two 
expressions was noted by Darwin (1872/1998) and this pattern of errors concurs with 
those found in previous studies (Ekman and Friesen, 1976;Young et al., 1997). However, 
AS subjects who had a low fear score often misidentified fear as anger -  a mistake which 
is uncommon amongst my controls as well as those of other studies (Ekman and Friesen, 
1976;Young et al., 1997). These differences did not reach statistical significance but they 
may be worth pursuing in the future, as they perhaps suggest that the AS subjects who are
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poor at recognising fear do not simply have an altered threshold when it comes to 
differentiating fear and surprise but have a more profound problem with emotion 
recognition. A similar situation is evident for sad expressions, the other emotion for 
which AS subjects were also significantly worse at recognising than controls. Again, the 
general pattern of errors (misidentifying sad expressions as fearful or disgusted) was 
similar between the two groups and concurred with previous studies (Ekman and Friesen, 
1976;Young et al., 1997). However, the AS group did not simply make more of the usual 
errors - 10% of their mistakes were caused by misidentifying sadness as surprise, 
something that controls never did. Clearly data on more subjects is required before 
definitive conclusions can be drawn, but this type of error analysis could prove useful in 
characterising the emotion recognition deficits in ASD.
The two groups were well matched in terms of age, IQ and basic visual perceptual 
abilities (as measured by the DTVP). In addition, reaction times did not differ 
significantly between the groups and none of the variables just mentioned correlated with 
fear or sadness recognition ability within the AS group. Therefore, neither differences in 
cognitive/perceptual abilities or in a speed-accuracy tradeoff can be invoked to explain 
the observed fear and sadness deficits. Rather, they would appear to reflect a specific 
impairment in social-perceptual ability and therefore support the existence of a distinct 
social-cognitive ‘module’, removed from other areas of cognition.
Neither fear or sadness recognition impairment correlated with the severity of autistic 
symptomology as measured by the ADOS or AQ, perhaps indicating that deficits in 
social-perception can not predict deficits in day to day social interaction and 
communication. There may be a number of reasons for this: some practical, to do with 
problems concerning measurement and operationalisation of psychological concepts, and
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others more theoretical, concerning the place of social-perceptual deficits in the autism 
phenotype. These issues will be discussed in more detail in the discussion to chapter 5 
and, particularly, in the general discussion in chapter 7, where it will be possible to place 
them in the context of the other findings in this thesis.
Taking the evidence as a whole, my data adds to a growing consensus of a fear 
recognition deficit in adults with high functioning autism or AS. However, the reasons 
and causes of this are yet to be explored. As discussed in chapter 1, a number of studies 
have shown that those with an ASD fail to fixate the eyes in faces as much as controls 
(Dalton et al., 2005;Klin et al., 2002;Pelphrey et al., 2002). Given the association 
between the eyes and fear recognition in normal individuals (chapter 3 and Smith et al., 
2005) and SM (Adolphs et al., 2005), linking the two in ASD seems an obvious step, yet 
to date no studies have tried to do this formally. The next section attempts such an inquiry.
Part 2 -  Poor fear recognition in AS is associated 
with a failure to fixate eyes
Methods
18 of the AS subjects who participated in part 1 provided data for this stage of the study. 
Of those whose data is missing, one was unable to take part due a lack of wheelchair 
access to the testing room, one became anxious during the testing procedure and asked to 
stop and one completed the task but his recording was not of sufficient quality to be used. 
The AS group were matched in terms of age and gender with 18 control subjects, who 
had also participated in part 1. Unfortunately, eyetracking data was corrupted for one 
control subject, leaving 17 participants. The AS subjects’ impairment in recognising
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fearful and sad facial expressions persisted with these truncated groups -  fear, U = 95, p 
= .025; sad, U=73.5,p=  .003). Table 14 displays the group characteristics.
The subjects took part in the eyetracking task as described in chapter 2. To recap, subjects 
had their eye movements recorded during two experimental phases. In phase 1 there was 
no task; subjects were told to, “look at the faces however they wanted to”. In phase 2, 
after viewing each photograph, subjects were required to choose which emotion they 
thought the person was expressing from a list of the six basic emotions. Therefore, as 
well as having their eye movements recorded, subjects also repeated the Ekman-Friesen 
test of facial affect. In terms of the eyetracking data, the dependent variables were the 
amount of time spent fixating the eye and mouth region, expressed as a percentage of the 
total number of fixations to the face.
Table 14. Group characteristics for the subjects who took part in the eye-tracking study.
Age
(years)
Gender Verbal
IQ
Performance
IQ
Full IQ DTVP
Score
AQ
score
ADOS
Category
AS 33.2 15 M 116.8 120.0 (15.10) 120.7 106.3 36.6 8 Autism
Mean (SD) (13.97) 3 F (10.08) (12.76) (6.67) (6.26) 10 Autistic 
spectrum
Controls 31.9 14 M 115.1 115.9 117.4 106.7 14.6 NA
Mean (SD) (11.58) 3 F (8.37) (8.87) (8.26) (6.14) (9.17)
DTVP = Developmental Test of Visual Perception. ADOS = autism diagnostic observation schedule. AQ = Autistic-spectrum quotient 
In (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001b), the mean AQ score for the AS sample was 35.8 (SD = 6.5); the mean score for a large sample of normal 
controls was 16.4 (SD = 6.3).
There were no significant differences between any of these variables (all p > .38), apart from AQ (p < .001).
155
Results
Emotion recognition re-test
Table 15 shows the results of the Ekman- 
Friesen emotion recognition test, which 
subjects repeated as part of phase 2 of the 
eyetracking experiment. Both groups 
showed an improvement on the first time 
they took the test, but the rank order of 
results did not change, as shown by non­
significant Wicoxon signed ranks tests for 
each emotion (all p > .35).
Mean SD
Happy AS 9.9 .24
Controls 10.0 .00
Sad AS 7.7 1.19
Controls 8.2 1.25
Fearful AS 7.5 1.41
Controls 8.8 1.33
Angry AS 8.5 1.34
Controls 8.7 1.10
Surprised AS 8.5 2.20
Controls 8.8 1.29
Disgusted AS 6.6 2.57
Controls 8.1 2.26
Table 15. Re-test o f the Ekman-Friesen test with 
the AS group and controls.
AS subjects were again significantly impaired at recognising fearful faces (U = 85, p 
< .05, corrected), but there were no significant effects for the other emotions after 
correcting for multiple comparisons (all p>  .2 corrected).
Variability in responses was again generally higher for the AS group, although to a much 
smaller degree than for the first test, especially for fearful expressions. This was reflected 
in the results of Conover’s squared ranks test for equality of variance, which were non­
significant for each emotion following correction for multiple comparisons (all p > .6; 
although the variability for surprise was significantly greater in the AS group before 
correction -p <  .025).
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The reaction times for the emotion recognition task are shown in figure 11, split by 
emotion and group. These data were entered into an ANOVA. There was a highly
significant effect of emotion, 
F(5,160) = 19.3, p < .001. Post- 
hoc comparisons revealed that 
this was driven by the faster 
mean response time for happy 
faces, which was significantly 
lower compared to all other 
emotions (all p  < .001). No 
other pairwise comparisons 
were significant. Although the 
mean response time of the AS 
group was longer for each 
emotion, there was no 
significant effect of group, F(l,32) = 1.5, p  = .23, or a significant group x emotion
interaction, F(5,160) = .3, p  = .93. In addition, there was no significant correlation
between mean emotion recognition score (averaged across all emotions) and mean 
reaction time for either group (AS, r = .004,/? = .99; controls, r = .25, p  = .34). Together, 
these results confirm the suggestion made in part 1 that emotion recognition deficits in 
the AS group can not be attributed to a speed-accuracy trade-off.
Eye-tracking data
The fixation data were entered into an ANOVA with group as a between-measures 
variable and phase and emotion as repeated-measured variables. The independent
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Figure 11. Mean reaction times for the emotion 
recognition test taken in phase 2 of the eyetracking 
experiment. Error bars indicate ± 1 standard error.
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variable was the percentage of fixations made to the eyes. There was no significant effect 
of phase or a significant interaction between phase and the other variables (all F < 1.5, all 
p > .2); therefore, for display purposes, data from both phases are combined (figure 12). 
The main effects of emotion, F(5,160) = 17.7,/? < .001, and group, F(l,32) = 5.6 ,p  = .02, 
were significant, as was the interaction between them, F(5,160) = 2.8, p  =.02.
Post-hoc comparisons were used to investigate the main effect of emotion. These 
revealed that subjects spent significantly less time fixating the eyes when viewing 
disgusted and angry faces, compared to all other emotions (all p  < .05, Bonferroni 
corrected). In addition, subjects spent significantly more time fixating on the eyes when 
viewing surprised compared to happy faces. No other pairwise comparisons were 
significant following correction for multiple comparisons.
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Figure 12. Subjects with AS spend less time fixating the eye region of faces than 
age and gender matched controls. Error bars indicate ± 1 standard error.
To investigate the significant group x emotion interaction, t-tests were conducted 
comparing the groups on each emotion separately. The effects for surprised, t{ 1,32) = - 
2.9, p  = .02, sad, t( 1,32) = -2.7, p  =.03, and happy, /(1,32) = -2.6, p  = .03, faces were 
significant, following Bonferroni-Holm correction for multiple comparisons (others: .06 
<p< .09).
Data on the amount of time spent fixating the mouth was also entered into an ANOVA 
with group, phase and emotion as independent variables. Again, the main effect of phase 
and its interactions with the other variables were not significant (all p > .1); therefore data 
for the different phases are combined for display (figure 13). There was a trend towards 
the AS group spending more time fixating the mouth than controls but this did not reach
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significance, F( 1,32) = 3.5, p  = .07. However, there was again a main effect of emotion,
F(5,160) = 7.74, p < .001. Post-hoc 
comparisons suggest that this was 
driven by fewer mouth fixations being 
made to sad expressions: this was 
significant in comparison with every 
other emotion (all p  < .004, Bonferroni 
corrected). No other pair-wise 
comparisons were significant.Expression v  &
Figure 13. The amount o f time spent fixating on the 
mouth in the eyetracking task, split by emotion and group.
Error bars indicate ±  1 standard error.
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For the AS group, the percentage of fixations made to the eyes was negatively correlated 
with the number made to the mouth, r -  -.66, p  = .003 (figure 14). There was a 
correlation in the same direction for the control group but this not as strong and was not 
significant, r = -.24, p  = .36 (figure 14). These two correlation co-efficients were not 
significantly different, z = -1.34,/? = .25.
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Figure 14. Scatterplots showing the relationship between the percentage o f fixations made to the 
eyes and the percentage made to the mouth, split by group.
In the AS group, reduced time spent fixating the eyes was not associated with greater 
severity of autistic symptomology, as measured by either the ADOS or the AQ (table 16). 
The percentage of fixations made to the mouth showed a trend towards a correlation with 
AQ but not with the ADOS.
ADOS
Com
ADOS
RSI
ADOS
Total
AQ
% fixations made to eyes r -.06 -.18 -.14 -.07
% fixations made to mouth r -.08 .26 .21 .47*
Table 16. Correlations between gaze fixation pattern and measures of severity 
of autistic symptoms. *p = .07, all others,/? > .33
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Correlating time spent fixating the eyes with fear recognition score
Next I tested the prediction that poor fear score15 in the AS group would be associated 
with a failure to fixate the eye region of faces by looking at the correlation between these 
variables separately for each group. Figure 15 shows the relevant scatter plots. There was 
a significant correlation for the AS group (r -  .56, p  = .01) but not for the control group (r 
= .06,p=  .41). However, these correlation co-efficients were not significantly different, z 
= 1.29, p  = .20. The correlation for the AS group remained significant even after removal 
of the outlier seen in the bottom left hand side of the scatterplot (r = .45,/? = .03).
:o so 40 
% of fixations made to the eyes
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o o o o
40 50
% fixations made to the eyes
Figure 15. Scatterplots showing the correlation between fixations to the eye region and the ability to 
recognise fearful faces, shown separately for each group. Fear recognition scores have been averaged across 
the two repetitions of the test.
15 All the emotion recognition scores used in this section are mean scores, calculated from both repetitions of the test.
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For the AS group, the amount of time spent fixating the eyes only significantly predicted 
the ability to recognise fear -  not the other emotions (table 17).
Recognition score for...
Happy
faces
Sad
faces
Fearful
faces
Angry
faces
Surprised
faces
Disgusted
faces
% fixations made to eyes r 
(mean of all faces)
-.01 .35 .56* -.02 -.14 .23
Table 17. For people with AS, the amount of time spent fixating the eye region of faces predicts 
recognition score only for fearful expressions. *p < .06, Bonferroni-Holm corrected.
In the AS group, fear recognition score was predicted by the amount of time spent 
fixating the eyes of all facial expressions except happy, not just fearful faces (table 18).
Percentage of fixations made to the eyes for...
Happy
faces
Sad
faces
Fearful
faces
Angry
faces
Surprised
faces
Disgusted
faces
Mean fear recognition score r .34 .55* .56* .58* .51* .48*
Table 18. Fear recognition ability is predicted by the amount o f time spent fixating eyes o f all facial 
expressions except happy faces. *p < .05, Bonferroni-Holm corrected
Discussion
As predicted, the AS group made fewer fixations to the eyes than did control subjects. 
This replicates with an AS sample a number of earlier studies, which found the same 
result with adults diagnosed with autism (Dalton et al., 2005;Klin et al., 2002;Nacewicz 
et al., 2006;Pelphrey et al., 2002), and is consistent with clinical and anecdotal reports of 
poor eye fixation in ASDs (for example, see, American Psychiatry Association, 
1994;Hutt and Ounsted, 1969).
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There was no significant effect of experimental phase or a significant phase x group 
interaction, suggesting that both groups fixate faces in the same way regardless of 
whether or not they are overtly engaged in judging the facial expression. There was, 
however, a significant group x emotion interaction, which post-hoc t-tests suggest is due 
to a greater difference between the groups when fixating sad, surprised and happy faces 
compared to the other emotions (see figure 12). Although the post-hoc t-tests for fearful, 
angry and disgusted faces were not significant following correction for multiple 
comparisons, there were trends towards significance in each case (see figure 12) and it 
seems likely that differences between all three emotions contributed to the group 
difference in the amount of fixations made to the eyes.
Also as predicted, the amount of time spent fixating the eyes correlated with ability to 
recognise fearful faces in the AS group. A number of previous studies have shown a fear 
recognition deficit in ASD (Howard et al., 2000;Pelphrey et al., 2002), others have shown 
that autistic individuals spend less time fixating eyes (Dalton et al., 2005;Klin et al., 
2002;Nacewicz et al., 2006;Pelphrey et al., 2002) and we know that eyes are a critical 
feature for fear recognition in normal subjects (Adolphs et al., 2005;Smith et al., 2005). 
However, to my knowledge, this is the first study to formally link variability in eye 
fixation to fear recognition in an ASD.
Fear recognition ability was associated with fixation to the eyes for all facial expressions, 
not just fearful faces. However, eye fixations only significantly predicted recognition 
performance for fearful faces, not for other emotions. This is consistent with the data 
from normal subjects, showing the crucial role of the eyes in recognising fearful faces but 
not other expressions (Smith et al., 2005, see figure 1) and is reminiscent of SM, who
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showed reduced fixation to the eyes for all faces, regardless o f  emotion, but who has a 
specific fear recognition deficit (A dolphs et al., 2005).
There w ere ~4 outliers in the correlation 
betw een the percentage o f  fixations made 
to  the eyes and fear recognition score (see 
figure 16). These individuals rarely fixated 
the eyes (m aking 7 -  14% o f  fixations to 
the eyes, com pared to a m ean o f  29%  for 
the AS group and 40%  for controls) yet 
they correctly  identified the m ajority o f  
the fearful faces (m ean fear recognition 
score betw een 7 and 8 out o f  10). These individuals are potentially  very interesting 
because they show that it is possible to achieve a norm al fear recognition score w ithout 
looking at the eyes. These individuals may be using a com pensatory cognitive strategy, 
solving the task in an unusual way, not involving the ey e s16. This w ould be consistent 
with previous studies on other aspects o f  face processing in ASD, such as face 
recognition m emory, that have shown that individuals w ith an A SD  can perform  a given 
task as well, and som etim es better, than controls, but m ay be doing so in an atypical 
fashion (e.g. Langdell, 1978).
One w ay to investigate i f  the outliers do possess an alternative strategy (rather than 
m aking super-efficient use o f  the short tim e they do fixate the eyes) w ould be to use a
In fact, if their strategy did not involve the eyes (as would seem to be the case) it may add to their low eye fixation percentages by 
directing them away from the eyes towards other features.
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Figure 16. Outliers in the correlation between the % 
fixations made to the eyes and fear recognition score.
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modified Ekman-Friesen test of facial affect in which the eyes had been digitally 
removed. The hypothesis would be that fear recognition scores would drop in normal 
controls (and in AS subjects who fixate the eyes normally) but not in the outliers. 
Another would be to analyse the eye fixation patterns of the outliers in more depth, to see 
if they consistently make use of certain features other than the eyes when correctly 
identifying fearful faces17. Probably the most precise, but also most labour-intensive, 
method of assessing any alternative strategy would be to use the Bubbles task (Gosselin 
and Schyns, 2001;Smith et al., 2005) with these individuals, which would give precise 
details of the areas of the face that are critical for them to identify a fearful expression. 
These experiments are beyond the time available for this thesis but they provide 
interesting avenues for future research.
Both the hypo- and hyper-active amygdala neurodevelopmental models of ASD predict 
that those with the condition would spend less time fixating eyes than those without the 
condition and that this would be associated with social-perceptual problems, such as poor 
fear recognition. However, the models differ in what they would consider to be the root 
cause of this failure to fixate the eyes. The hypo-activation model would hypothesise that 
the amygdala fails to flag the eyes as salient and therefore attention is not drawn towards 
them. The hyper-activation model would predict that fixating eyes produces over-arousal 
and so they are avoided. In the next section, I attempt to tease apart these possibilities by 
testing some specific hypotheses of the two neurodevelopmental models.
17 A quick analysis of the mouth fixation data does not suggest that the outliers fixate on the mouth more than other low fear scoring 
AS subjects.
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Chapter 5 -  Testing predictions from the 
hyper- and hypo-active amygdala models of 
ASD
Introduction and summary
In this chapter I will present psychological, psychophysiological and neuroanatomical 
evidence which, overall, supports the hyper-active amygdala model of ASD and sheds 
some light on the causes of low eye fixation and poor fear recognition amongst my AS 
group. The hyper-activity model associates amygdala pathology with anxiety in ASD and 
predicts that more anxious individuals will show greater avoidance of arousing stimuli. In 
part 1 ,1 confirm the high incidence of anxiety in AS and show that those individuals with 
the highest social anxiety fixate the eyes the least and have the lowest fear recognition 
score. In part 2, I report a psychophysiological experiment in which AS subjects were 
instructed to fixate either the eyes or the mouths of faces while their skin conductance 
responses were recorded. The hyper-activation model would predict that individuals who 
normally show greatest avoidance of the eyes (and the lowest fear scores) will have the 
greatest autonomic responses to eyes versus mouths. The hypo-active model, which 
supposes that eyes lack salience for those with an ASD, would predict the opposite effect. 
The results are not wholly unequivocal but generally support the hyper-active model. In 
part 3 ,1 present a voxel based morphometry study which looks at the correlation between 
amygdala volume and social anxiety, eye avoidance and fear recognition in AS. 
Following Nacewicz et al., (in press), the hyper-activity model predicts that those 
showing greatest social anxiety and who fixate eyes the least (and therefore have the 
lowest fear recognition scores) would have the smallest amygdala volumes due to a 
hyper-activity induced atrophy. The first of these correlations would be inconsistent with
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the hypo-active amygdala model; the situation with the latter two is less clear. Evidence 
is presented for all three correlations, again generally in support of the hyper-active 
model. Finally, in part 4 ,1 instruct a group of low fear scoring AS subjects to fixate the 
eyes while viewing faces and examine the effect of this on their ability to recognise fear. 
The findings as a whole are discussed in terms of the two models and in terms of the 
limitations of the experimental paradigms. A number of further experiments are proposed, 
which may help solve some of the remaining ambiguities. In the next chapter, an 
experiment which explicitly tests a prediction of the hypo-active amygdala model is 
presented.
Part 1 -  psychological data 1
The hyper-active amygdala model suggests that the amygdala is involved in producing 
heightened anxiety in ASD, which results in the avoidance of arousal-inducing stimuli, 
such as direct gaze. The model therefore predicts that
a) AS subjects will show higher anxiety than controls
b) More anxious individuals will show the greatest avoidance of social stimuli (i.e. 
lowest fixation of the eyes) and therefore the lowest fear recognition scores.
The major aim of this section is to test these predictions via self-report questionnaires of 
general and social anxiety.
In chapter 3 I reported that normal males who were poor at recognising fear (LFS) had a 
distinctive personality profile when compared to males who had no deficit recognising 
fear (NFS). As well as rating themselves higher for ‘neuroticism’ (which is related to 
anxiety) they also rated themselves as less ‘open to experience’. Therefore, a secondary
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aim of this section is to see if ‘openness to experience’ plays a part in the fear recognition 
deficits of the AS group.
Method
The subjects who took part in the eyetracking experiment reported in chapter 4 were 
contacted by post and asked to fill in the NEO PI-R personality questionnaire (Costa and 
McCrae, 1991) and two other questionnaires, measuring aspects of anxiety: the trait 
portion of the Spielberger state-trait anxiety questionnaire (Spielberger, 1983) and the 
Social Phobia and Anxiety Inventory (Turner et al., 1999).
Social desirability, i.e. the tendency to portray oneself in a favourable light, is known to 
bias anxiety measures, often leading to a underestimation of an individual’s true value on 
this dimension (Egloff and Schmukle, 2003). To control for this confound, subjects were 
also asked to fill out the Marlowe-Crowne social desirability scale (Crowne and Marlowe, 
1960) and this measure was entered as a co-variate in the statistical analyses. Seventeen 
of the AS subjects and fourteen of the control subjects replied to the request to fill out 
questionnaires.
Personality and anxiety
Results
AS
Controls
30
measures
Figure 17 shows how the 
subjects rated themselves on the 
five factors of the NEO PI-R
Personality Factor
Figure 17. Personality characteristics of the AS and control 
groups. Error bars show ±1 standard error.
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personality questionnaire. These data were entered into a MANOVA. There was a highly 
significant overall difference between the groups: Pillai’s trace = .99, F(5,24) = 759, p 
< .001. The data suggest that this is driven by differences in neuroticism and extraversion 
between the two groups (figure 17), which was confirmed by ANOVAs conducted on 
each personality factor separately: neuroticism, F( 1,28) = 22.5, p  < .001; extraversion, 
F(l,28) = 9.7,/? = .004; all others, F< .6,/? > .4.
It is important to note that, unlike the LFS group seen in chapter 3, AS subjects did not 
rate themselves lower in terms of ‘openness to experience’. In addition, fear recognition 
scores did not correlate significantly with openness to experience rating for either AS 
participants (r = .21, p  = .42) or controls (r = .10, p  = .75). The same is true for 
extraversion -  AS group, r = .001,/? = .99; control group, r = -.11,/? = .77.
Table 19 summarises how the groups rated themselves on the anxiety questionnaires and
on the social desirability scale. There
Mean SD
Trait Anxiety AS 68.1 8.17
Controls 56.4 7.29
Social Phobia AS 110.1 17.90
Controls 65.5 46.78
Social Desirability AS 11.6 3.57
Controls 14.5 4.64
Table 19. Measures of anxiety and social desirability 
in AS subjects and controls.
was a trend towards a significant 
difference in social desirability ratings: 
t(29) = -1.94, p  = .06, with controls 
tending to portray themselves in a 
more positive light than the AS group. 
AS subjects rated themselves 
significantly higher on both anxiety
questionnaires, with social desirability entered as a co-variate: trait anxiety, F(l,28) =
12.1,/? = .002, Bonferroni-Holm corrected; social phobia scale, F(l,28) = 10.2,/? = .004, 
corrected.
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However, within the AS group, none of the anxiety measures (including neuroticism) 
correlated significantly with the severity of autistic symptoms, as measured by the ADOS 
and AQ (table 20).
ADOS Com ADOS RSI ADOS Total AQ
Trait Anxiety r .38 .38 .40 .31
P .15 .15 .13 .25
Neuroticism r .02 .03 .03 -.44
P .94 .91 .92 .09
Social Phobia r -.22 -.13 -.17 .04
P .42 .62 .52 .88
Table 20. Correlations between the anxiety measures and the severity of autistic 
symptoms.
ADOS = autism diagnostic observational schedule. ADOS Com = communication sub-scale of the 
ADOS. ADOS RSI = reciprocal social interaction subscale of the ADOS. AQ = autistic spectrum 
quotient
Social phobia predicts poor fear recognition and low fixation of the eyes in AS
For the AS group, social phobia showed a significant negative correlation with mean fear 
recognition score after controlling for differences in the social desirability scale (table 21 
and figure 18). For controls, there was a positive correlation with trait anxiety, again after 
controlling for social desirability rating (table 21). There were no other significant 
correlations.
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group AS
Fear score
AS Controls
Neuroticism -.31 .31
Trait Anxiety .13 .55*
Social Phobia -.51* .27
OM -
£
■ c 1 —
M
f  o-
•s
•
O  - I -  
uw
I I I t  I
-40 -20 0 20 40
Social Phobia adjusted for SDS
Table 21. Partial correlations between anxiety measures and mean fear recognition score, controlling for social 
desirability scale (SDS). * = p <  .05
Figure 18. Scatterplot showing the correlation between social phobia and fear recognition in AS subjects, after 
controlling for the social desirability scale (SDS). The residuals after regressing social phobia onto SDS are plotted 
against the residuals after regressing mean fear recognition score onto SDS.
In the AS group, social phobia also correlates with the percentage of gaze fixations made 
to the eyes, again after controlling for SDS (table 22 and figure 19).
group: a s
% fixations made 
to the eyes
AS Controls
Neuroticism .12 .03
Trait Anxiety -.30 .28
Social Phobia -.49* -.07
S ion
•  - 2 0 -
1
-20
Social Phobia adjusted for SDS
Table 22. Partial correlations between anxiety measures and the percentage of fixations made to the eyes, controlling 
for social desirability scale (SDS). * ~ p <  .05
Figure 19. Scatterplot showing the correlation between social phobia and the percentage of fixations made to the eyes 
in AS subjects, after controlling for the social desirability scale (SDS). The residuals after regressing social phobia 
onto SDS are plotted against the residuals after regressing the mean percentage of fixations made to the eyes score 
onto SDS.
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The correlations between social anxiety, the amount of time spent fixating the eyes and 
fear recognition ability in AS are summarised in figure 20. These results will be discussed 
at the end of the chapter, together with those from parts 2 and 3.
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F ear recognition abilitySocial anxiety
P e rcen tag e  of 
fixations m ad e  to 
the  ey e s
Figure 20. Summary of the relationships between social anxiety, the amount of time spent fixating the eyes and 
fear recognition ability in AS.
Part 2 -  psychophysiological data
I have shown that poor fear recognition score in AS is associated with a failure to fixate 
the eye region of faces. Both of these variables are in turn associated with heightened 
social anxiety. This evidence is consistent with the hyper-responsive amygdala model of 
ASD, which predicts that some subjects with AS would find social stimuli, such as eyes, 
aversive and so actively avoid them, leading to social-perceptual deficits. To further test 
this model I conducted an experiment where AS subjects were told to engage the eyes or 
the mouth of faces while their skin conductance responses were measured. According to 
the hyper-responsive model, the prediction would be that those subjects who normally 
engage the eyes the least (and who have the lowest fear scores), should show the highest 
autonomic response when instructed to engage the eyes versus the mouth. By contrast, 
the hypo-responsive model suggests that those who fail to fixate the eyes do so because 
the stimuli lack salience for them. Therefore, the prediction from this model is the
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opposite of the hyper-active model: those who normally engage the eyes the most (and 
have the highest fear scores) should show the greatest autonomic reaction when made to 
look at eyes versus the mouth.
Methods
The same seventeen individuals with AS who took part in part 1 of this chapter also took 
part in the psychophysiological experiment. Figure 21 summarises the experimental 
design. There were 8 experimental blocks, during each of which subjects viewed 14 faces 
from the KDEF (Lundqvist and Litton, 1998) series - 7 male, 7 female, 2 of each of the 6 
‘basic’ emotions plus 2 neutral faces. Faces were presented for 1.5 seconds, interspersed 
with a blank, grey screen for 0.5 seconds. For half the blocks, subjects were instructed to 
fixate on the eyes for the whole block, for the other half they were told to fixate the 
mouth region. As I was interested in correlations within the group, it was important that 
any order effects that existed were kept constant for each subject; therefore blocks were 
shown in a fixed order (see figure 21). Before each block, subjects were presented with a 
3 second prompt, which instructed them to fixate either the eyes or the mouth region. 
This was followed for two seconds by two adjacent fixation crosses, which were placed 
either where the eyes were to appear or where the mouth was to appear, depending on the 
experimental condition. After each block, a blank grey screen was presented for 35 
seconds. This led to an inter-block time of 40 seconds, a block time of 28 seconds and a 
total experiment time of 9 minutes 4 seconds. There was no experimental task.
During each block, subjects’ skin conductance responses and eye movements were 
recorded following the procedures described in chapter 2. Subjects’ eye fixations were 
monitored carefully during the experiment to ensure that they fixated on the eyes or
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mouth as appropriate. If required, during the rest period subjects were reminded to fixate 
the appropriate area when instructed to do so. However, this rarely proved necessary.
The total number of SCRs and the total amplitude of SCRs were calculated for each 
condition. For statistical analyses, the total amplitude of SCRs were normalised via a 
square root transformation. However, for ease of interpretation, it is the raw data that is 
presented in table 23.
Eye Mouth E ye\ Mouth Mouth Eye Eye Mouth
\
Block -  28 se c s
Inter-block interval -  40  se c s
14 x (1.5 secs face on + 
0.5 secs blank screen)
35 secs rest (blank 3 secs 2 secs fixation
grey screen) prompt e.g. cross in eye or
“Look at mouth region
EYES".
Figure 21. Measuring autonomic responses to eyes in AS -  experimental design.
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Results
Table 23 summarises the SCR responses to 
eyes and mouths. The difference in response 
between eyes and mouths is significant for the 
sum amplitude of SCRs, /(16) = 2.4, p  = .03, 
but not for the absolute total of SCRs, /(16) =
\.\,p= .2 .
Mean SO
Sum of SCRs to eyes 2.1 2.11
Sum of SCRs to mouth 1.1 .86
Sum difference 1.0 1.85
N SCRs to eyes 10.6 7.19
N SCRs to mouth 9.8 6.52
N difference .8 3.02
Table 23. SCR responses to eyes and 
mouths. ‘Sum o f SCRs’ is the total amplitude 
in pSiemens. ‘N scrs’ refers to the absolute 
number o f SCRs.
As table 24 and figure 22 show, the level of 
reported social phobia correlates well with the
difference in the absolute number of SCRs between the eyes and the mouth condition (N 
difference) but not with the difference in the sum amplitude of SCRs between the eyes 
and the mouth (sum difference).
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Social Phobia
Sum difference r .37
N difference r .61*
N difference
Table 24. Correlations between skin conductance responses and the level of reported social phobia 
Figure 22. Scatterplot of the correlation between social phobia and N difference.
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Similarly, as presented in table 25 and figure 23, N difference correlates negatively with 
the percentage of fixations made to the eye region (eye tracking data from chapter 4), 
whereas sum difference does not.
% fixations to 
the eyes
Sum difference r -.06
N difference r -.51*
Table 25. Correlations between skin conductance responses and the percentage of fixations made to the eyes. 
Figure 23. Scatterplot of the correlation between N difference and the percentage of fixations made to the eyes.
However, the level of autonomic reaction to eyes did not correlate with the severity of 
autistic symptoms, as measured by the ADOS and AQ (table 26).
ADOS Com ADOS RSI ADOS Total AQ
Sum difference r .17 .03 .09 .35
P .54 .93 .75 .22
N difference r .06 .19 .18 .32
P .83 .50 .51 .27
Table 26. Correlations between the autonomic measures and the severity of 
autistic symptoms.
ADOS = autism diagnostic observational schedule. ADOS Com = communication sub-scale of the 
ADOS. ADOS RSI = reciprocal social interaction subscale of the ADOS. AQ = autistic spectrum 
quotient
Unfortunately, although the eyetracker was used during this experiment and gaze patterns 
were monitored carefully in real-time to ensure that subjects were looking at the required
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parts of the face, the traces were lost due to recording error and it is therefore not possible 
to present data on where the subjects were looking.
Part 3 -  Neuroanatomical evidence
As discussed at length in chapter 1, existing structural studies of the amygdala in ASD 
support a dynamic model in which abnormally large amygdala volumes in childhood give 
way to abnormally small amygdala volumes by adulthood. Severity of impairment is 
thought to interact with age, diminishing the observed changes in higher-functioning 
individuals. Drawing on animal models of chronic stress, Nacewicz et al. (in press) 
propose that the initial outgrowth followed by atrophy is induced by neuronal hyper­
activity, caused by heightened ‘allostatic-load’ (Nacewicz et al. in press, pg. 20). In 
support of this, they find that a group of autistic adults not only has a reduced mean 
amygdala volume but that those individuals with the smallest amygdala spend the least 
time fixating the eyes of faces in an eye-tracking task. In this section, I attempt to 
replicate and extend the work of Nacewicz et al. (in press) with my sample of AS 
subjects. Specifically, I aim to answer the following questions:
a) Is there an overall group difference in amygdala volume between AS subjects and 
age and IQ matched controls? Given the age x impairment interaction discussed 
above, and the fact that my group are high-functioning, I predict that there will 
not be such a difference. Rather, the informative data will come from examining 
the variability of amygdala volumes within the group.
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b) Is there a correlation between amygdala volume and the percentage of fixations 
made to the eyes in AS, as there was in the low-functioning autism group tested 
by Nacewicz et al. (inpress)!
c) The logical extension of (b) is that the individuals with the smallest amygdala 
volume should be poorest at recognising fearful faces. This is also tested.
d) Nacewicz et al. (in press) propose that amygdala atrophy is being caused by 
heightened allostatic load. Therefore, do the AS participants with the smallest 
amygdala show:
a. the highest level of social anxiety?
b. the greatest autonomic activity when looking at eyes compared to mouths?
e) A number of authors have found a negative correlation between amygdala volume 
and severity of autistic impairment, as measured by the ADI-R. I will look for a 
similar correlation within my sample using the ADOS and AQ.
Methods
Age
(years)
Sex ADOS
Category
AS 31.4 13 M 5 Autism
Mean (SD) (12.91) 2 F 10 Autistic 
spectrum
Controls 31.8 13 M NA
Mean (SD) (11.28) 2 F
Table 27. Characteristics o f the groups 
who took part in the structural MRI study.
Participants
Fifteen subjects with AS took part in this section of 
the study, along with fifteen age matched controls. 
A number of these controls were new subjects who 
had not participated in any previous experiments. 
Table 27 gives the group characteristics.
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Imaging procedures
MRI was performed using a Siemens 1.5T scanner. A phased-array head coil was used to 
obtain high-resolution images using a T1 weighted sequence yielding 124 contiguous 
1.6mm axial slices of 256 x 256 voxels with an in-plane resolution of 1 mm2.
Analysis
SPM5 (www.fi 1.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm) was used for both the pre-processing and statistical 
analysis steps. Pre-processing followed the procedures explained in chapter 2. Briefly, 
images were normalised to the MNI template and segmented into grey matter, white 
matter and CSF images as part of a unified segmentation model (Ashbumer and Friston, 
2005). The data was then smoothed using a 12mm Gaussian kernel. A smoothing 
parameter of 12mm was chosen because it corresponds roughly to the cross-sectional 
dimensions of the amygdala and, by the matched filter theorem, sensitised the analysis to 
differences at this spatial scale (Salmond et al., 2003).
There is some evidence that global brain volume is enlarged in ASD (e.g. Courchesne 
and Pierce, 2005a;Palmen et al., 2006). Therefore, in volumetric studies focussing on a 
specific region of interest, it is necessary to control for this confound. In this study, grey 
matter, white matter and CSF volumes were determined by finding the integrals of the 
relevant images. Total brain volume was found by summing these volumes for each 
participant.
To compare group differences, an ANCOVA model was used, with total brain volume as 
a covariate. To look for correlations, a regression model was used. To correct for multiple 
comparisons, small volume correction was employed, centred on the amygdala (left and
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right separately) using anatomical masks created using WFUPickAtlas
(http://www.fmri.wfubmc.edu download.htm).
Results
Group differences
Table 28 summarises the grey matter, 
white matter, CSF and total brain volumes 
for the two groups. There were no 
significant differences between group 
means (all p  > .37). However, the AS 
group showed significantly greater 
variability in both grey matter volume,
F(l,28) = 17.6, p  < .001, and total brain 
volume, F(l,28) = 12.6, p  = .001 -  see 
column four in table 26 and figure 24.
To look for regional differences in grey matter, the smoothed, segmented grey matter 
images were entered into an ANCOVA in SPM5, with group as a fixed factor and total 
brain volume as a covariate. In the amygdala (the a  p r io r i  region of interest) there were 
no significant differences in either direction, even at liberal thresholds {p < .01, 
uncorrected). In other areas of the brain there were no significant differences between the 
groups after correcting for multiple comparisons.
Mean SD
GM Vol Controls .77 .04
AS .79 .11
WM Vol Controls .49 .04
AS .48 .06
CSF Vol Controls .28 .06
AS .31 .10
Brain vol Controls 1.53 .07
AS 1.58 .19
Table 28. Volumes o f neural tissue in AS and 
control groups.
Values are in litres. GM = grey matter, WM = white 
matter, CSF = cerebro-spinal fluid
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Figure 24. Box plots showing the distribution of grey matter and total brain volume in the AS and control groups. 
There is significantly greater variability in both measures for the AS group (see main text). Boxes show the median 
(black line) and the inter-quartile range (IQR, edges of boxes). Whiskers are 1.5 * IQR. Circles represent mild 
outliers (between 1.5 and 3 * IQR) and stars represent extreme outliers (> 3 * IQR).
Correlations
Next, for the AS subjects, I looked for correlations between grey matter volume and the 
following four variables:
1. the percentage of gaze fixations made to the eyes (taken from the eyetracking 
experiment in chapter 4)
2. mean fear recognition ability (again taken from experiment 4)
3. social phobia score
4. autonomic response to eyes compared to mouths -  ‘N difference’ from part 2 of 
this chapter
focussing the analysis on the amygdala. Following small volume correction, there were 
significant correlations in each case for the left, but not the right, amygdala (table 29). 
Weaker correlations with grey matter volume were evident in the right amygdala, but 
they did not survive small volume correction.
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Variable MNI co-ordinate of maximum activation
x, y, 2
p value (SVC) Pearson’s r
% fixations to the eyes 1 00 1 .037 .60
Mean fear recognition score -17,-4, -20 .028 .62
Social phobia -26, -2, -26 .014 -.74
N difference -19,-3,-21 .038 -.59
Table 29. Correlations with amygdala grey matter volume in AS.
I also looked for correlations between amygdala grey matter volume and the severity of 
autistic symptoms, as measured by the ADOS and AQ. There were no significant voxels 
either atp<  .05 SVC or at/? < .001 uncorrected.
Part 4 -  psychological data 2
The work presented so far has assumed that not looking at the eyes causes poor fear 
recognition. However, while the data provided in chapter 4 are consistent with this 
hypothesis, they are correlational and so it is not possible for this to be positively inferred. 
Proving causation in this manner can often be difficult, but one possibility is to borrow an 
experiment from Adolphs et al.’s (2005) study of SM. While SM does not spontaneously 
look at the eyes, she is able to do so when instructed, with the result of a dramatic 
improvement in her fear recognition ability. When the task is repeated a few weeks later, 
however, both the failure to fixate the eyes and the poor fear score have returned. 
Together, these results suggest that amygdala damage in SM has caused a failure to 
spontaneously fixate the eyes, which is the mechanism for her poor fear recognition.
However, there is an important caveat to bear in mind with this experiment. As Adolph et 
al. (2005) suggest, SM is likely to have had the opportunity, before her lesion, to learn the
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association between eyes and fear18. This explains how, when she is made to look at eyes, 
SM has the necessary cognitive representations to be able to link the visual input to its 
meaning. However, the situation may be different with ASD: the hypo- and hyper-active 
amygdala models assume that lack of attention towards socially salient stimuli exists 
from birth (e.g. Schultz, 2005), i.e., unlike SM, AS subjects may never have had the 
opportunity to learn the association between the eyes and fear. In other words, even 
though not fixating the eyes may ultimately be the cause of poor fear recognition in some 
AS subjects, directing their attention towards the eyes may not dramatically improve their 
ability because they may not formed the mental representations necessary to make 
adequate use of the data.
To summarise, if low fear scoring AS subjects are made to look at the eyes in faces and, 
like SM, their fear recognition ability does dramatically improve, this would suggest:
a) Failure to spontaneously fixate eyes is the mechanism for poor fear recognition
b) The subjects do possess the necessary mental representations to make use of 
information from the eyes when they receive it. Like SM, their problem seems to 
be one of not receiving the necessary input rather than not being able to 
adequately process that input. This would perhaps argue against the 
neurodevelopmental account of social-perceptual impairment given by the hypo- 
and hyper-active amygdala models.
If, when made to look at the eyes, low fear scoring AS subjects’ fear recognition ability 
does not show a strong improvement, this could mean one of two things:
18However, it should be noted that the date of SM’s lesion is uncertain and there is a possibility that it was sustained early in life 
(Adolphs et al., 1995).
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a) Failure to spontaneously fixate the eyes is not the mechanism for poor fear 
recognition in AS
b) Alternatively, failure to fixate the eyes is the cause, but is so developmentally 
rather than in real-time. This would support the neurodevelopmental account 
given by the hypo- and hyper-active amygdala models.
In this section I will present some preliminary data on a repeat of the Adolphs et al. (2005) 
study with some of the low fear scoring AS subjects.
Method
Ten of the AS subjects with the lowest average fear scores took part. Unfortunately, three 
subjects with low fear scores were not available to take part.
Subjects repeated the Ekman-Friesen test of facial affect but were this time asked to 
fixate the eyes in the faces throughout the presentation. The eye tracker was used to 
monitor where subjects were looking during the experiment and encouragement was 
given to look at the eyes if necessary.
185
Results
Table 30 compares the fear score during free 
viewing to that when subjects were made to 
look at the eyes. As can be seen from this 
table, with one or two exceptions, fear 
recognition scores did not improve strongly. 
The mean score in the free viewing tasks was
6.35/10, when made to look at the eyes this 
rose to 6.9/10, a difference which was not 
significant - 1(9) = -1.2, p  = .26.
Subject Mean free 
viewing fear score
Fear score when made 
to look at eyes
1 3.5 3
2 4.5 5
3 6 6
4 6.5 7
5 6.5 10
6 7 7
7 7 9
8 7.5 6
9 7.5 7
10 7.5 9
Table 30. The effect o f being encourage to fixate the 
eyes on fear recognition o f low fear scoring AS subjects. 
The ‘mean free viewing fear score’ is the mean 
calculated form both repetitions o f this test.
Discussion of parts 1 -4
In this chapter I have presented psychological, psychophysiological and neuroanatomical 
evidence which begins to converge on an explanation for the poor fear recognition ability 
amongst some people with AS (see figure 25) and which, broadly speaking, offers 
support for the hyper-activity amygdala model of ASD. The main causal pathway is 
proposed to be as follows: in some AS subjects, from early in life, eyes are hyper- 
arousing (which is aversive) and are therefore avoided. Because the eyes are a critical 
feature for recognising a fearful face (Adolphs et al., 2005;Kohler et al., 2004;Smith et al., 
2005), these subjects fail to make the necessary associations linking eyes to fearful faces 
and so have a pervasive fear recognition deficit. Associated with the hyper-arousal to 
social stimuli is heightened social anxiety and smaller amygdala volume. According to
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the hyper-active amygdala model, the latter is due to neuronal atrophy caused by high 
‘allostatic load’, in a similar fashion to atrophy seen in rat models of chronic stress 
(Nacewicz et al., in press). Whether reduced amygdala volume has a direct role to play in 
the reduced time spent fixating the eyes and/or the poor fear recognition ability is unclear 
and has not been explicitly considered in descriptions of the hyper-active amygdala 
model (e.g. Nacewicz et al., in press). However, it is a possibility and is discussed further 
later in this chapter.
Amygdala
atrophy
Social stimuli 
are hypeF 
arousing
Impaired 
facial fear 
recognition
Less time 
spent fixating 
the eyes
Looking at eyes 
is aversive
(as measured by 
skin conductance)
• associated with
Increased
(social)
anxiety
F igu re  25. A causal model for fear recognition deficits in AS.
Together, the results presented in this chapter support a causal model for fear recognition deficits in AS, 
which is presented graphically above. With some caveats, which will be discussed later in the chapter, 
this is in line with the hyper-activity model of amygdala involvement in ASD.
In part 1, I confirmed the higher incidence of anxiety (general and social specific) in AS 
and showed that those subjects who displayed the highest levels of social anxiety:
a) spent least time fixating the eyes of faces
b) had the lowest fear recognition scores.
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This is consistent with the idea, predicted by the hyper-activity model, that eye avoidance 
in ASD is linked to hyper-arousal and anxiety in social situations. However, against 
predictions, neither general (trait) anxiety or neuroticism measures showed these 
correlations (although neuroticism showed a trend in the right direction). Eyes and faces 
are archetypal social stimuli so perhaps it is unsurprising that stronger relationships were 
found with social rather than general anxiety. Still, it will be useful to see replications of 
these findings, with new samples of participants, before confident conclusions can be 
drawn.
As discussed in chapter 1, there is a large literature showing that anxious people are 
hypervigilant for potentially threatening stimuli, such as fearful or angry faces (for review 
see Dalgleish and Power, 1999). For example, anxious individuals have an attentional 
bias for fearful faces (Fox et al., 2005;Georgiou et al., 2005) and samples of high trait 
(general) anxiety (Surcinelli et al., 2006) and high social anxiety individuals (Richards et 
al., 2002) show an advantage for recognising fear in facial expressions. Consistent with 
this, I found that trait anxiety correlated positively with fear recognition in my control 
group and that neuroticism and social anxiety showed a trend in the same direction. 
However, these findings are clearly inconsistent with my results for the AS group and 
with the predictions made by the hyper-active amygdala model of ASD, under which 
individuals are supposed to avoid anxiety-inducing stimuli rather than being biased 
towards them. This discrepancy may reflect an interaction between autistic symptoms and 
anxiety. In other words, people with an ASD might react to and cope with their 
anxiousness in a different way than non ASD people. Consistent with this, Pfeiffer et al. 
(2005) suggested that anxiety may produce sensory defensiveness in high-functioning 
autistics, rather than hyper-vigilance. More work needs to be done to assess these
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potential differences in coping style, for which qualitative interviews may be the most 
appropriate method.
Another potential explanation for the apparent discrepancy between my AS findings and 
those of the hyper-vigilance literature relates to the actual level of anxiety involved in 
these different investigations. For example, Richards et al. (2002) use the same measure 
of social anxiety as I do in my studies with AS (the SPAI, Turner et al., 1999). They find 
that their high socially anxious group are better at recognising fearful faces than their low 
social anxiety group. However, their high social anxiety group has a mean SPAI of 84.1 
(SD = 11.9), which corresponds to the minimum SPAI score for my AS group (mean =
101.1, SD = 17.9). The AS subjects scoring -84 on the SPAI in my study are the subjects 
with the highest fear scores, who spend the most time fixating the eyes -  it is the AS 
individuals with very high SPAI scores (>110) who have the low fear scores and fixate 
the eyes the least. Furthermore, the low social anxiety group reported by Richards et al. 
(2002), who are poor at recognising fear, have very low SPAI scores (mean = 19.3, sd = 
7.7, bottom 25% of the normal 
population), much lower than 
my control sample (mean SPAI 
score of 65.5, sd= 46.8). These 
findings are suggestive of a 
non-linear relationship between 
social anxiety and fear 
recognition / hyper-vigilance.
The shape of the relationship 
might follow an inverted ‘U’
(see figure 26), such that low socially anxious individuals are hypo-vigilant of threatening
Richards et al’s (2002) ‘high’ social
anxiety group and my least socially 
anxious AS subjects
My control group
The more socially anxious 
AS subjects
Richard et aTs (2002) ‘loW 
social anxiety group
Social anxiety
Figure 26. Does the relationship between social anxiety and 
vigilance of social stimuli follow an inverted ‘U’?
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stimuli (such as a fearful faces), medium-high socially anxious individuals -  represented 
by the high anxious group of Richards et al. (2002) and the lower socially anxious AS 
subjects in my study -  are hyper-vigilant and are therefore good at recognising fear. But 
when socially anxiety becomes very high, as in some of my AS participants, hyper­
vigilance may give way to sensory defensiveness and avoidance, resulting in a falling off 
of fear recognition. It would be interesting to conduct a study with a large sample of 
normal individuals to look for evidence of this kind of non-linear relationship.
In chapter 3 ,1 found that males from the normal population who were poor at recognising 
fear (LFS) rated themselves as less open to experience than did males with a normal fear 
recognition ability (NFS). Other studies have also shown a relationship between greater 
openness to experience and the ability to recognise emotions (Matsumoto et al., 
2000;Terracciano et al., 2003). However, variability on this dimension of personality did 
not appear to have a role in the fear recognition deficits in AS: there was no difference 
between the AS group and controls and no correlation between openness and fear score 
within the group.
The psychophysiological experiment presented in part 2 of this chapter offered the best 
chance to directly test the hyper- against the hypo-active amygdala models of ASD. If 
some individuals with AS are avoiding eyes because they find them aversive (as 
predicted by the hyper-active model) then this should be detectable via autonomic 
measures: those who normally avoid the eyes should show the greatest autonomic 
response when they are made to look at eyes. By contrast, the hypo-active model suggests 
that a lack of eye contact results from a failure to flag the eyes as salient, therefore those 
who normally fail to fixate the eyes should show the smallest autonomic response when 
they are made to look at eyes. I found some support for the former: a greater difference
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between the total number of SCRs produced when looking at the eyes compared to when 
looking at the mouth was associated with greater social phobia and less time spent 
fixating the eyes.
However, the data using the total SCR amplitudes failed to show these correlations. 
While this makes it difficult to form definitive conclusions from the data, it is important 
to note that both measures failed to support the hypo-active model: there were no positive 
correlations between either measure of the autonomic response to eyes and either eye 
fixation percentage or fear score. Therefore, the data broadly support the predictions from 
the hyper-active model. Still, it would be useful to repeat the experiment with an 
improved paradigm, designed to be more sensitive to the potential responses. Some 
suggestions are given below.
A problem with this and many studies of autonomic responses is the rapid onset of 
habituation (possibly made worse by the ‘unreal’ nature of laboratory based stimuli -  see 
next paragraph). A more sensitive approach may have been to use an odd-ball paradigm 
in which grey screens, blank except for fixation crosses corresponding to either the eyes 
or the mouth, were interspersed randomly with faces. This would mean that the 
appearance of each face would retain a level of surprise, which may diminish the affect of 
habituation.
Another potential problem with the psychophysiological experiment may have been a 
lack of ecological validity. When the subjects were debriefed following the experiment, a 
number admitted to having an aversion to eyes in real-life social situations but to not 
feeling any such revulsion during the experiment because they “knew that it was just a 
picture”. In future experiments it might be valuable to attempt to recreate a more realistic
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social situation, perhaps by recording SCRs while subjects fixate on the eyes of real 
people.
Another problem is that, because of recording error, I was unable to make use of the 
eyetracking data I took during the psychophysiological task. It would have been useful to 
make sure that the subjects were indeed fixating the eyes when they were instructed to. 
The amount of time they did spend fixating the eyes could have been used as a co-variate 
in the statistical analyses. However, during the experiment I was able to carefully monitor 
where the subjects were looking using the eyetracker and to offer encouragement if 
subjects forgot to fixate the required area. This was almost never necessary and it is 
unlikely that, were it available, the eyetracking data would make a significant difference 
to the findings.
In part 3 of this chapter, I presented neuroanatomical evidence which again broadly 
supported predictions made by the hyper-active model. Nacewicz et al. (in press) suggest 
that, by adulthood, hyper-arousal to social stimuli in AS causes hyper-activity induced 
amygdala atrophy. In support of this they found that autistic individuals who fixate the 
eyes the least have the smallest amygdala volume. I replicated this finding in my sample 
of high-functioning adult AS subjects and extended it by showing that small amygdala 
volume is also associated with:
a) greater autonomic arousal to eyes
b) greater social anxiety
c) lower fear recognition score
These data are consistent with hyper-activity induced atrophy of amygdala neurons 
resulting from heightened allostatic load. However, to infer the developmental pattern of 
these changes, longitudinal studies will be required.
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It is unclear whether, or to what extent, smaller amygdala volume has a role in causing 
reduced fixation of the eyes and/or poor fear recognition in some AS subjects. It could 
simply be that these variables all correlate with the hyper-arousal to social stimuli, which 
may be the primary causal factor. Alternatively, it could be a combination: initially, 
reduced fixation of the eyes could be due, alone, to the hyper-arousal caused by such 
stimuli but amygdala atrophy, as it progresses, could add an effect of its own. Assuming 
the hyper-active amygdala model is correct, a longitudinal study may help decide 
between these possibilities. According to the model, hyper-arousal to social stimuli is 
present early in life but amygdala atrophy only becomes apparent in late adolescence or 
adulthood. If this model is correct and the atrophy itself is having a causal effect on 
abnormal gaze patterns and/or fear recognition impairment, then these factors (the eye 
fixations and fear recognition) should get worse with age, as the atrophy progresses.
In part 4 of this chapter I showed that the majority of low fear scoring AS subjects show 
only a small or no improvement in fear recognition ability when they are instructed to 
look at the eyes. This is in contrast to SM, who improved from 46% of fearful faces 
correctly identified to 83%, with this simple instruction (Adolphs et al., 2005). One 
interpretation of this finding is that failure to fixate the eyes is not causing poor fear 
recognition in AS and that the correlation between these variables is perhaps due to a 
third, as yet unidentified, factor. However, as explained in the introduction to part 4 of 
this chapter, these findings are also consistent with the developmental account of social- 
perceptual impairment which is proposed for the hyper- (and the hypo-) active amygdala 
models. The models assume that lack of attention towards socially salient stimuli, such as 
eyes, occurs from birth (e.g. see Schultz, 2005). This is thought to lead to 
underdevelopment of social-perceptual abilities and their associated brain regions such 
that low fear scoring AS subjects may not possess the mental representations required to
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adequately process the visual input even if they are directed towards the eyes. This is in 
contrast to SM who, Adolphs et al. (2005) suggest, is likely to have had the opportunity 
to accrue social knowledge prior to her lesion.
Caveats and future experim ents
There are two important and related caveats with the interpretation put forward so far. If 
the hyper-activity model does apply in the way stated above, it clearly does not apply 
equally to all individuals with AS. AS subjects vary from normal to abnormal on all the 
measures presented. On its own this would not necessarily be a problem -  one could posit 
that more severely autistic subjects showed the necessary signs more clearly. However, 
this brings us to the second caveat: neither fear recognition ability, the percentage of time 
spent fixating the eyes, autonomic responses to the eyes nor the amount of amygdala 
atrophy, correlated with the severity of autistic symptoms, as measured by the ADOS and 
AQ. This is in contradiction to Nacewicz et al. (in press), who found that autistic 
symptoms correlated negatively with both time spent fixating the eyes and amygdala 
volume. However, the participants in the Nacewicz et al. (in press) study were low 
functioning individuals with autism, in contrast to my high-functioning AS group. In 
addition, Nacewicz et al. (in press) used the ADI-R as a measure of the severity of 
autistic symptoms. I was unable to take a similar measure with my group due to the 
unavailability of parental informants for a number of subjects. If I had used a parental 
interview it is possible that I would have found the required correlations -  the ADI-R is 
more dimensional that the ADOS and does not rely on self-report, unlike the AQ. 
However, this seems unlikely as all three measures have been clinically validated to 
measure the same construct (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001b;Lord et al., 1994;Lord et al., 1999) 
and it would raise the question of how to interpret my ADOS and AQ results.
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Another possibility is that the model presented in figure 25 represents a route to social 
perceptual impairment which can exist independently from other routes that lead to the 
symptoms picked up by classic diagnostic tools, such as the ADOS. I showed in chapter 3 
that poor fear recognition and associated low fixation of eyes can exist without an 
increase in the presence of autistic symptoms: LFS did not score higher than NFS on the 
AQ. This is a difficult issue, which will considered in greater detail in the general 
discussion.
Another caveat is that, while much of the evidence presented here is more consistent with 
predictions of the hyper-active model, there is little which argues positively against the 
hypo-active model. For example, the hypo-active model does not explicitly predict a 
relationship between failing to fixate the eyes and heightened social anxiety but it is not 
clear that it would predict its absence. Similarly for the neuroanatomical data, the 
correlation between social anxiety and smaller amygdala volume clearly favours the 
hyper-active model but one could envisage an argument whereby reduced salience of 
social stimuli is related to small amygdala volume via under-use and under-development 
of amygdala neurons. The psychophysiological experiment offered the best hope of 
providing evidence positively for one theory of the other. The results, however, were not 
wholly unequivocal (the correlations predicted by the hyper-active model existed for N 
difference but not sum difference) so some residual doubt remains. A solution would be 
to repeat the autonomic experiment with a more sensitive and ecologically valid 
paradigm. Another would be to use fMRI to directly measure amygdala activity in ASD 
while manipulating the focus of gaze. Unfortunately, there is not time to conduct these 
experiments within the current program but they provide the logical next step for the 
future. Instead, for the remaining results chapter of this thesis I will present an
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experiment which aims to explicitly test a prediction from the hypo-active amygdala 
theory of ASD.
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Chapter 6 -  Testing the hypo-active
amygdala model of ASD
Summary
Identification of a 1st target in a rapid serial visual presentation sequence leads to a 
transient impairment in the ability to report a 2nd target -  this is known as the attentional 
blink (Raymond et al., 1992). The size of the attentional blink is substantially reduced if 
the second target is emotionally arousing (Anderson, 2005;Anderson and Phelps, 
2001;Ogawa and Suzuki, 2004). A functioning amygdala is critical for this emotional 
modulation of the attentional blink and the phenomenon is thought to represent a specific 
example of the amygdala’s role in enhancing perception of emotionally or socially salient 
events (Anderson and Phelps, 2001). The hypo-active amygdala model of ASD cites a 
failure in the amygdala to perform this perception-enhancing role as a primary cause of 
the social-perceptual problems in the disorder (Schultz et al., 2000b;Schultz, 2005). 
Using an emotional modulation of the AB paradigm, I found, against the predictions of 
the hypo-active model, that subjects with AS did show a perceptual benefit for arousing 
stimuli in general. However, the size of this benefit was significantly reduced compared 
to controls when the lag between the first and second target was very short -  i.e. when 
attention was most stretched. Control experiments showed that this finding could not be 
attributed to differences in the perceived arousal of the stimuli or to a global impairment 
affecting any type of modulation of perceptual encoding at short inter-target lags. The 
results are discussed in terms of the hypo-active amygdala model of ASD and in the 
context of the other findings presented in this thesis.
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Introduction
Many theorists argue that the amygdala functions as a ‘salience’ detector, monitoring the 
environment for emotionally or socially significant events and then influencing current 
and future behaviour through modulation of other brain areas, such as the hippocampus, 
FG and STG (for review, see chapter 1 and Dolan, 2002;Sander et al., 2003). The hypo- 
active amygdala model of ASD sees a break-down in this modulation as a primary cause 
of social-perceptual impairment in ASD (Grelotti et al., 2002;Schultz et al., 
2000b;Schultz, 2005). For example, Schultz et al. (2005) suggest that many of the face 
processing deficits in ASD might be traced back to a failure of the amygdala to influence 
activity in the FG.
The neuromodulatory role of the amygdala, in response to salient events, has been neatly 
demonstrated via the phenomenon of the emotional modulation of the attentional blink 
(Anderson and Phelps, 2001). When two masked targets (known as T1 and T2) are 
presented within approximately 500 msecs of each other, subjects are often unable to 
report the second of the two targets accurately, even though the first has been reported 
correctly (Raymond et al., 1992). Allocating attention to T1 is thought to leave less 
attention available for T2, rendering T2 vulnerable to decay or substitution -  hence the 
transient ‘blink’ in attention (for review, see Shapiro et al., 1997). However, the size of 
the attentional blink is greatly attenuated if T2 stimuli are emotionally charged (Anderson, 
2005;Anderson and Phelps, 2001;Arend and Botella, 2002;0gawa and Suzuki, 2004). 
Affective modulation of the attentional blink is most evident when T1 and T2 are close 
together, which is when attentional resources are most occupied with the processing of 
the preceding Tl. Further experiments have shown that it is the arousal quality of the
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emotional stimuli, rather than their valence, that enhances the ability of T2 to be detected 
(Anderson, 2005).
Consistent with its role in enhancing perception for emotional events, amygdala integrity 
has been shown to be crucial for emotional modulation of the attentional blink. Patients 
with amygdala damage show much reduced perceptual benefit for arousing T2 stimuli, 
despite unaffected comprehension of their affective quality (Anderson and Phelps, 2001). 
These deficits are most marked when T2 occurs shortly after Tl -  i.e. when attention is 
most stretched. The emotional modulation of the attentional blink therefore provides a 
behavioural paradigm for investigating the integrity of the amygdala in general and, 
specifically, the amygdala’s ability to modulate processing in other brain regions in 
response to emotionally salient events.
The hypo-active amygdala model of ASD proposes that the amygdala fails to flag 
emotionally or socially relevant stimuli as salient and therefore fails to modulate other 
areas of the brain in order to enhance perception of that stimulus. Therefore, this model 
predicts that, like patients with amygdala damage, individuals with an ASD will:
a) show reduced enhancement of perception for emotionally arousing events in an 
attentional blink paradigm, compared to matched controls
b) that this difference should be most obvious when the lag between Tl and T2 is 
short -  i.e. when attention is most stretched and normal controls show the greatest 
perceptual benefit for arousing stimuli
c) that these effects can not be attributed to differences in how arousing the stimuli 
are perceived by the two groups
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Experiment 1
Methods
Participants
17 adults with a diagnosis of AS and 17 gender matched controls took part in the study. 
Age and IQ were matched as closely as possible (see table 31). AS diagnosis was 
confirmed via the ADOS and AQ. On this occasion, AQs were not taken for the control 
group.
Age
(years)
Gender Verbal
IQ
Performance
IQ
Full IQ AQ
score
ADOS
Category
AS
Mean (SD)
34.2
(11.99)
15 M 
2 F
109.4
(14.27)
112.1
(15.25)
112.9
(13.99)
34.9
(9.0)
8 Autism
9 Autistic 
spectrum
Controls
Mean (SD)
32.3
(13.26)
15 M 
2 F
108.7
(10.99)
108.7
(8.18)
109.9
(8.57)
NA NA
Tabic 31. Characteristics of the groups who took part in the attentional blink experiments.
The groups did not differ significantly on any of these variables — all / < .81, all/?> .42.
ADOS = autism diagnostic observation schedule. AQ = autistic-spectrum quotient, 80% of adults with high- 
functioning autism or AS score > 32.
The experiment was in two parts: the first was the attentional blink experiment itself; the 
second, which took place at least one week later, measured subjects’ arousal response to 
the T2 words, both via self-report and SCR recording. Details of the design and 
procedure for these two parts to the experiment are given separately below.
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Emotional modulation of the attentional blink experiment
The first target stimuli (Tl) were 38 neutral words. The second target stimuli (T2) 
consisted of 19 negative-arousing words (e.g. rape, bastard) and 19 neutral words (e.g. 
basin, sparrow). The arousing words were the same as those used in previous experiments, 
where they have been shown to produce a large attenuation of the attentional blink in 
normal subjects (Anderson, 2005;Anderson and Phelps, 2001). The neutral words were 
taken from the ANEW ‘Balanced Affective Word List’ 
(h tt p : w w w .se i .sdsu.edu C AL/word 1 ist/) and were chosen to have low ratings for arousal. 
The negative and neutral word lists were matched for average word length and semantic 
relatedness. Distractor stimuli were 326 neutral words, again taken from the ANEW list, 
matched in length with the target words.
Each trial consisted of 15 words -  2 targets and 13 distractors (see figure 27). Tl and T2 
were designated as targets by appearing in black, whereas the distractor words appeared 
in a random selection of 4 colours (yellow, red, green and blue; the same colour was not 
allowed to appear twice in a row). Each item in the stream was presented for 120 msecs 
and was immediately followed by the subsequent item. A random number of distractors 
(between 3 and 6) appeared before Tl. T2 was presented at one of four possible times 
after Tl -  120 msecs (no intervening items), 360 msecs (two intervening items), 600 
msecs (four intervening items) or 840 msecs (six intervening items). The shorter two of 
these four T1-T2 lags are within the time window during which T2 is susceptible to an 
attentional blink, the later two are beyond this window (Shapiro et al., 1997). There were 
19 trials for each factor combination of lag (1-4) and word type (neutral versus arousing), 
resulting in 152 trials. The subjects’ task was to monitor the stream of words and to report 
the identity of the two black target words (Tl and T2) by writing them down at the end of
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the stimulus sequence. Trials where subjects failed to correctly identify Tl were excluded 
from analysis (this occurred on < 5% of cases). The dependent measure was the number 
of T2 stimuli correctly identified.
Words were presented in Geneva font, 30 point type, on a uniform light grey background. 
Viewing distance was approximately 40 cm.
ISI = 120 m secRELAYTIME
HOTEL
ATTIC
CLOCK Lag = 360 m sec
WAGON
T2RAPE
RADIO
Figure 27. Diagram o f the attentional blink task.
Words were briefly presented sequentially in an identical central location and observers were instructed to ignore 
the coloured words (distractors) and indicate the identity of two target words appearing in black. The temporal 
lag between the first (Tl) and second target (T2) was varied. We used two short lags (120 ms or 360 ms), during 
which T2 is susceptible to the attentional blink, and two long lags (600 ms and 840 ms) at which T2 is less 
susceptible to the attentional blink. The dependent measure was the percentage of T2s correctly identified.
Arousal measurements
To assess perceived arousal to the T2 stimuli, subjects viewed all 38 T2 words (19 neutral 
and 19 arousing) sequentially on a computer screen (Geneva font, 30 point, viewing 
distance approximately 40 cm), whilst their SCRs were recorded. Each word was shown
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for 4.5 seconds. During this time subjects were instructed to read the word silently to 
themselves but to remain still. Following the presentation of each word, there was a blank 
screen for 0.5 seconds followed by the question, “How emotionally arousing did you find 
that word?” This was the cue for subjects to rate the arousal quality of the word on a scale 
of 1 -  5 via a keyboard press. On this scale, ‘1’ represented, ‘not at all arousing’ and ‘5’ 
represented, ‘very arousing’. There was an unlimited time to answer. To allow the skin 
conductance trace to return to baseline, there was a gap of at least 16 seconds between 
words.
SCRs were recorded and analysed in accordance with the method outlined in chapter 2. 
Briefly, a SCR was considered to be in response to a word if it began between 1 and 3 
seconds post stimulus onset (Dawson et al., 2000). Only the first response occurring in 
this time window was analysed. The amplitude of each SCR was recorded and the mean 
SCR amplitude was calculated for each word type (neutral or arousing), separately for 
each group.
Results
Self-reported arousal in response to the words 
Table 32 summarises how the groups 
rated the words in terms of emotional 
arousal. These data were analysed using 
an ANOVA. There was a highly 
significant effect of word type, F(l,32)
= 70.5, p < .001, suggesting that the
Word Type Group Mean SD
Neutral Words Controls 2.0 .73
AS 1.8 .63
Arousing Words Controls 3.6 .78
AS 3.3 1.16
Table 32. Summary of how the two groups rated the arousal 
quality of T2 words. Subjects rated each word on a scale of 
1 to 5, where 1 was ‘not at all arousing’ and 5 was ‘very 
arousing’.
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participants did indeed find the arousing words more emotionally salient than the neutral 
words. However, there was no effect of group, F( 1,32) = 1.6, p  = .22 and no significant 
interaction, F(l,32) = .09, p  = .76, suggesting that the two groups were comparable in 
terms of how emotionally arousing they found the words.
Autonomic measure of arousal in response to the words
Table 33 shows the mean amplitude of the SCRs made to the words. These data were
normalized via a square root
Word Type Group Mean SD
Neutral Words Controls .12 .107
AS .22 .082
Arousing Words Controls .29 .148
AS .35 .135
Table 33. Mean SCR magnitudes to the words, split by 
group. Data are in Vp Siemens.
transformation and then analysed 
via ANOVA. There were 
significant effects of word type, 
F(l,32) = 49.8, p  < .001, and 
group, F{\,3>2) = 4.5, p  = .04.
Importantly, however, there was no evidence of a group x word type interaction, F(l,32) 
= .73,p  -  .4. This suggests that, while the AS subjects had a higher autonomic reaction to 
the words in general, the groups were comparable in terms of how they differentiated 
between the neutral and arousing words.
Emotional modulation of the attentional blink
Figure 28 summarises the results of the attentional blink experiment. These data were 
entered into an ANOVA with word type and lag as repeated measures variables and 
group as a between measures variable.
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Figure 28. Results o f the emotional modulation o f the attentional blink experiment.
As predicted, there were highly significant effects of lag, F(3,96) = 30.9, p  < .001, and 
word type, F(l,32) = 23.2, p  < .001. Post-hoc comparisons show that significantly more 
T2 words were identified for lags 3 and 4 compared to both lags 1 and 2 (all p  < .001, 
Bonferroni corrected). Subjects correctly identified more arousing than neutral T2s at 
every lag (all t > 3.1, all < .012, Bonferroni corrected). However, there was a significant 
word type x lag interaction - F{ 1,32) = 23.2, p  < .001, reflecting the fact that the effect of 
word type was stronger at earlier lags (mean enhancing effect of arousing words for each 
lag: 120 msecs = 16%, 360 msecs = 9%, 600 msecs = 5% and 840 msecs = 6%). In 
summary, arousing T2s were more easily identified and this effect was stronger at shorter 
T1-T2 lags when attention was most stretched.
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Contrary to predictions, there was no word type x group interaction, F(l,32) = 1.7,/? =.2, 
-  i.e. there was no evidence that AS subjects showed less enhancement of perception for 
the arousing words in general. However, there was a significant word type x lag x group 
interaction -  F(3,96) = 5.2, p  = .002. To 
investigate this further, the difference in 
the percentage of correctly identified 
arousing, compared to neutral, T2s was 
calculated separately for each group at 
each lag. As table 34 (and figure 28) 
shows, at Lag 1 (120 msecs) controls 
demonstrated a greater perceptual benefit 
for arousing words than did AS subjects -  
r(32) = 2.5, p  = .018 uncorrected, .072 
Bonferroni corrected. Such differences were not evident at longer lags -  all t < .71, all p 
>.48.
For the AS subjects, table 35 shows the correlations between the size of the emotional 
modulation of the attentional blink at lag 1 and both severity of autistic symptoms and 
fear recognition score.
ADOS Com ADOS RSI ADOS Total AQ F ear recognition sco re
00CNji‘ -.31 -.32 -.14 .44
p .36 .31 .30 .60 .07
Table 35. Correlations between the size of the effect of arousal on T2 identification (i.e. the 
difference between the percentage of arousing T2 and neutral T2 correctly identified) and the 
severity of autistic symptoms and fear recognition score.
ADOS = autism diagnostic observational schedule. ADOS Com = communication sub-scale of the 
ADOS. ADOS RSI = reciprocal social interaction subscale of the ADOS. AQ = autistic spectrum 
quotient
T1 - T2 lag Mean SD
120 m sec Controls 22.3 14.19
AS 7.4 19.88
360 m sec Controls 8.0 8.77
AS 7.1 13.42
600 m sec Controls 2.7 7.97
AS 3.8 12.60
840 m sec Controls 4.9 5.66
AS 3.2 7.75
Table 34. The enhancing effect of arousal on T2 
identification. Data are the mean difference between 
the percentage of arousing and neutral T2s correctly 
identified, broken down by lag and group.
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Proportion of subjects showing no advantage for arousing T2s, or showing less 
advantage than SM
An alternative way to analyse these data is to ask what proportion of each group showed 
absolutely no advantage for arousing versus neutral T2 (i.e. their percentage of correct 
arousing T2 stimuli minus their percentage of correct neutral T2 stimuli was < 0, 
averaged across all T1-T2 lags). 5 of 17 AS subjects (29% of sample) fulfilled this 
criteria, compared to 1 of 17 controls (6% of sample), a difference which showed a trend 
towards significance: x2 = 33, p  = .08.
Using an almost identical paradigm to the one used here, Anderson and Phelps (2001) 
report that a patient with bilateral amygdala damage showed a 2% advantage for arousing 
versus neutral T2 stimuli at short T1-T2 lags (compared to 22.6% for controls). In the 
current study, 7 of 17 AS subjects (41% of sample) showed < 2% advantage for arousing 
versus neutral T2s, compared to 1 of 7 controls (6% of sample), a difference which is 
significant: x2 = 5.9,/? = .02.
Within the AS group, there were no significant differences in perceived arousal of the T2 
stimuli between those who showed no perceptual benefit for them (or less perceptual 
benefit than SM) compared to those who did show such an advantage (see tables 36 and 
37). Neither were there differences in IQ or severity of autistic symptoms between these 
groups.
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Effect of
arousal? Mean SD
More arousal effect
than SM (2%)? Mean SD
Self-reported YES 1.6 1.10 Self-reported YES 1.5 1.01
arousal arousal NOdifference NO 1.1 .79 difference 1.4 1.13
SCR difference YES .07 .07 SCR YES .06 .068difference NONO .12 .13 .13 .119
ADOS Total YES 11.3 4.46 ADOS Total YES 11.3 4.46
NO 11.5 3.00 NO 11.6 3.00
AQ YES 35.3 8.25 AQ YES 32.9 7.26
NO 34.2 11.43 NO 37.3 10.8
IQ YES
NO
112.7
113.4
12.85
18.11
IQ YES
NO
113.5
112.0
12.7
16.6
Table 36. Comparing those AS subjects who show no perceptual benefit for arousing T2s to those that do. There were no 
significant differences -  all t < .91, allp > .37
Table 37. Comparing those AS subjects who show less perceptual benefit for arousing T2 than SM to those who show 
more. Again, there were no significant differences -  all t < 1.4, all p > . 18
‘Self-reported arousal difference’ is the difference between how arousing the subjects rated the T2 arousing words compared to the T2 
neutral words. ‘SCR difference’ is the difference in mean SCR amplitude to these stimuli types.
Experiment 2
In experiment 1, AS subjects appeared to show reduced emotional modulation of the 
attentional blink at the earliest time lag (when attention was most stretched). However, 
rather than reflecting an impairment specifically in affective modulation of perception, 
this difference may be due to a disruption of a more global process, which effects any 
type of modulation of perceptual encoding. To investigate this possibility, I conducted a 
second experiment where the salience of the T2 stimuli was altered in terms of visual- 
perceptual, rather than emotional, attributes.
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Methods
Participants
The same subjects who took part in experiment 1 took part in experiment 2.
Attentional blink control experiment
The design and procedure was largely the same as experiment 1. However, on this 
occasion all T2 words were neutral in content and their salience was adjusted by altering 
their brightness. Higher salience T2s were jet black (R,G,B channels all 100%), which 
meant that they stood out clearly against the grey background and multi-coloured 
distractors. Lower salience T2s were dark grey (R,G,B channels all 75%), with the result 
that they stood out less clearly. Tl stimuli were mid-way between the two types of T2 in 
terms of brightness (R,G,B channels all 87.5%).
Results
Figure 29 summarises the results of the control attentional blink experiment. Again, these 
data were entered into an ANOVA, with lag and T2 salience as repeated measures 
variables and group as a between measures variable.
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Figure 29. Results o f the attentional blink control experiment.
As before, there were main effects o f  lag, 
F (3,96) = 59.8, p  < .001, and T2 salience, 
F (l,32 ) = 33.5, p  < .001, as well as a lag x 
salience interaction, F(3,96) =  2.7, p  =  .04. 
Although it is not clear in figure 29, this 
interaction again seems to be due to T2 
salience having a greater effect at shorter 
lags, when attention in most stretched (see 
table 38).
T1 - T2 Lag Mean (%) SD
120 msec 15.2 15.47
360 msec 10.8 17.41
600 msec 8.0 18.82
840 msec 5.5 11.54
Table 38. The perceptual benefit for high-salience 
T2s at different T1-T2 lags.
Data is the percentage difference between the number of 
high and low salience T2s correctly identified.
A significantly greater percentage of high salience T2s 
were correctly identified at each T1-T2 lag (all t > 2.8, all p  
< .02, Bonferroni-Holm corrected), but as the above table 
shows, this effect was greater at shorter lags.
There was no main effect o f  group, F (l,3 2 ) =  2.4, p  =  .13 and, importantly, no lag x 
salience, F (l,3 2 ) = .22, p  = .64, or lag x salience x group interaction, F(3,96) = .38,/? =
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.77. This suggests that the effect of manipulating T2 salience was the same for both 
groups at each lag.
Discussion
There was no evidence that AS subjects showed a general reduction in perceptual benefit 
for emotionally arousing stimuli compared to controls -  i.e. in experiment 1 there was no 
group x word type interaction. However, at the shortest T1-T2 lag, when attentional 
resources were most stretched, controls showed a much greater perceptual enhancement 
for arousing T2s than did AS subjects. In this regard the AS subjects are reminiscent of 
SM, whose reduced perceptual benefit for arousing words was most evident at the 
shortest T1-T2 lag (Anderson and Phelps, 2001). In addition, a greater proportion of AS 
subjects showed no, or little, perceptual advantage for arousing T2s: - 29% of AS 
subjects showed absolutely no advantage, while 41% showed less advantage than a 
patient with bilateral amygdala damage in a similar paradigm (Anderson and Phelps, 
2001). For controls, the figure was 6% in both cases.
Together, the data therefore offer partial support for the predictions made by the hypo- 
active amygdala model, suggesting that the efficacy of the amygdala’s perceptual 
enhancement system may be reduced in AS and in some subjects may be as ineffective as 
it is in those with bilateral amygdala lesion.
The hypo-active model cites a failure in the amygdala to perform its usual perception- 
enhancing role as a primary cause of the social-perceptual problems in the disorder (Klin 
et al., 2005;Schultz et al., 2000b). The fact that the AS subjects who showed the largest 
emotional modulation of the attentional blink tended to have the best fear recognition
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ability offers some support for this position. However, the correlation was only 
marginally significant and so should be interpreted with caution.
Control experiments showed that these differences could not be explained by differences 
in the perceived arousal level of the T2 stimuli, measured by both self-report and skin 
conductance. In addition, a control attentional blink experiment in which T2 salience was 
modulated visuo-perceptually rather than emotionally found no differences between the 
two groups. However, on this occasion neither group showed the large benefit for the 
high salience T2s during the shortest T1-T2 lag which was evident for the control group 
in experiment 1. This highlights the special effect of emotion for the control but not the 
AS subjects. In fact, the shape of the graph is very similar for the AS group in both 
experiment 1 and 2, perhaps indicating that the subjects treated the stimuli in much the 
same manner.
The finding of some, albeit limited, support for the hypo-active amygdala model, at least 
in some subjects, suggests the interesting possibility that both the hypo- and hyper-active 
amygdala models might be in operation but in different populations of AS individuals. 
Hirstein et al. (2001) proposed something similar when they found evidence of two 
distinct groups of autistic children: those who experienced hyper-arousal of the 
autonomic system (the majority) and those who experienced hypo-arousal. Unfortunately, 
there was very little cross-over between the AS subjects who took part in the attentional 
blink experiments and the group who took part in the earlier experiments: therefore it is 
not possible at this time to directly compare results from the two sets of experiments. The 
possible existence of two distinct groups of AS individuals is discussed in greater depth 
in the next chapter, where some suggestions are made for possible experiments to 
investigate the issue.
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One caveat is that T2 stimuli were emotional but they were not social. It is possible that 
the AS subjects would have shown less perceptual enhancement for strictly social stimuli 
(faces perhaps) than emotional words. However, with social stimuli the experiment may 
have been confounded by the subjects’ abnormal fixation patterns towards the stimuli. 
Also, using emotional words provided a stronger test of the neurological predictions 
made by the hypo-active model -  total failure of amygdala to modulate other brain areas 
in response to any salient stimuli. Still, it is possible that the amygdala’s failure to 
enhance perception is stimulus type dependent -  social stimuli may have an effect where 
generally emotional stimuli do not.
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Chapter 7 - General Discussion
Summary of findings
The amygdala has long been associated with emotional processing but recently theorists 
have suggested it may form an important component in a social cognitive module, 
subserving behaviour in response to conspecifics (Brothers, 1990). This thesis 
investigated the role of the amygdala in social cognition by examining variability in 
social-perceptual abilities in the normal population and via experiments with AS 
individuals, whose social cognitive impairments are thought of as a core component of 
their disorder (American Psychiatry Association, 1994).
As a theoretical background, these experiments were informed by models where the 
amygdala is seen as a ‘salience’ detector, functioning to enhance the perception of, or 
memory for, an emotionally or socially relevant event via modulation of other brain areas 
(Dolan, 2002;Sander et al., 2003). In the hypo-active amygdala model of ASD, failure in 
this system results in a lack of attention towards socially important stimuli (Grelotti et al., 
2002;Schultz et al., 2000b;Schultz, 2005). In the hyper-active amygdala model, stimuli 
are actively avoided to prevent aversive over-arousal (Dalton et al., 2005;Nacewicz et al., 
in press). In either case, failure to attend to social stimuli is thought to result in social 
cognitive impairment. This could happen both in real-time, simply through failing to spot 
the socially relevant aspects of the environment, and developmentally, because prolonged 
under-exposure to social stimuli is thought to result in under-development of social- 
perceptual areas, such as the FG and STS (Schultz, 2005).
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In my experiments with males from the normal population, I found that a significant 
minority had a marked deficit in their ability to recognise fearful expressions. This 
impairment was of a level akin to patients with bilateral amygdala damage (e.g. Calder et 
al., 1996). In addition, social cognitive deficits in the low fear scoring group (LFS) 
extended to encompass theory of mind abilities. Using fMRI, I found that LFS showed 
reduced activation of diffuse areas of the social brain, including the amygdala, in 
response to a socially relevant stimulus. There was also reduced functional connectivity, 
in LFS, between the amygdala and the anterior STG and MPfC -  areas known for their 
involvement in theory of mind processing. These data suggested provocative conclusions. 
Firstly, that variability in the functional capabilities of the amygdala and other areas of 
the social brain might underlie important individual differences in social cognitive skills 
within the healthy male population. Secondly, and more specifically, that failure of the 
amygdala to flag social stimuli as salient and to then modulate activity in other brain 
regions, where fine grained perception of these stimuli takes place, might be the 
mechanism by which differences in social cognitive ability arise.
However, eyetracking experiments showed that LFS do not fixate on the eyes as much as 
NFS. While this is reminiscent of patient SM (Adolphs et al., 2005), again suggesting 
altered amygdala function in LFS, it brings the interpretation of the fMRI results into 
question. Were the brains of the LFS and NFS participants reacting differently to the 
same visual input or were they looking at the stimuli differently, therefore receiving 
different visual input? More experiments are required to answer this question but a link 
between poor fear recognition and the amygdala in LFS remains a possibility.
I hypothesised that, since LFS had problems with social-perception in the laboratory, they 
may have difficulties in social interaction and communication in their day-to-day lives.
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However, LFS do not experience more autistic-like traits than the general population, as 
measured by the AQ (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001b), even when considering only those sub­
scales of the AQ that specifically ask about behaviour in social situations. LFS subjects 
do, however, rate themselves as more anxious, more neurotic and more socially phobic 
than NFS. This raises the possibility that anxiety, low eye fixation and poor fear 
recognition may be linked in LFS: affected individuals may find eyes aversive and so 
avoid them, echoing the hyper-active amygdala model of ASD. As discussed in chapter 3, 
this is only one of a number of possibilities for explaining the LFS findings and more 
research is required before definitive conclusions may be drawn. Some suggestions for 
future work were given in chapter 3 but will be discussed again in a later section of this 
chapter.
I began my experiments with AS subjects in the same way as I did for the normal 
population -  by examining fear recognition ability. I found evidence of an impairment in 
identifying fearful faces, which also existed for sad expressions. Whether such a deficit 
exists has been a controversial question in ASD research but, I argue in chapter 4, my 
data add to a growing consensus for a fear recognition impairment amongst adults with 
high-functioning autism or AS. However, there was a great deal of variability in the AS 
group: some subjects performed normally or better than average, while others were 
severely impaired. The cause of the fear recognition deficit and of its variable 
manifestation may lie in differences in the way AS subjects fixate faces. Like SM and 
LFS, I found that, as a group, subjects with AS spent less time fixating the eyes compared 
to age, gender and IQ matched controls and that there was a significant correlation 
between the percentage of fixations to the eyes and fear recognition score.
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I next investigated the possible cause for the reduced eye fixation in AS, taking direction 
from the hyper- and hypo-active amygdala models of ASD. I found that both high social 
anxiety and high autonomic responses to the eyes were associated with less time spent 
fixating eyes and poorer fear recognition. This was consistent with the theory that some 
AS subjects actively avoid eyes to prevent over-arousal. I linked this to the amygdala 
with a VBM study: grey matter volume in the left amygdala correlated with low social 
anxiety, low autonomic response to the eyes, more time spent fixating the eyes and high 
fear recognition. This replicated and extended work by Nacewicz et al. (in press), who 
suggest that smaller amygdala volumes in adult AS subjects who fixate the eyes the least 
are caused by a hyper-activity induced atrophy. As a whole, the findings presented in 
chapters 4 and 5 generally support the hyper-active amygdala model of ASD, whereby 
high allostatic load is thought to lead to both amygdala atrophy and avoidance of anxiety- 
inducing social stimuli, leading to an impairment in social cognition.
In my final study, I used the emotional modulation of the attentional blink to test the 
hypothesis, made by the hypo-active amygdala model, that the AS amygdala fails to 
enhance perception for emotionally salient events. I found that AS subjects did show a 
perceptual benefit for arousing stimuli in general, but that the size of this benefit was 
reduced compared to controls when attention was most stretched. In addition, a 
significantly greater number of AS than control subjects showed little or no perceptual 
benefit for the arousing events. This is consistent with a breakdown in the amygdala 
perception-enhancing system and provides partial support for the hypo-active amygdala 
model in at least a sub-set of AS subjects.
Together, these results provide support for a general route to social cognitive impairment, 
which has the failure to attend social stimuli as its basis. There may be a number of root
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causes for the inattention to social stimuli, but the hyper- and hypo-amygdala models of 
ASD provide two plausible, evidence based possibilities. In the remainder of this chapter, 
the details of this general route to social cognitive impairment and its implications for 
ASD and other disorders of social cognition will be discussed. Following this, some 
unanswered questions and ambiguities will be considered, as will be the limitations of the 
current work and the field in general. Finally, suggestions will be given for taking the 
project forward.
Implications and further discussion
A general ‘rou te’ to  social cognitive im pairm ent?
The major implication of my findings is that failure to attend to the socially relevant parts 
of the environment could be a common route19 to social cognitive or, at least, social 
perceptual deficits in a wide variety of populations (see figure 30). For example, in 
subjects with LFS, ASD and psychopathy (Dadds et al., in press) there is evidence of 
both social cognitive deficits, including poor fear recognition, and a failure to fixate the 
eyes.
I call this a ‘route’ because it is likely to be only one of a number of possible pathways to social cognitive impairment. Multiple 
routes could be in operation in the same individual or group of individuals and may interact, leading to profound and variable 
differences in social cognitive abilities in different psychiatric groups.
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Figure 30. Routes to social impairment with ‘inattention to social stimuli’ as their basis.
Social-
perceptual
deficits
Over time 
leads to...
^  Other toutes
Low IQ
Impairment in 
executive function
Weak central 
coherence
Deficits in social- 
cognitive skills such 
as ToM
Lack of ‘scaffolding’ 
necessary to 
understand non-verbal 
communication
Impairment in day 
to day social 
functioning
The same may be true of Turner’s syndrome, although the eyetracking experiments have 
yet to be completed.
One mechanism whereby inattention to socially relevant stimuli may exert its deleterious 
effect on social perception is via development. Some neurofunctional models of ASD 
propose that failure to orient to social stimuli, if it occurs early in life, can lead to under­
development of brain areas such as the FG and STS (Schultz et al., 2000b;Schultz, 2005). 
Since these areas are thought necessary for computations which provide the ‘scaffolding’ 
required to understand the barrage of non-verbal communications that occur during social 
interactions, under-development of these circuits could result in a wide-range of social- 
cognitive deficits (Schultz, 2005). As well as applying to ASD, it is possible that this 
model may explain some of the social cognitive deficits seen in other populations, such as 
LFS and Turner’s syndrome.
Alternatively, however, failure to attend stimuli such as the eyes could cause problems of 
social perception, such as poor fear recognition, in real-time alone. One could envisage, 
for example, an adult who has a fully developed FG and STS but who, perhaps because 
of amygdala damage, stops orienting towards socially relevant stimuli. Social perceptual 
deficits would ensue simply because the brain does not receive the necessary input, not 
because the brain is incapable of processing that input correctly if it does receive it. This 
is perhaps the case for SM, whose amygdala lesion appears to have led to a failure to 
fixate the eyes and a corresponding fear recognition deficit. However, when she is 
encouraged to look at the eyes her fear recognition score improves dramatically, 
suggesting that her brain is able to process the stimuli correctly if it receives the 
necessary visual input.
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In contrast, my AS subjects’ fear scores did not improve dramatically when they were 
made to look at the eyes, suggesting that they were not able to correctly process the 
stimuli even when directed towards it. This perhaps indicates that failure to attend the 
eyes has existed from early in life in these subjects, therefore supporting the 
developmental account advocated by the hyper- and hypo-active models. Consistent with 
this is the research showing that reduced orienting towards faces exists at a young age in 
children who are later diagnosed with an ASD (Osterling and Dawson, 1994).
In my LFS sample however, I have not yet investigated the change in fear scores when 
the subjects are instructed to fixate the eyes, so the situation is less clear. For the future it 
will be important, as it will be whenever the Mack of social attention’ route to social- 
cognitive impairment is suspected for a particular population, to ascertain to what extent 
their particular deficits are developmental in origin and to what extent they can be 
explained by inattention to social stimuli in real-time alone.
So far in this section I have discussed how failure to pay attention to socially relevant 
parts of the environment could be a common route to social cognitive impairment in 
various populations. What I have not yet discussed are the potential causes of this 
inattention. There may be many possibilities, but this thesis explicitly investigated two 
which other authors have suggested specifically for ASD. These were the hyper- and 
hypo-active amygdala models of ASD and they will be discussed in the next section
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The hyper- v e rsu s  the hypo-active am ygdala m odels of ASD and their 
possib le  role in o ther d iso rders of social cognition
These models offer two different possible causes of inattention to social stimuli in 
ASD. The hyper-active amygdala model suggests that affected individuals find social 
stimuli over-arousing and hence aversive. Such stimuli are therefore actively avoided. 
Neurofunctionally, this model predicts heightened amygdala responsiveness to relevant 
stimuli (so long as attention is directed towards those stimuli); neuroanatomically it 
predicts an initial outgrowth (in childhood) and later atrophy (in adulthood) of amygdala 
neurons (see Nacewicz et al. in press). The hyper-active model has its roots in the work 
of Ilutt and Ounsted (1969), but the major proponents of its modem incarnation are 
Richard Davidson, David Amaral and colleagues (Amaral and Corbett, 2002;Dalton et al., 
2005;Nacewicz et al., in press).
According to the hypo-active model, the amygdala in ASD fails to flag socially relevant 
stimuli as salient. The result is a lack of social interest; hence social stimuli are ignored 
rather than avoided. Neurofunctionally, this model predicts reduced amygdala 
responsiveness to relevant stimuli; neuroanatomically, no specific predictions are made. 
Conceptually, this kind of theory could be traced back to Kanner (1943), who suggested 
that reduced "affective contact’ was at the heart of autism. However, its most vocal 
supporters in recent years have been Bob Schultz and colleagues (Grelotti et al., 
2002;Schultz et al., 2000b;Schultz, 2005).
As a whole, the experiments in chapters 4 and 5 of this thesis supported predictions made 
from the hyper-active amygdala model: both high social anxiety and high autonomic 
response to eyes predicted low eye fixation and poor fear recognition ability. In addition,
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each of these variables was associated with smaller amygdala volume. There are some 
caveats, which will be discussed below, but the data suggest that a process along the lines 
of that outlined by the hyper-active model is indeed leading to social-perceptual 
impairment in some individuals with AS.
The first caveat is that only one of the autonomic measures (the number of SCRs made to 
eyes compared to mouths) predicted low eye fixation and poor fear recognition; the other 
(summed amplitude of SCRs to eyes compared to mouths) showed no correlation. A 
second issue is that the model specifically predicts heightened amygdala activity but a 
direct measure of this has not been taken. Finally, the attentional blink experiment 
presented in chapter 6 provides some, albeit limited, support for the hypo-active model, at 
least in some subjects. As discussed in detail in chapter 5, a crucial step in resolving these 
issues will be to conduct an experiment where amygdala activity is measured, by fMRI, 
while the direction of the subjects’ fixation (either to the eyes or the mouth) is carefully 
manipulated. Conducting this experiment is the vital next step in this programme of 
research (see ‘future directions’ section below).
The fact that there is some support for the hypo-active amygdala model, at least in some 
subjects, suggests the interesting possibility that both models may be operating but in 
different populations of AS individuals. At least two other groups have made a similar 
proposal before. For example, Hirstein et al. (2001) conducted experiments measuring 
SCR activity of autistic children while they looked at faces and during everyday 
behaviours and concluded that there are two types of autistic child: those who experience 
hyper-active sympathetic activity (the majority) and those who experience hypo-activity 
(a small percentage). Dalton et al. (2005) suggest a similar hypothesis when they found
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the majority of autistic subjects in their sample exhibited hyper-activity of the amygdala, 
while a small percentage showed hypo-activity compared to controls.
However, the Hirstein et al. (2001) study has a number of methodological problems, the 
case and control groups are wildly unmatched for example, and to my knowledge the 
study has not been replicated. Furthermore, Dalton et al. (2005) mention the possible 
existence of a hypo- and a hyper-active group only as an afterthought in their discussion - 
they do not formally present data on the issue. Therefore, these studies are far from 
definitive. Given the potential theoretical importance of the issue, repeating these studies 
in a more controlled and transparent manner should be a priority. A large scale study 
involving many subjects would be necessary to gain a true sense of the relative size of the 
hyper- and hypo-active groups, if both do indeed exist. SCRs and/or amygdala activity 
should be monitored at rest and in response to a number of controlled social and non­
social stimuli or events. Control groups should be carefully matched and care should be 
taken over potential confounds of SCR measurement, such as the time of day that the 
recordings are taken and the temperature of the room whilst this is being done (Dawson et 
al., 2000). As well as a ‘normal’ control group it will also be necessary to have groups 
that suffer from anxiety and social phobia, but not autism. This will allow an 
investigation of the extent to which autonomic peculiarities are independent of co-morbid 
anxiety in ASD.
A final caveat is that there are a number of AS individuals who showed no evidence of 
either model. For example, some subjects spent a normal amount of time fixating the eyes, 
had normal fear recognition ability, normal emotional modulation of the attentional blink, 
a normal autonomic response to eyes versus mouths and a normal amygdala volume -  yet 
these same subjects were severely impaired in terms of reciprocal social interaction and
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communication, according to the ADOS and AQ. There are at least two explanations for 
this:
1) the processes proposed by the two models (e.g. inattention to social stimuli etc) 
are not necessary to cause day to day social impairment in AS
2) the processes proposed by the two models are necessary and are causing day to 
day social impairment in these individuals but they are employing compensatory 
strategies, which mean that evidence for either model is not apparent using our 
laboratory tests
The first of these explanations is compatible with the idea that inattention to social 
stimuli is one of a number of possible routes to social cognitive impairment in ASD and 
other disorders. Other deficits in such things as executive function and central coherence 
may be involved in causing day to day social impairment in these individuals. It is also 
compatible with the idea of heterogeneity in ASD, with the possibility of there being 
multiple sub-types within the disorder (e.g. Hrdlicka et al., 2005;Klin et al., 2005;Verte et 
al., 2006b). To investigate explanation (1) it would be useful to gain a thorough profile of 
the individuals who show no evidence for either the hyper- or hypo-active amygdala 
models. This should include tests of executive function and weak central coherence as 
well as an attempt to characterise the nature of their day to day social impairment, with a 
view to comparing this to other individuals who do show evidence for one of the models.
Explanation (2) has some plausibility as some studies of face processing in ASD have 
shown that, while subjects may achieve a higher than expected result on a given task, 
they may be doing so in an atypical fashion (e.g. Pierce et al., 2001;Schultz et al., 2000a). 
This highlights the potential importance of focussing on the processes used by individuals 
when completing an experimental task, and not only on the results obtained (Volkmar et
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al., 2004). When it comes to fear recognition, it is possible that an individual may have 
constructed an alternative strategy to recognise the emotion. The Bubbles task (Gosselin 
and Schyns, 2001;Smith et al., 2005) would be an ideal method for investigating this. 
With regard to eye fixation, people with an ASD are often encouraged to fixate the eyes 
by parents, teachers etc. It is possible that some of the subjects with a high eye fixation 
percentage may be making an unnaturally conscious effort to fixate the eyes, resisting the 
urge to look away from them. Interviews or questionnaires may be a suitable method for 
investigating this. However, despite these possibilities, the existence of compensatory 
strategies could not explain all instances where some individuals do not fit either the 
hyper- or hypo-active model -  it is difficult to see how such strategies could affect the 
autonomic or neuroanatomical data, for example. It therefore seems likely that other 
routes to social cognitive impairment are in operation in some individuals. This makes it 
even more important to profile the individuals who show no evidence of the models and 
to examine other possible routes to social cognitive impairment in ASD.
So far in this section I have talked mainly about the hyper- and hypo-active models in 
terms of ASD. However, if inattention to social stimuli is a general route to social 
cognitive impairment, then processes similar to those proposed in the hyper- and hypo- 
active models might be the cause of social deficits in other populations, such as LFS, 
psychopathy or Turner’s syndrome (see figure 30). The heightened anxiety in LFS, for 
example, perhaps hints at a hyper-active type model, although of course much more work 
needs to be done to investigate this further. Similarly, there have been suggestions of 
increased anxiety and heightened amygdala and autonomic responsiveness in Turner’s 
syndrome (Keysor et al., 2002;Skuse et al., 2005), although these have not been linked 
specifically to social cognitive impairment. More work clearly needs to be done, but it
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would be interesting to see how lessons from ASD might be applied to other disorders of 
social cognition.
The hyper-active m odel -  unresolved issu es
As a whole, my data offers most support for the hyper-active amygdala model in ASD 
and hints at a similar mechanism in LFS. However, there are a number of ambiguities and 
unresolved issues with this theory, which will be discussed below.
Amygdala hyper-activity, anxiety and social cognitive impairment in ASD 
The nature of the relationship between amygdala hyper-activity, anxiety and social 
cognitive impairment under the hyper-active model requires elucidation. One problem is 
that the model supposes that anxiety results in avoidance of anxiety-inducing stimuli in 
ASD, whereas there is a large literature showing that anxious and socially anxious 
individuals from the normal population are hyper-vigilant for such stimuli. This was 
discussed at some length in chapter 5, where I suggested two possible explanations for 
the apparent discrepancy:
1) there may be an interaction between autistic symptoms and anxiety -  i.e. people 
with an ASD might react to and cope with their anxiousness in a different way to 
non-ASD individuals. Consistent with this is the suggestion by Pfeiffer et al. 
(2005) that anxiety produces ‘sensory defensiveness’ in ASD, rather than hyper­
vigilance
2) the discrepancy may be explained by the actual levels of anxiety / social anxiety 
involved in the different studies. The levels experienced by my AS sample were 
generally higher than the ‘high anxiety’ groups used in the studies of the normal
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population, and the ‘low anxiety’ groups in these studies were considerably less 
anxious than my normal control group. I suggested that the relationship between 
anxiety and vigilance towards social stimuli might follow an inverted U shape, 
where medium-high anxiety corresponds to hyper-vigilance but very high or low 
anxiety corresponds to hypo-vigilance.
It will be important to investigate these possibilities in order to refine the hyper-active 
amygdala model.
Another unresolved issue, which is potentially a deeper problem for the hyper-active 
model, concerns the causes of anxiety / social anxiety and amygdala hyper-activity in 
ASD. For example, to what extent is social anxiety in ASD a ‘normal’ reaction to peer 
isolation / bullying as a result of impairment in social interaction? Under this scheme the 
direction of causality might be as follows: poor social functioning causes anxiety which 
causes hyper-activity in the amygdala. Turning this on its head, to what extent is anxiety 
or social anxiety caused by hyper-arousal which has neuropathology as its origin? Under 
this scheme, pathology in the amygdala causes amygdala hyper-activity and autonomic 
hyper-arousal which leads to anxiety. It may also be the case that elements of both 
schemes are operating, and interacting, within the same individual. For example, 
amygdala pathology may pre-dispose an individual to hyper-responsiveness to anxiety- 
inducing stimuli. As well as causing some social problems by itself, this initial hyper­
activity may be reinforced by social isolation resulting from autistic symptoms of 
independent origin. The now heightened arousal / anxiety levels could then lead to further 
problems with social interaction, which causes more social isolation and therefore greater 
arousal / anxiety, and so on in a positive feedback loop.
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Although the preceding discussion is highly speculative, it highlights gaps in the hyper­
active model which need to be answered if the model is to provide a satisfying 
description of the relationship between amygdala hyper-activity, anxiety and social 
cognitive impairment in ASD.
Pre-disposition to amygdala hyper-activity and anxiety in ASD 
If there is a pre-disposition to amygdala hyper-activity and/or anxiety in ASD, it would 
be interesting to explore its origin. One intriguing possibility is that it is related to the 
serotonin transporter (5-HTT) polymorphism. The short (s) allele of the 5-HTT gene has 
reduced transcriptional efficiency compared to the long (/) allele (Murphy et al., 2004). In 
members of the general population, the s allele has been associated with increased 
anxiety-related personality traits (Schinka et al., 2004;Sen et al., 2004), increased 
autonomic response to stress (Williams et al., 2001b), increased amygdala reactivity to 
emotionally salient stimuli (Bertolino et al., 2005;Hariri et al., 2005) and smaller 
amygdala volumes (Pezawas et al., 2005). In children, possession of two copies of the s 
allele is associated with increased shyness, a precursor to social anxiety (Battaglia et al., 
2005), and in socially anxious adults, the s allele is associated with increased symptom 
severity and heightened amygdala excitability (Furmark et al., 2004). In addition, there is 
some evidence that the s allele is over-transmitted in ASD (Devlin et al., 2005). Together, 
these results suggest that possession of an 5 allele may pre-dispose individuals with an 
ASD to several aspects of the hyper-active model: namely, social anxiety, heightened 
autonomic and amygdala activity and decreased amygdala volume. Genotyping of my AS 
subjects for the 5-HTT polymorphism is currently underway, but unfortunately was not 
completed in time for inclusion in this thesis.
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An alternative hyper-active amygdala model?
The current hyper-active amygdala model, expounded by Davidson and colleagues 
(Dalton et al., 2005;Nacewicz et al. in press), assumes that amygdala hyper-activity and 
autonomic over-arousal comes in response to (social) stimuli. Therefore, by avoiding the 
stimuli in question, an individual can prevent experiencing aversive over-arousal. 
However, there may be an alternative scheme where the amygdala and autonomic system 
are constantly hyper-active. If this were the case then it would be difficult to discern a 
signal indicating the presence of a significant stimulus over the background noise: 
salience signals from the amygdala would be essentially meaningless and may come to be 
ignored by the rest of the brain. In effect, the amygdala would fail to flag the relevant 
stimuli as significant and to modulate processing in other brain regions accordingly. This 
is exactly the same pathway to social cognitive impairment proposed by the hypo-active 
amygdala model (Schultz et al., 2000b;Schultz, 2005), albeit by a different aetiology. In 
other words, this ‘alternative hyper-active mode’ may be able to merge aspects of both 
the hypo- and hyper-active models into a single entity.
Support for this alternative theory in the literature is limited, but Hirstein et al. (2001) 
propose a similar model to explain what they termed “type A” autistic children. These 
children showed generally higher autonomic responses to a wide-range of stimuli 
compared to normal controls, but their SCR responses, although large, did not 
discriminate between a face and a paper cup. As discussed earlier, Hirstein et al.’s (2001) 
work has a number of methodological problems and has not been repeated, but it does 
highlight the possibility of an alternative hyper-active model.
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This alternative hyper-active model could potentially explain a number of the findings in 
this thesis -  for example the attentional blink results presented in chapter 6 and the higher 
rates of anxiety in ASD presented in chapter 5. It may also explain the correlation 
between higher social anxiety and reduced eye fixation and fear score -  individuals with 
the highest hyper-activity would have the highest anxiety and also the most acute failure 
to signal social stimuli as significant. Amygdala atrophy to allostatic load could also 
apply equally to both hyper-active models. What the alternative model is unable to 
explain is the finding of a higher autonomic response to eyes versus mouths in my AS 
sample and the correlation between the size of this difference and low eye fixation, poor 
fear recognition and smaller amygdala volume. It will be remembered though that I found 
this correlation with one type of autonomic measurement but not the other. Therefore, 
differentiating between the two alternative hyper-active models is yet another reason why 
it is imperative to conduct an experiment measuring the amygdala activity and autonomic 
responses of a large sample of ASD individuals to a wide variety of social and non-social 
stimuli in a well controlled manner.
Lack of associa tion  with autistic sym ptom s
In AS, neither fear recognition ability, the percentage of fixations made to the eyes, 
anxiety level or magnitude of amygdala atrophy correlated with the severity of autistic 
symptoms, as measured by either the AQ or the ADOS. This obviously presents a 
problem for the model communicated in the preceding pages: if a failure to attend to 
social stimuli, poor fear recognition etc are supposed to be indicative of social cognitive 
impairment then one would expect this to be reflected in ADOS or AQ scores or, at least, 
in those sub-scales of these instruments which measure problems with reciprocal social 
interaction and communication.
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A potential explanation may lie with the instruments themselves. The AQ is a self-report 
measure and some subjects may lack full insight into their condition (indeed, it may be 
the worst affected cases that most lack insight). The output from the ADOS is somewhat 
categorical and it could be argued that it is not able to discriminate between subtle 
differences in social impairment. Arguing against this though is the fact that there was a 
large spread in ADOS scores from mildly to severely affected. Still, a measure such as 
the ADI-R or 3-DI may have yielded more promising results: Nacewicz et al. (in press) 
found that both failure to fixate eyes and amygdala atrophy were associated with higher 
scores on the ADI-R. However, their sample consisted of low functioning autistic 
subjects. Perhaps for high functioning AS subjects more sophisticated tools are required 
that, rather than looking for autistic symptoms per se, measure subtle impairments in
social interaction. An appropriate tool might monitor behaviour in a (staged) naturalistic,
20complex social interaction, for example . If such tools exist I am not aware of them but it 
seems that they would be a useful addition for social cognitive research.
However, it is perhaps more likely that there is nothing at fault with the sensitivity of the 
ADOS or AQ. Rather, inattention to socially relevant stimuli, and the social-perceptual 
deficits that ensue, may simply not be sufficient to cause problems in day to day 
interaction and communication. There may exist a multitude of compensatory strategies 
that allow for appropriate interaction in spite of problems with social perception. In 
addition, as well as social cognitive deficits, individuals with an ASD are known to have 
difficulties with executive function (Pennington and Ozonoff, 1996) and with integrating 
details into meaningful wholes ('weak central coherence', Happe and Frith, 1996). These 
deficits may reduce the ability to compensate for social perceptual problems. In this
20 The ADOS has an element of staged social interaction but it is of a rather simple nature.
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framework, social-perceptual, executive and central coherence deficits interact such that 
‘multiple insults’ are required to produce the profound difficulties in social interaction 
often seen in ASD. To predict the severity of autistic symptoms in ASD, measures of all 
three factors may be required. In other populations where social perception problems 
exist (LFS individuals for example) the lack of any accompanying impairment in 
executive or central coherence functions may allow the full scope of compensatory 
strategies to operate, preventing the emergence of measurable autistic-like deficits in 
social interaction and communication.
However, LFS did show deficits on a theory of mind task, indicating that their 
impairments do not stop at basic social-perception but dig deeper into social cognition, 
even if they do not permeate strongly into day to day interaction. Clearly, the true scope 
of social cognitive impairment in LFS both in terms of laboratory based tests and 
everyday functioning needs to be examined in greater depth. Similarly, with ASD the 
mapping of laboratory demonstratable social-perceptual / social-cognitive impairment 
onto real world social ability, perhaps via interaction with other core autistic deficits such 
as executive function, should be a priority. Information of this kind could have important 
consequences for treatment of social difficulties in this population.
Future directions
Throughout this and earlier chapters I have suggested a number of experiments which 
would usefully carry the project forward. I will recap on the most important here before 
making some new suggestions for potentially useful experiments.
1) The most vital experiment would be one that makes a proper assessment of amygdala 
and autonomic reactivity in ASD in response to a variety of social and non-social
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stimuli. There have obviously been experiments measuring, for example, amygdala 
activity to faces in ASD, but none of these have carefully controlled and manipulated 
the direction of the subjects’ attention: as I have shown in this thesis and others have 
commented before me (e.g. Dalton et al., 2005), this is absolutely essential, because 
ASD subjects may be avoiding or missing the most emotionally salient parts of the 
stimulus (Dalton et al., 2005;Klin et al., 2002;Pelphrey et al., 2002). This experiment 
would help discriminate between the two models of amygdala involvement in ASD, 
which have been discussed at length in this thesis (the hyper- and the hypo-active 
models), and would help investigate the possibility of an alternative hyper-active 
model, which I suggested earlier in this chapter. Large samples should be used 
because of the possibility that more than one of the models is in operation, but in 
different populations of ASD (Hirstein et al., 2001). As well as an age- and gender- 
matched control group, ASD subjects should also be compared to groups of anxious 
and socially anxious individuals. This would allow an investigation of the extent to 
which abnormalities in amygdala and/or autonomic reactivity in ASD are primary to 
the condition, rather than secondary, as a result of co-morbid anxiety. To be done 
properly, this experiment would be demanding, especially in terms of making sure 
that all subjects attend to the stimuli in the same way, but, in my opinion, it could 
prove extremely beneficial in terms of understanding the role of the amygdala in ASD.
2) It would be useful to conduct a similar experiment with LFS and NFS males from the 
general population, especially measuring amygdala activity to faces while 
manipulating where on the stimulus the subjects are fixating (i.e. the eyes or the 
mouth). This would help in discerning the causes for reduced eye fixation in LFS: 
could it be along the same lines as those suggested for ASD, i.e. is eye fixation 
associated with hyper- or hypo-active activation of the amygdala compared to
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controls? Or, is there no difference in amygdala reactivity between LFS and NFS, 
suggesting that reduced eye fixation is caused by a factor not related to emotional 
salience or the amygdala? This experiment would also help clarify the fMRI results 
presented in chapter 3: do LFS and NFS brains react differently to the same visual 
input or do LFS individuals fixate the stimuli differently, therefore receiving different 
visual input than NFS?
3) To gain a broader picture of emotion recognition in general and fear recognition in 
particular amongst LFS and AS subjects, it would be interesting to compare the 
cognitive strategies used by these individuals to normal controls when completing the 
Ekman-Friesen test of facial affect. This would be especially illuminating for those 
AS subjects who spend very little time fixating the eyes yet still correctly identify a 
high proportion of fearful faces (see chapter 4, page 160). The Bubbles task would be 
a good method for doing this, as it would provide a summary of the information used 
by each individual to identify the different emotions (Smith et al., 2005). Specific 
hypotheses about a varying reliance on the eyes for different subject groups could be 
investigated by digitally removing these features from the faces and measuring the 
change in fear recognition. For example, one might predict that those AS subjects 
with a high fear score despite low eye fixation would show no detriment in fear 
recognition but that other AS subjects, who normally fixate the eyes a lot, would 
show lower scores with the eyes removed. These methods should generate some 
hypotheses regarding the different kinds of cognitive strategies being employed in the 
Ekman-Friesen task. These could then be confirmed by a new analysis of the 
eyetracking data already taken as part of the experiments presented in chapters 3 and
4.
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4) The hyper- and hypo-active amygdala models of ASD provide neurodevelopmental 
accounts of the disorder. Therefore, the degree to which they can be investigated by 
cross-sectional study is limited. Longitudinal studies will be required, looking, for 
example, at the volume of the amygdala as age progresses.
5) As discussed in the last section and in chapter 5, the fact that high social anxiety in 
members of the general population has been associated with hyper-vigilance of social 
stimuli and high fear recognition offers a challenge to the hyper-active model. I 
suggested that the apparent discrepancy might be explained by different coping styles 
in AS or by an inverted ‘U’ relationship between vigilance and social anxiety (e.g. see 
chapter 5, page 184). Investigating these possibilities will be an important step 
towards refining the hyper-active model.
6) Again, as discussed in the last section, fear recognition and associated variables such 
as failure to fixate the eyes did not predict the level of an individual’s impairment in 
reciprocal social interaction and communication, as measured by the ADOS and AQ. 
It will be important for the theoretical understanding of ASDs to investigate how 
social-perceptual and social-cognitive deficits map on to day to day difficulties with 
social cognitive impairment. This may require novel methods for assessing real world 
social functioning that perhaps attempt to mimic the complexity of a genuine social 
situation.
The suggestions above are a selection of some of the possible future directions that I have 
already discussed earlier in this thesis. In the following section I will discuss some ideas 
for future experiments which I have not considered previously.
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I have shown that reduced fixation of the eye region is associated with poor fear 
recognition in AS and LFS. It would also be interesting to see if the amount of time spent 
fixating eyes correlates with ability on other tasks thought to require the processing of 
information from this region of the face -  Baron-Cohen’s ‘reading the mind from the 
eyes’ task (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001a) would be one such example. Another example 
might be the ability to differentiate between Duchenne (true enjoyment) and non- 
Duchenne (faked/social) smiles. Duchenne smiles are distinguished by contraction of the 
orbicularis oculi muscles, which produces characteristic ‘crow’s feet’ wrinkling around 
the eyes (Duchenne de Boulogne, 1862/1990;Ekman et al., 1990). Normal subjects are 
known to spend a prolonged time fixating the wrinkling around the eyes when viewing 
smiling compared to neutral facial expressions (Williams et al., 2001a). Both LFS and 
low-eye-fixating AS subjects correctly identify almost 100% of happy expressions (see 
chapters 3 and 4) but it would be interesting to see if they have more difficulty 
distinguishing Duchenne from non-Duchenne smiles and if this could be associated with 
a failure to fixate the eye area.
Limitations
There are a number of limitations to the methodology used in this thesis which are worthy 
of further consideration. Often, these reflect limitations which are common in the fields 
of social cognitive neuroscience and AS research. One area of difficulty concerns the 
recruitment of AS subjects. It is often difficult to find suitable adult participants and 
many research groups rely on adverts in AS related publications or on volunteers from 
AS social groups, as I have done. There is instant selection bias here in that one is only 
accessing those individuals who choose to read the relevant publications or decide to 
attend the social groups. However, a more important source of selection bias might be
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that those who choose to take part in studies may have different characteristics than those 
who do not -  one might hypothesise that those who do take part may be more socially 
able, for example. I do not have any formal data on this, but in the course of subject 
recruitment I visited a number of AS social groups to meet potential participants. 
Typically, only -20% of those present volunteered to take part in my studies and it 
seemed to me that these were often some of the least socially impaired individuals. 
Added to this is the fact that my experiments required travelling to a busy area of central 
London. I can recall a number of subjects who were happy to be visited in their homes 
but were put off by the thought of this journey -  again, it seemed that it was the least 
impaired who were willing to make the journey. Of course, much of the above is 
anecdotal and some formal measurement of these potential biases is required, but it 
would be difficult to assert that my AS group represented a random sample of the 
population, making it difficult to infer strong conclusions about the condition as a whole.
Another potential source of bias is the heterogeneity within AS and the broader ASD 
phenotype, both in terms of the severity of impairment in differing areas of the ‘triad’ 
(Wing and Gould, 1979) and, potentially, in the aetiology and pathology relating to these 
impairments. The problem is compounded by the typically small sample sizes used in 
studies of ASD and by the different ways in which diagnosis can be confirmed. It seems 
likely that one sample of AS subjects may be very different from another. It is difficult to 
see how this problem can be resolved before a deeper understanding of the nature of the 
heterogeneity has been reached, which is perhaps why several groups are making it a 
focus of their research (e.g. Hrdlicka et al., 2005;Klin et al., 2005;Verte et al., 
2006b;Verte et al., 2006a).
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Finally, due to the nature of the topic under study, the research presented here has been 
correlational rather than experimental. Along with case studies, correlational research is 
common (and often unavoidable) when the aim is to study a particular disorder. With this 
kind of data it is, of course, not possible to conclusively prove causality and it should 
therefore by remembered that conclusions should be somewhat tentative and reference to 
theory and converging evidence is of particular importance.
Concluding remarks
As with many research studies, this project has raised far more questions than it is able to 
answer, and limitations in design, time and the availability of research participants have 
restricted the scope of its conclusions. Nevertheless, the project has shown the potential 
benefit of using theoretical accounts to inform research into the involvement of the 
amygdala in social cognition and has been able to suggest several avenues for exploring 
this further. It is hoped that these will prove fruitful areas of research in the near future.
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